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Abstract
The private health care market in the United Kingdom is a multi-billion pound industry 
whose dynamics remain largely unexamined. This is so even though the boundaries 
between the public and private sectors are becoming increasingly blurred, particularly in 
England. Given the growing importance of this sector, the policy community needs to 
know more about the nature of private health care in the UK, how well the private market 
operates and how successful have been the various attempts within it to improve value for 
money and health care quality, given that private health care has traditionally been seen 
by many citizens as unaffordable.
In particular this thesis traces recent efforts by the British United Provident Association 
(Bupa) to reshape the UK private healthcare market. The account provided draws on the 
author’s experience as a senior Bupa manager involved in planning and implementing 
such changes. The thesis describes a series of Bupa initiatives designed to change 
provider behaviour in pursuit of improved quality and value-for-money, and the 
difficulties and obstacles encountered. The latter often centred on tensions or 
confrontation between the insurer and professional providers that are discussed in relation 
to the wider literature on the social and economic organisation of health care markets.
An attempt has been made to draw some general conclusions via an empirical study of 
the role and limitations of market-based changes within the UK private sector. The 
broad conclusion is that the private market in the UK exemplifies those features of health 
care seen throughout the developed world that create imperfect market conditions. As 
such the market is highly resistant to insurer initiatives that would reverse the 
longstanding trend for premiums to rise above the rate of inflation. It is considered 
unlikely given the current market structure that any insurer, including Bupa, can escape 
these constraints in the short term. However, Bupa has implemented some successful 
initiatives that suggest that longer-term incremental change is possible.
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A study of the dynamics of the private healthcare market in the 
United Kingdom with particular reference to the impact of 
British United Provident Association (Bupa) provider and benefit 
initiatives
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Thesis Outline
This thesis sets out to examine the dynamics of the private health care market in the United 
Kingdom. In doing so it discusses a number of initiatives undertaken within that market by 
British United Provident Association (Bupa) that had the express purpose o f delivering price 
or quality improvements. This thesis is primarily an empirical study with the central aim of 
exploring how the UK private health market currently works, what forces drive it and how 
these translate into particular market features. Throughout, the recent experiences o f the 
dominant UK insurer (Bupa) are traced via an examination of its various attempts to shape, or 
react to, the market over the last decade.
The theoretical background to this thesis is set both by the general characteristics o f demand 
for healthcare and the nature o f healthcare provision in the developed world. More 
specifically there are particular features of the demand for private healthcare, private medical 
insurance and provider delivery that are set out in the ensuing chapters. There is a particular 
aim of assessing how effective market-based initiatives which aim to deliver lower 
prices/higher quality in the UK private sector have been.
Such a study requires both breadth - with an overview of approaches and experience that are 
at times necessarily international, so as to give sufficient context - and detailed case studies. 
The latter are provided using examples from Bupa’s UK health insurance arm - United 
Kingdom Membership (hereafter called UKM for ease o f reference).
The various case studies highlight a number o f health policy issues that surface as recurring 
themes for investigation in health care studies.
1
(i) The degree to which transactional relationships represent the most appropriate way of 
achieving desired changes in provider behaviour;
(ii) The nature o f the doctor/patient relationship in private healthcare and how that 
relationship impacted upon insurer/purchaser initiatives to change care delivery;
(iii) The role and impact o f information asymmetry;
(iv) The role and impact o f professional power;
(v) The theory o f countervailing powers between commissioners and providers
The case studies shed light on the characteristics of private healthcare in the UK and 
hopefully contribute new insights affecting a number of the areas above. They provide an
empirical reference point which helps us to assess the applicability o f theories from the wider
health policy literature to the specifics o f UK private healthcare. Private healthcare in the UK 
has been the subject o f relatively little research, although the general literature on the above 
subjects is quite extensive. This thesis sets out to describe the current dynamics o f the UK 
private healthcare market, its particular characteristics and how these are both shaping and 
limiting market based initiatives. It pays special attention to the impact of current funding and 
payment arrangements on patient, insurer and provider behaviour, as revealed in the 
initiatives described in the case studies. This allows an element o f empirical testing o f the 
various theories o f provider, patient and payer behaviours set out in the earlier chapters, at 
least in terms o f their general plausibility as theories that are more or less consistent with 
observed events.
Methodology
The UK private sector, and the working practices of the companies that make it up, are not 
easy topics to research. Unlike the public sector in the UK, there is limited published material 
to draw upon. This is in part a reflection o f a more fundamental obstacle; the reluctance of 
insurers and private providers to expose themselves to potentially critical scrutiny, primarily 
because o f the possible commercial ramifications o f any negative reports. From the 
perspective o f the organisations in question this position is unsurprising. Generally speaking, 
the risks o f research typically outweigh the perceived benefits.
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This renders very difficult many o f the traditional lines o f academic research. Structured 
interviews and questionnaires are unlikely to elicit much in the way o f meaningful results 
because firstly, the organisations concerned are unlikely to agree to such enquiries and 
secondly, even if they did, commercial considerations (and the associated need for 
confidentiality) limit the value o f the answers provided. In a similar way, recourse to 
published documents will only provide a partial picture. Commercial enterprises rarely make 
public statements about either their intentions or internal/market weaknesses that might aid 
potential competitors. To a lesser degree the same applies to access to internal documents as 
commercial organisations are acutely aware that such papers may end up in the hands o f 
competitors. In this regard the author notes that it was one of the distinguishing features of 
Bupa compared to the NHS that the company’s strategy was essentially conveyed verbally. 
There was no ‘strategy document’ as such (or if there was it was restricted to a level above 
his pay grade), as would be a routine feature of NHS organisations.
It might be argued that this problem can be overcome by giving assurances that the research 
in question would have a bar on access when finally published. This may well assist the 
researcher to gain better access and more revealing answers to questions, but arguably the 
central problem remains. The commercial entities involved would in all probability view 
research in terms o f commercial risks versus benefits, and conclude the primary goal is to 
increase shareholder value rather than assist researchers in the pursuit o f knowledge 
(compare, Bakan 2004). In organisations that are heavily ‘brand’ driven, such as Bupa, this 
view is likely to be even more pronounced, as any publicity (negative or positive) is 
considered likely to affect customer and investor perceptions.
Does the fact that Bupa does not have shareholders and reinvests its profits into the business 
undermine the above point? The bonus system for managers in operation at Bupa UKM 
(which the author participated in from February 2002 to February 2006) closely resembled 
the incentive schemes from more overtly commercial companies. Around 70% of the bonus 
was dependent on UKM and the wider Bupa Group meeting profit targets, with 
approximately 20% based on UKM specific objectives around customer growth and the 
remaining percentage on customer and consultant satisfaction scores. As a result commercial 
considerations remain a central managerial preoccupation.
3
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A doctoral thesis requires the author to demonstrate that he or she has made an original 
contribution to knowledge. In the present context, this required the author to undertake an 
original investigation, as opposed to a review o f what is already written about private 
healthcare in the UK. With regard to the latter there was relatively little in the way of 
published material to draw upon in any case. This basic problem became even more 
pronounced when considering the action o f a particular company within the market. These 
restrictions dictated the approach taken for the thesis. This was to gather data on the structure 
o f the market and the behaviour o f market actors by concentrating on the events surrounding 
a series o f known Bupa initiatives, which were reported in the general and ‘trade’ press.
Close examination and interpretation of these events was made possible by the author’s own 
role in the organisation at that time.
The author has been fortunate to occupy relatively senior managerial positions in both the 
NHS and in the private sector. He was Head o f Policy, Quality and Provider Relations within 
Bupa’s UK Insurance Division between February 2002 and February 2006. The author 
worked within UKM’s Health Care Partnerships (HCP) department - the part o f UKM 
charged with shaping and conducting contractual negotiations with hospitals, consultants and 
other health professionals. This afforded the author considerable exposure with regard to the 
core o f this thesis -  how the private market works in the UK, and what dynamics underlie it.
This approach might be considered partly ethnographic in nature, in that the research 
undertaken had elements o f fieldwork within it. For a number o f Bupa case studies the author 
was either leading the initiative in question -  or heavily involved in its design/ 
implementation. In the author’s opinion, it would have been difficult to present the case 
studies in the correct context without the insights provided from working within the 
Association, and the exposure that provided both to key decision makers and the prevailing 
managerial culture. Within the NHS two books by Brian Edwards (Edwards, 1995; Edwards 
and Fall, 2005) have utilised approaches similar to that o f the author by drawing on 
experiences gained as a senior manager to interpret the events described. In similar vein,
John Spiers relied on managerial experience to write a book subtitled ‘An Insider’s 
Commentary on the NHS Reforms’ (Spiers, 1995).
However, the ethnographic component has been strictly curtailed because a conventional 
presentation describing interactions and events in ‘blow by blow’ detail would, in the
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author’s opinion have given rise to major problems with ethical, commercial and possibly 
legal dimensions.
Although Bupa senior managers were aware that the author was conducting a doctoral project 
on financing and reimbursement mechanisms in healthcare and how these affected cost 
containment and quality improvement, most colleagues would not have known that material 
from ongoing work interactions might appear in a study, and use of this kind o f information 
would have posed troubling issues o f informed consent. It is always difficult to draw the line 
on the permissibly level o f disclosure and consent in research in organisational settings. It is 
not so much that there are covert versus overt studies but that there exists a ‘continuum with 
different degrees o f openness’ (Brewer, 2000 p.84). Many apparently open studies gloss 
over covert practices (Calvey, 2008; McKenzie, 2009). The author preferred to steer away as 
much as possible from use o f data that might be seen to betray individual confidences or 
reveal the content o f meetings which colleagues believed to be confidential.
Moreover, more than mere disloyalty to colleagues might be involved if the author had 
attempted an ethnographic presentation that ‘told all’ about Bupa’s internal operations. There 
were real issues o f commercial confidentiality where information on the detail o f Bupa’s 
perspectives and strategies in respect of particular issues might be of benefit to other players 
in the market place. The author had a good relationship with colleagues at Bupa and was 
grateful for the support provided to begin this study. He left on good terms and had no desire 
to damage the Association. It must also be admitted that any actual damage to Bupa might 
have highly negative consequences for the author himself, both in terms o f the destruction of 
personal relationships and in the extreme the possibility o f litigation (Mello Studdert and 
Brennan, 2003).
The above gave rise to a difficult dilemma. The author felt that much of what he had 
observed would provide valuable insights on the working o f the UK private medical 
insurance (PMI) market that would be of interest to policy analysts generally and indeed to 
policy makers in organisations like Bupa. Yet the strongest data at the author’s disposal -  his 
direct observation o f several initiatives relevant to the thesis topic - could not be reported in 
detail without raising the major problems described above.
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The imperfect solution adopted has been to try to strike a balance between fair use o f the 
insights gained as a result o f the author’s insider role and ensuring that appropriate 
commercial confidentiality is maintained. What is offered is a study describing a series o f key 
Bupa initiatives, in which the ethnography remains in the background, but is used to help 
interpret information about events that is already in the public domain.
In line with the above, the thesis does not attempt to reconstruct the content o f meetings or to 
quote what individuals at Bupa may have said behind closed doors. In his four years at Bupa, 
the author sat through many discussions on the state of the market, the relative strength of 
parties engaged in contractual negotiations, the profitability or otherwise of certain products 
and so on, but using this material would raise the issues o f informed consent, trust and 
commercial confidentiality already mentioned. Consequently quotations from individuals at 
Bupa (or other figures within private healthcare sector) are included only when they are 
available from conference presentations, media reports, published articles, letters, and press 
releases which were all in the public domain. In any case, the thesis is less concerned with 
Bupa’s internal operations and self perceptions, than with the company’s interaction with the 
market. The principal question under consideration is not how Bupa operated per se, but 
rather what an examination o f how the company interacted with its customers and providers 
in the UK’s private healthcare system might tell us about the dynamics o f that market?
Overall it is more accurate to characterise the present study as a study o f a sensitive subject 
(Brannen,1988; Lee and Renzitti, 1990; Renzetti and Lee 1993; Lee, 1993;) than a covert 
study. Seiber and Stanley (1988, p. 49) write that ‘socially sensitive research refers to studies 
in which there are potential social consequences or implications, either directly for the 
participants in the research or for the class o f people represented by the research.’ This 
includes potential consequences for the organisation and researcher. While much o f the 
published literature highlights that such studies can have psychological or emotional 
consequences for subjects and researcher,(Johnson and Clarke, 2003. Dickson-Swift et al., 
2008; 2009) the present study shows that in the organisational domain, hard-nosed 
commercial and legal considerations also enter the picture. As stated above commercial 
confidentiality was a paramount preoccupation, and this is quintessential^ a study where the 
dissemination o f observational research data in raw form would involve a substantial threat to 
the researched and the researcher. The study also conforms to a pattern, described by 
Dickson-Swift and associates (2006) as common in research on sensitive topics, where there
6
Iis a blurring o f boundaries between the group under study and the researcher, in the present 
case because much o f the analysis relies on an insider perspective.
Because many sensitive subjects raise problems o f access and ethics, non-standard 
approaches to study design are often utilised. In many instances such studies provide an 
imperfect glimpse into the life o f a social group or organisational domain about which no 
research reports would otherwise exist. For that reason studies that make methodological 
compromises or are undertaken on a smaller scale than is ideally desirable nevertheless serve 
a useful role (Hughes, 2004). The present study uses such an unconventional approach and 
the observational component is necessarily truncated, in a way that clearly would be 
undesirable in normal circumstances. But these compromises, which the author considered 
necessary to complete an academic research project within a commercial environment, do 
make it possible to shine a light into an area o f business practice which has not been reported 
elsewhere. In the author’s view an approach dictated by circumstances, does nevertheless 
deliver an account o f the operation o f UK private health care that will be of interest to policy 
makers and policy scholars.
The author has had to consider the possibility that his own biases and beliefs have influenced 
the reporting and analysis o f the events described, which is a potential weakness of 
observational studies (Le Compte and Goetz, 1982; Rohner, Dewalt and Ness, 1973). Two 
possible biases need to be declared by the author. The first relates to the author’s historical 
support for market mechanisms being used in certain areas of healthcare funding and 
provision (Royce, 1995; 1997). The second relates to his personal involvement in some of the 
Bupa initiatives described. The author believed at the time that these initiatives had a real 
potential to improve the quality o f patient care and/or control costs and hence had some 
emotional attachment to those schemes -  especially some of those deemed ultimately 
unsuccessful.
To help counter the above biases, the author has tried to assemble multiple sources of 
evidence concerning the Bupa market initiatives discussed, so that a more complete picture 
can be drawn o f the nature o f each particular initiative and the reactions to it. Extensive use is 
made of written documents and accounts from third parties with whom he has no connection. 
This helps to ensure that both the initiatives themselves and the reactions of key players, such 
as hospital groups and professional associations, have been adequately represented.
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Even allowing for the steps taken to keep Bupa’s internal meetings and interactions in the 
background, some readers who adhere to strict interpretations of informed consent may feel 
that the author has strayed (the background analysis does after all rely on interactions with 
some who did not realise a research study was being conducted). However, the author takes 
the view that informed consent must be balanced against wider conceptions o f the public 
interest (Dingwall, 2008). He believes that no harm has been done to the managers 
concerned, and that it is ethically acceptable for him to offer assessments of the significance 
o f the Bupa initiatives examined, based on his insider knowledge. The research did not come 
under the auspices o f a NHS Research Ethics Committee and the University o f Wales did not 
have an internal Ethics Committee at the time when this study was undertaken. The author 
decided on an appropriate ethical stance taking account of his own judgment and advice from 
his supervisor.
Public and Private Healthcare in the developed world
Academic studies o f the structure and dynamics o f healthcare in the developed world 
typically highlight a number o f common issues. These include:
■ Widespread use o f third party payment (with its associated moral hazard risks);
■ Asymmetry o f information between those consuming and those delivering care reinforced 
by inadequate transparency o f quality and outcomes and resulting in a difficulty in 
making legitimate price/value comparisons;
■ The unusual degree o f emotional (and physical) dependence o f the healthcare consumer 
on those providing the service;
■ Health care is a labour intensive industry with delivery dependent upon professionals;
■ Clinicians have essentially a common core training programme based on a dominant 
medical scientific paradigm and an ethics based on their primary responsibility being to 
the individual patient;
■ Health care is subject to rapid advances in treatments through the application o f scientific 
knowledge and a worldwide pharmaceutical/medical appliances industry that has a strong 
commercial interest in promoting new developments;
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■ Significant barriers to entry through a combination of governmental and professional 
regulation, and - in the case o f purchasing and provider organisations - high set up and 
running costs;
■ Rising societal expectations o f health care underpinned by rising standards of living and 
faith in science;
■ Significant technical difficulties in relating reimbursement o f providers to the outcomes 
o f the services rendered.
The above issues mean that the dynamics o f health care are closer to those o f other 
professional service domains -  law, architecture, higher education -  than to non-professional 
service or production industries such as computer support or car manufacturing. Whilst these 
common issues are often readily acknowledged there is considerably less consensus on how 
health care should be organised and what combination of market and governmental planning 
or regulation is desirable. Such disputes are not confined to academia but are in part 
reflections o f ideological positions.
Economists writing with regard to health care typically highlight the above features to make 
the point that the demand for, and provision of healthcare, departs significantly from the neo­
classical economic models associated with theorists such as Ricardo (1817). Indeed ‘health’ 
itself is not tradeable (McGuire, A; Henderson, J. and Mooney, G; 1988, p.33), but healthcare 
is. Consumers have demand for health but cannot directly purchase it. They must purchase 
health care services that are used to produce health. Michael Grossman (1972) first discussed 
the idea that health care has a derived, rather than a direct, demand.
Light (1994) argues that professional work fits poorly into an economic market model 
because it is difficult to judge how well the work undertaken has been performed. In this 
regard Weisbrod (1978) makes the telling point that for the bulk of healthcare the 
patient/buyer has great difficulty in assessing quality, not only before the purchase (a 
situation that exists with many products) but also after the purchase/intervention.. Whilst this 
is not entirely unique to healthcare, the difficulty in judging quality both ex ante and ex post 
is a characteristic feature o f this domain.
As described later in this chapter, information asymmetry combines with transactional cost 
issues and psychological dependency to provide a foundation for what Light describes as
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“protected markets” and which he asserts generate a “capitalists’ heaven” (Light p.36). Light 
(1991) had previously argued that the goal of competitors is generally to minimize 
competition -  not to promote it - and that in this regard healthcare often represents the 
antithesis o f the basic conditions for a functioning competitive market. This provides one 
explanation for the relative price inelasticity of healthcare. A RAND sponsored study by 
Ringel et al (2000) states that:
‘Despite a wide variety o f empirical methods and data sources, the estimates o f the 
demand for healthcare...are consistently found to be price inelastic (pg 20)’
This phenomena is fuelled by third party payment mechanisms which (as discussed below) 
generate moral hazard issues.( Zweifel and Manning, 2000).
Despite the above, in recent years a large literature has emerged on the potential o f markets 
and competition to transform both predominantly private and public health care systems 
(Baumol, 1995; Herzlinger, 1997; Fuchs, 1988; Smith, 2000; Gaynor, Haas-Wilson and Vogt, 
2000; Nichols et al, 2004; Maynard, 2005; Berenson, 2005; Porter and Teisberg 2006;
Wigger and Anlauf, 2007;) Porter and Teisberg’s (2006) influential book ‘Redefining Health 
Care’ highlights the problems o f rising costs and poor quality affecting US health care, and 
argue that the root cause is an absence of real competition. They suggest that:
‘In a normal market, competition drives relentless improvements in quality and cost. 
Rapid innovation leads to rapid diffusion o f new technologies and better ways of 
doing this  Quality adjusted prices fall, value improves... ’
For these writers the operation o f the health sector is very different. Costs rise, while quality 
problems persist. They argue that the extent o f market failure is evident from the large 
variations observable in costs and quality across providers and geographical areas, and the 
slow diffusion o f technological innovations.
Arguably however, the problems identified by Porter and Teisberg are not confined to the 
United States, and may not even be the preserve o f pure market systems, since the features 
described also affect planned systems and collaborative models. To reinforce this point, let us 
examine a summary o f the benefits o f normal market competition compared with the failed
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version found in health care (below) provided by Porter and Teisberg. The argument made in 
this thesis is that whilst this is correct in so far as it applies to the U.S system, the authors do 
not recognise that they are also describing health care delivery in ‘socialised’ systems such as 
the pre-intemal market NHS as well as well as the UK’s current private sector.
Table 1. The Relevance o f  Porter and Teisberg’s ‘Imperatives for Policy Makers: 
Improving the Structure o f  Health Care Delivery’
UK
Private
UK
NHS
Enable Universal Results Information
Establish a process for defining outcome measures 
Enact mandatory results reporting
Establishing information collection and dissemination infrastructure
Improve Pricing Practices
Establish episode and care-cycle pricing 
Set limits on price discrimination______
V
x
V
x
Open up Competition at the Right Level
Reduce artificial barriers to practice area integration 
Require a value justification for captive referrals or treatment involving an 
economic interest
Eliminate artificial restrictions to new entry 
Institute results-based license renewal 
Strictly enforce antitrust policies 
Curtail anticompetitive buying-group practices
Eliminate barriers to competition across geography_____________________
Establish Standards and Rules that enable Information Technology and 
Information Sharing
Develop standards for interoperability of hardware and software
Develop standards for medical data
Enhance identification and security procedures
Provide incentives for adoption o f information technology_____________
Reform the Malpractice System
Redesign Medicare Policies and Practices
Make Medicare a health plan, not a payer or a regulator 
Modify counterproductive pricing practices 
Improve Medicare pay for performance 
Lead the move to bundled pricing models 
Require results-based referrals
Allow providers to set prices________________________
Align Medicaid with Medicare X
TInvest in Medical and Clinical Research
V = applicable x = non-applicable
11
In considering the options for reform in the various areas cited above, health policy makers 
keep returning to the central question o f what role market mechanisms should play in health 
care funding and delivery and the respective roles and size of the public and private sectors. 
The issue o f how healthcare is to be funded and provided is not merely a technical one but 
tends to be an emotional affair, underpinned by ideology, culture and nationalism.
This thesis aims to contribute to that debate by examining in detail the results of a series of 
market based approaches to reform within the private healthcare market in the UK. The 
author in doing so wishes (as far as possible given what was previously written on potential 
biases) to resist any ideological pre-determination as to what the success or otherwise of such 
a programme is likely to have been. Moreover it is acknowledged at the outset that the 
findings will be conditioned by the prevailing circumstances in the country being studied. 
Approaches and solutions have to be seen within the context o f the particular context in 
which they have arisen. What may work for country, or even organisation ‘A ’ will not 
necessarily work in ‘B ’. It is thus acknowledged at the outset that the UK’s health system has 
unique features, including the particular role the private sector plays. Unless the historical 
development and existing relationships between the various components o f the UK’s private 
sector are properly understood, analysis o f their predicted future development is likely to be 
faulty.
Individuals, Risk and M arket Failure
Whilst the determination o f the primary objective of a public (or indeed private) health 
system can be difficult, certain economists have considered that the motivation o f any 
particular individual with regard to health care can be stated with some certainty. Arrow 
outlined their essential position as follows:
‘...there are two kinds o f risks involved in medical care: the risk o f becoming ill, and the risk 
of total or incomplete or delayed recovery... From the point of view o f the welfare economics 
of uncertainty both losses are risks against which individuals would like to insure’ (Arrow, 
1963, p.959).
In this analysis individuals are looking to a health care system to deliver them from both risks 
-  with the latter likely to be their primary objective as many people are quite fatalistic about
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the chances o f them becoming ill, or suffering an accident (Niederdeppe and Levy, 2007; 
Nelson et al 2002; Liang et al 2004; Margolis et al 2003).
It might be objected that Arrow’s delivers an overly reductionist approach which depends 
upon the traditional model o f ‘home economicus’ that behavioural psychology research has 
increasingly questioned (Simon, 1956, 1957,1987a, 1987b; Kahneman, Slovik and Tversky, 
1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). However such risks exist even if the importance 
assigned to them by individuals can be debated, and how they (and societies as a whole) 
insure against those risks can - and does - take a multitude o f forms. Within civil society an 
individual’s personal objective may be superseded for a variety o f reasons. These include (but 
are not confined to) utilitarian or social solidarity notions that give less priority to the welfare 
o f any given individual in favour o f the collective benefit o f society as a whole (Bentham, 
1789; Rawls, 1971; Hahn 1982; Weale, 1983).
Now it has to be acknowledged that individuals - like governments - do not desire only one 
thing in isolation. The ‘health’ objective described above competes with other objectives, 
some of which draw resources away in their pursuit. There are circumstances when the 
‘health’ objective might override all others-when an individual is in severe pain for example. 
However, even when we are faced with a life threatening illness, the focus on recovery may 
be set against competing desires. These might include concern not to be a burden on 
relations, concern that medical fees will erode sibling’s inheritances, or simply a conviction 
that a subsequent poor quality o f life will not make recovery worthwhile.
It is the contention o f most economists working in the field o f ‘welfare economics’ that all 
other things being equal, individuals would rather transfer the risk of attaining their desired 
states (including health) to third parties rather than bear them directly. If individuals could 
transfer these costs as well then so much the better. Both inclinations have a particular 
resonance in health where risks and costs can be high and consumer uncertainty on both is 
typically a significant factor. From these basic premises Arrow claimed much of the 
particular non-market features o f health care flow.
Closely associated with a desire to transfer risk sits an information asymmetry problem that 
generates a number o f moral hazard issues for healthcare (Arrow, 1965, Robinson, 2001). As 
will be seen these have a particular relevance to private health insurance. The inherent
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problems with insurance (regardless of whether they are public or private schemes, voluntary 
or compulsory) are well known, have a significant literature, and can be summarised as 
follows:
Firstly, people are more likely to use services if they are insured - a phenomenon commonly 
known as moral hazard (Arrow, 1965; Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970; Spence and 
Zeckhauser, 1971; Kotowitz, 1987). Over-consumption can occur because people can be less 
attentive to their health in the expectation that the insurer (government or private body) to 
pay for their care. It can also occur because those insured do no bear the marginal cost of care 
when they consume it. Pauly (1968) provides a particularly cogent exposition of this problem 
and in doing so help provide an economic basis for price rationing (user charges) to help 
produce a more efficient solution to matching demand to available resources.
As Farrington and Coelho (2008) note, insurance -  both public and private- is a compromise 
between the inefficiencies created by moral hazard and the benefits o f improved risk sharing. 
Risk sharing can also be inherently problematic. Different individuals represent different risk 
types. If insurers are not fully capable o f distinguishing those who are relatively sick from 
those who are relatively healthy they run a risk that those seeking insurance will pretend to be 
healthier than they are. This is possible because of information asymmetry because typically 
the person seeking insurance knows more about their health status than the insurer.
The above problem is known as adverse selection and again is well documented in the 
literature (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson 1977, Cutler and Zechauser 2000). 
Essentially a potential for health insurance market failure emerges because either people opt 
for the wrong plans because o f an insufficient understanding o f their risks and probabilities o f 
illness and insurers have an incentive to attract low risk and repel high risks (Robinson,
2002). Even if these problems could be overcome and all insurance was sold at actuarially 
fair prices (that is truly reflecting buyer’s risk profiles) and there were no adverse selection 
problems it would be in the self interest o f both high and low risk individuals to purchase 
insurance coverage in line with their specific risk type. This implies high risks paying 
substantially more for insurance than low risks; which not only creates risk segmentation but 
also at some point practically compromises the practical basis on which insurance springs - 
namely that the demands o f the few are covered by the many.
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These problems o f risk segmentation and adverse selection create market failures that create a 
case for government intervention and a number of authors argue strongly that regulation by 
itself will not offset such problems (Cutler and Reber, 1998;Cutler, 2002; Colombo and 
Tapay, 2004). These authors argue that mandatory coverage is required to prevent the healthy 
from declining coverage, and a single health plan is needed to prevent sorting by risk.
This thesis does no attempt to debate this issue further but instead the point is merely made 
that even if  the above is accepted it does not follow that all healthcare expenditure should be 
channelled through a national insurance plan. The reasons why this is not necessarily so 
(indeed certain economists such as Pauly (1968) would say they have demonstrated quite 
definitively that it cannot be so) can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, as previously indicated, the problem of moral hazard is not merely an issue for private 
insurance schemes but also applies (perhaps even more so) to public insurance systems. This 
creates an economic argument for some costs to be borne by the individual in some 
circumstances -  typically some form o f co-payment or deductible- to counter excessive 
demand/ lack of attention by the individual to maintaining their own health. Secondly, 
individuals differ in the value they attach to different forms of healthcare consumption and 
also in their ability/willingness to pay. Where a single insurance plan sets uniform 
entitlements, this makes no allowance for individuals to express their preferences to purchase 
higher (or lower) levels o f entitlement. Arguably, the ability to purchase healthcare privately 
running alongside a national plan such as the NHS increases ‘allocative efficiency’ (Hall and 
Jones 2007;) This also helps explain why individuals and companies choose to purchase 
private medical insurance/care, despite the existence of the NHS. The studies by Higgins and 
Wiles (1992; 1996), Thorogood (1992), and Cant and Calnan (1992) reinforce that point. 
Some individuals with disposable income decide that sole reliance on the NHS is not a 
palatable proposition. In effect they are willing to pay for healthcare consumption at a price 
that exceeds that set by the universal scheme (the NHS).
The issues outlined above forms part o f the conceptual framework for this thesis -especially 
the question as to the degree to which consumers should be given direct incentives to restrict 
their demands for care, and to choose cheaper or higher quality providers.
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The thesis also discusses certain other aspects of health care organisation that limit the 
efficient working o f markets. The current literature contains many references to ‘distortions’ 
arising from factors such as professional power, lack o f price/quality transparency, anti 
competitive behaviour and the psychological dependency o f the patient on the provider. The 
above, both individually and collectively generate considerable debate as to whether these 
represent terminal flaws in any market based solution (Reinhardt 2001, 2007; Freidman,
1991; Culyer, 1989; Hubbard, Cogan, and Kessler, 2005), as does the question as to whether 
healthcare should be seen as a consumer good at all?
All o f the above are examined within the thesis in subsequent chapters. To help set a 
foundation for the later discussion, a brief review o f the current literature is provided below.
The Influence of Health Professionals
The influence that health professionals have on healthcare organisation and delivery is well 
documented in both the sociological and economic literatures. Accounts of the history of the 
NHS chart the significant role o f the medical profession in determining the form o f the 
service (Powell, 1966; Pater, 1981; Webster, 1988; Owen, 1988; Rivett,1998;) as well as the 
‘implicit concordat’ by which the profession was given substantial autonomy and powers of 
self-regulation in return for managing the provision of care within available resources (Jacob, 
1988; Klein, 1990; Allsop and Sacks, 2002). To a considerable extent, the position o f the 
British medical profession resembled the professional dominance reported in the classic 
American literature (Kessel, 1958; Freidson, 1970a; 1970b; Abbott, 1988; Mechanic, 1991), 
even if there were also echoes o f the erosion o f power over time via increased regulation and 
the rise o f countervailing powers (Light, 2000). The tension between professional autonomy 
and state or managerial control is particularly well documented (Freddi and Bjorkman, 1988; 
Scrivens, 1988; Wolinsky, 1993; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Ferlie, 1997).
Major NHS reforms from the Griffiths general management reforms o f the 1980s onwards 
have commonly been conceptualised as attempts to undermine professional autonomy and 
self regulation (Harrison and Ahmad, 2000; Davies and Harrison 2003.). In the eyes o f some 
commentators recent developments associated with clinical governance and contracting 
threaten the original ‘compact’ between doctors and the state, and a suggest a diminution o f 
medical autonomy in a bureaucratised NHS (Klein 1998; Griffiths and Hughes, 2000).
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Private-sector practice seems to provide an illuminating window on the extent o f any 
reduction in professional power across the system as a whole, but the author has been unable 
to locate any studies that explore relations between insurers and the doctors who contract 
with them to provider private medical services, and the extent of any parallel tensions. This 
thesis provides an opportunity to examine the interplay of purchaser and professional power 
in the private sector context.
The ability o f doctors to exert collective resistance to attempted reform rests also on their 
demonstration o f a ‘knowledge mandate’ (Halliday, 1987); a point that applies equally 
whether the body attempting the reform is government, insurer or even hospital management. 
Doctors have long relied on their cultural authority (Starr, 1982) and the indeterminacy and 
mystique o f clinical judgment (Jamous and Peloille,1970) to counter attempts to impose 
standardised rules or protocols affecting care delivery.
As will be seen this thesis provides further evidence -  should any be required -  o f the power 
of that knowledge mandate. In that respect it is worth considering at the outset that insurers’ 
nervousness as to the clinicians’ reactions to proposed change typically has two foundations. 
One is the negative impact of de facto  clinical embargoes which create problems for patients 
attempting to access services. The second concerns public perceptions and the negative 
impact for an insurer that is likely to follow from an open dispute with doctors. This dynamic 
applies to a commercial company such as Bupa, just as much as to a Department o f Health 
civil servant or an individual manager in an NHS Trust.
Psychological Dependency
The particular characteristics of information asymmetry and psychological dependency 
between patient and provider are closely associated with the professional status of the 
medical profession in the developed world. Hall (2001) argues that the psychologically 
traumatic nature o f serious illness and the vulnerability it creates means that trust is a central 
psychological phenomena in healthcare... regardless of its desirability. Parsons’ (1939, 1951) 
seminal theoretical work on the doctor/patient relationship emphasised that patients were 
helpless, anxious, vulnerable and lacking technical competence (1951, and were subject to 
“very complex non -and irrational reactions”. .Parsons also noted the cultural expectation to
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‘do something’, and for him ‘magical thinking’ could be found in both patients and 
physicians. However, this view o f the physician as the agent of patients’ desire to ‘do 
everything possible’ needs to be tempered by the findings o f a number of studies through 
time that vulnerable, poor, sick patients are discriminated against (Falk, 1933; Anderson, 
Collette and Feldman, 1960; Freidson and Feldman, 1963; Roth 1969).
Notwithstanding these concerns, Mulley (2009) and Newman (2008) have highlighted the 
post-enlightenment belief that science mediated by the expert clinician objectively determines 
what is the best medical care for each patient. This confers natural authority for decision 
making on clinicians, and absolution from responsibility on patients.
Probably this account risks caricaturing real-world clinical encounters, not least because 
decision making in healthcare typically takes place as a series o f conditional probabilities 
which become clearer over time (Groopman, 2008). Uncertainty in medical practice has been 
one of the classic themes of health sociology, so that Fox (1999) asserts that uncertainty, 
variability and interactions increase as medicine progresses Studies have shown that many 
clinicians are not adept at dealing with such probabilities and communicating the resulting 
uncertainty (Eddy, 1984). This is one explanation for the variations in clinical activity and 
outcomes reported worldwide (Glover, 1938; McPherson et al, 1982; Fisher, 2003; Wennberg 
and Cooper, 2009) though by no means the only one. Patient expectations and commercial 
considerations (Gawande 2009) also feature in the literature and this thesis will see these 
issues played out in relation to areas such as incidence of particular procedures (chapter 4), 
accreditation to undertake particular operations and length o f stay (chapter 7).
Lack of Price/Quality Transparency
Third-party payment typically generates problems with price transparency because often the 
service is free at the point o f consumption (most notably with the NHS but also for many 
with zero-excess insurance) (Herrick and Goodman, 2007).
Transparency problems commonly take two forms. The first is concerned with the person 
utilising the service not being made aware o f the cost of that service or of the different prices 
that different providers would charge for the same service. Research suggests that neither the
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general public or clinicians have good knowledge o f the actual costs o f healthcare (Allan, 
Lexchin and Wiebe 2007; Herrick and Goodman, 2007; Cooke 2010)
The second issue relates to the non-transparency o f provider prices. This links to the ability to 
discern the quality o f the service(s) on offer. Both are information asymmetry issues as 
previously noted -  especially the latter as it relates to the technical complexity of presenting 
many quality issues in healthcare. These may relate to issues o f quality assurance, 
professional competence and trust that cannot be easily monitored by a purchaser, but there 
are also issues concerned with breakdowns of price against activity performed and quality 
reporting, that appear to be more easily resolvable, but remain endemic. This area is closely 
related to price discrimination issues covered in the next section and authors tend to cover 
both issues in their treatment of the subject (Kessel, 1958; Anderson, 2007; Reinhardt, 2006; 
Dobson, DaVanzo and Namrata, 2006).
The problems with quality reporting are extensively covered in Chapter 6 and in their 
practical application mirror the problems of price transparency.
Anti -com petitive behaviours and countervailing powers
Kessel’s (1958) discussion of price discrimination remains the foundation for economic 
analysis o f the behaviour of providers - particularly doctors. The argument in essence is that 
members o f the medical profession will typically behave as discriminating monopolists. That 
is to say they will seek to extract surplus profits by charging what a particular market 
segment will bear. This is aided by information asymmetries and the lack of price 
transparency discussed above. Likewise Miller (1992) noted that UK doctors have routinely 
engaged in anti-competitive behaviour. It should be noted that geographical and service 
monopolies or quasi monopolies are also possible for hospital and other type of service 
providers (Evans-Cueller and Gertler,2003; Propper, Burgess and Green 2004).
Hostility to price or other forms o f competition can also be seen in the ban on doctors 
advertising (General Medical Council, 1993). Writers like Kessel (1958) and Herrick and
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Goodman (2007) argue that there is also a strong cultural bias within the medical profession 
against overt competition amongst doctors.
The influence o f health professionals, psychological dependency, anti-competitive behaviour 
and the concept o f countervailing power are interlinked. The first three generate the 
foundation from which medical practitioners continue to exercise professional power in the 
face of the countervailing powers o f those who wish to control their freedom of action and 
their incomes (most typically hospital management, insurers and government).
Countervailing power is a theory of political modification o f markets, credited to John 
Kenneth Galbraith (1952). It describes the balancing o f the market power o f one group by 
another group. An example would be a supermarket chain uses its buying power to counter 
the price rises imposed by a large supplier
Subsequently the theory has been much explored in healthcare - especially in the USA. Light 
(2000, 2004) has provided several detailed reviews of the issue within the context o f the 
development o f the US healthcare system. Yet it remains unclear whether the image o f a 
balance of opposing forces has entirely displaced the older theory of professional dominance 
(Friedson, 1970a, 1970b; Starr, 1982), which makes a more direct connection between 
professional expertise and market power (Larson, 1977; Weller, 1983). Both theories 
transcend national boundaries and might apply in broad outline to the public and private 
sectors in the UK.
Whilst professional and hospital resistance to efforts by insurers to reduce prices and set 
quality thresholds are manifest in the events described in this thesis, it should be emphasised 
that countervailing power is a two-way process. As such the insurer initiatives described in 
this thesis can be represented as attempts to counter the power of the medical profession to 
decide how services will be provided and set prices.These insurer initiatives can be seen as 
the UK private healthcare equivalent o f what Light described in the USA as “the revolt of 
payers as countervailing powers” (2004 pg.206) in the face o f escalating costs and 
diminishing returns. Light describes this change as being characterised by:
“ ...a  growing distrust of doctors’ values, decisions, and even competence, as evidence 
mounted o f overtreatment, medical errors and uneven quality, and large variations in 
practice style. This has led to a profoundly threatening shift, from granting physicians
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exclusive control over how they practiced medicine, to close monitoring o f their 
practice.” (Light 2004, p.206).
Despite the fact that Light presents this within the context o f what he considers to be a 
particularly American malaise, and which forms part o f a wider critique of the US health care 
system, the quotation above could just as well apply to UK private and even public 
healthcare.
Countervailing powers as a model focuses attention on the interactions of powerful actors 
who are inherently interdependent, but have distinct interests and constituencies. The events 
described in this thesis provide testimony to its descriptive power, but there is also some 
support for the idea that, although now facing more sustained challenges, professional power 
remains very significant. As will be shown, the period studied saw a series of moves by 
insurers and counter-moves by the medical consultant bodies, in which - for the time being at 
least - the latter were largely successful in safeguarding their interests
The Dynamics of Patient Choice
The above factors impact on the capability of patients to exercise choice, especially informed 
choice. Those authors most sympathetic to markets in healthcare place great store not only on 
the intrinsic importance of choice as an expression o f sovereignty but also on the potential of 
consumer choice to reform healthcare (Herzlinger, 1997; Enthoven, 2004; Porter and 
Teisberg, 2006). Against this there is a strong counter-current in the UK policy commentary 
which argues that choice detracts from other forms o f public engagement and makes the case 
for a wider conception of voice (Forster and Gabe, 2008; Hunter, 2009; Hughes, Mullen and 
Vincent-Jones, 2009)
Patient propensity and ability not only to discern differences in providers but also to travel to 
different provider locations are clearly crucial in this regard. Evidence that they are actually 
prepared to do so is however mixed. In the UK whilst some studies (MORI, 2006) signal a 
degree of willingness by patients to move between hospitals and a MORI poll o f 1,982 adults 
in 2002 for the BMA reported 27% as saying they would go anywhere in the UK and 15% 
anywhere in Europe the evidence from actual schemes tends to support a more conservative 
view (MORI, 2002). In Wales for example take up of the ‘second offer’ (an opportunity to 
be treated within the waiting time target by moving to an alternative provider) by patients in
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2003/4 (the last year statistics were made available) 828 patients out o f 3750 declined the 
opportunity o f earlier treatment and at another hospital. O f those who declined the offer 262 
said it was because they did not want to travel, 92 wanted to stay with their consultant, while 
299 said it was to do with social reasons such as they may not be able to be visited by friends 
or relatives (Hutt, 2004).
As will be demonstrated later in this thesis, willingness to travel and mechanisms for 
discriminating between providers are also extremely important issues in private healthcare. 
Indeed, as the volatility of patient flows is an important determinant o f the elasticity o f 
demand for healthcare from a particular provider (or more pertinently its inelasticity), this is 
central to the question as to the extent to which an efficient market can operate in healthcare.
Transaction Costs
A final factor that will play out throughout this thesis relates to the issue o f the transactional 
costs associated with attempts to change existing relationships between providers and 
insurer(s) through contractual arrangements and the use of tenders. All forms of exchange 
involve transaction costs which depend on three features associated with the goods or 
services exchanged: asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of exchange. (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975). Transaction cost theory predicts that in exchanges characterised by high 
complexity, uncertainty, asymmetry o f information, specificity o f investment and frequency 
o f exchange, buying goods and services from an external party will generate high transaction 
costs. At some point this becomes such an inefficient way of procuring goods and services 
(because of the high transaction costs involved in negotiating, drafting and monitoring highly 
complex and detailed contracts) that left to their own devices such arrangements are likely to 
evolve gradually into integrated hierarchical structures (Williamson, 1975).
Various economists (Coase R. 1937; Williamson, 1975) have commented on healthcare 
being an arena where transaction costs are likely to be quite prominent due to the inherent 
difficulty in determining complete ex ante contracts due to factors such as information 
asymmetry and technical difficulties in measuring quality. The theory has been specifically 
applied to healthcare reform in the UK public sector (Croxson, 1988; Dixon, Le Grand and
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Smith, 2003; Edwards, 2005; Marini and Street, 2007, Paton, 2010) where as described above 
the costs o f formal contractual arrangements against ‘collaborative’ behaviours have typically 
attracted negative comment.
This thesis provides an opportunity to review the issue within the context of the private 
sector. For UK private sector insurers these difficulties are generally less acute than for NHS 
commissioners because the uncertainty inherent in prospectively determining demand and 
case mix in contracts with providers is limited by various clauses within the policies issued 
by the insurer to the policy holder (the patient). Thus treatments are typically discrete 
episodes with insurers not covering chronic conditions and often setting financial thresholds 
in terms o f utilisation (for example with regard to outpatient visits and therapies and in some 
cases with regard to the cost of an operation/treatment.
Transaction costs can be split into four separate cost elements relating to the transaction in 
question (Williamson, 1985). Search costs, which include the costs o f gathering information 
to identify and evaluate potential trading partners. Contracting costs, which relate to the costs 
of negotiating and documenting the agreements. Monitoring costs which refer to the costs 
associated with ensuring (through monitoring) that each party is fulfilling its obligations and 
enforcement costs which refer to the costs associated with ex post bargaining and sanctioning 
where there is considered to be a performance issue relating to the agreement. Opportunistic 
behaviour by either party needs to be guarded against but in attempting to do so transaction 
costs rise (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). As noted above the cost dynamic behind 
transaction costs is such that at some point the costs of contracting in a certain way become 
prohibitive for one or both parties. Later chapters will serve to illustrate how this issue (and 
the other themes) play out within the context o f private healthcare in the UK and in particular 
with Bupa’s approach to speciality contracting and quality assurance
The Literature of the UK Health Market
The healthcare market in the United States has generated extensive research and a 
voluminous literature written over several decades. There are scholarly accounts of: US 
health care’s development as a pluralistic rather than a national health insurance system 
(Beland and Hacker, 2004 ; Quadagno, 2005); the changing regulatory environment (Jost,
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1988; Weissert and Weissert, 1996); relations between corporatized medicine and physicians 
(Starr, 1982; Light, 2004); oscillation between periods of increased regulation and enhanced 
market competition (Altman and Rodwin, 1988); shifts in the market power o f buyers, sellers 
and consumers (Hafferty and Light, 1995: Quadagno, 2004); trends towards vertical 
integration versus specialist ‘carve outs’ (Shortell et al., 1994; Frank et al., 1995); and 
attempts by purchasers to use buying power to drive quality improvements (Bodenheimer,
1999;). Doctoral research on any of these topics could draw on a plethora o f published 
studies beyond the indicative examples provided. By contrast the literature on the UK private 
healthcare sector is thin and leaves many gaps.
The most comprehensive recent account can be found in Foubister and colleagues (2005) 
descriptive overview of UK private medical insurance (PMI), which aims to set the British 
system in European context. The authors note that previous published British research has 
centred mainly on surveys of the demand for PMI, with relatively little written about the 
product or the health insurance industry. They describe the UK as an often-cited international 
exemplar of supplementary voluntary health insurance, which however has not been 
documented in detail apart from industry reports. The descriptive account provided is based 
on such reports as well as data gathered from the main industry analysts Laing and Buisson, 
and single interviews with representatives o f AXA PPP, BUPA, Norwich Union Healthcare 
and Standard Life Healthcare.
The study describes the two PMI sub-markets - the individual and corporate markets, the 
basic features of underwriting and pricing, policy types and common exclusions, and the 
regulatory framework, including the roles of the General Insurance Standards Council (GISC 
- a form of industry self-regulation) and the Financial Services Authority. The authors chart 
the changing patterns of demand for PMI services noting the declining numbers o f individual 
subscribers and the relatively stronger performance o f the corporate business. They suggest 
that the principal factors affecting such uptake are perceptions o f the quality of NHS 
treatments and the price of private insurance. The study points to certain recent changes in the 
industry such as the entry of for-profit commercial companies in the 1990s, the entry o f 
insurers on an underwriting-only basis, and the entry of PMI carriers without an underwriting 
capacity of their own. The authors note that premium income continues to exceed claims 
expenditure, but that this has depended on increases in premiums rather than extra customers. 
Overall this study provides a valuable synoptic review of recent trends in the UK PMI
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market, which however relies mainly on industry reports and does not move beyond 
description to consider the issues discussed in this thesis.
Other available material on the UK private market is heterogeneous and now largely 
outdated. The growth from the late 1970s onwards of the numbers of private hospital beds 
and subscribers to private insurance prompted a flurry of early studies (Day and Klein, 1985; 
Grant, 1985; Mohan, 1986; Raynor, 1987; Griffith, Uiffe and R ayner, 1987; Higgins, 1988; 
Propper and Maynard, 1989). The emphasis was on understanding increasing demand and 
other factors that would explain the emergence o f a private healthcare sector in the shadow of 
the NHS, and describing the nature of the market and the providers. Thus Joan Higgins’ 
influential book charts the transition of private health insurance from ‘cottage industry’ to 
commercial business, noting the growing role o f for-profit (predominantly American) 
insurers and hospitals in the 1980s and offering an assessment o f the ‘winners and losers’ as 
private health care expanded. Two interesting early publications by Bryant (1968) and Robb 
and Brown (1984) document the history o f Bupa from 1947-83, but describe a very different 
environment from that applying at the time of the present study.
In the twenty years or so since the first batch o f studies, a number of authors have attempted 
to chart the further growth and development o f private insurance and provision (Salter 1995; 
Mohan, 1991; Yates, 1995; Higgins, 2004; Chapman, 2004). Mohan (1991) further explores 
the trend towards commercialisation and internationalism discussed by Higgins, noting that 
though the involvement of multi-nationals was more evident their overall impact on the UK 
health care market remained quite limited (a perceptive assessment considering the 
continuing pre-eminence of a provident association -  Bupa -  to the present date). Saltman 
(2003) made the interesting point (also mentioned by Foubister and associates) that the line 
between the public and private sectors was becoming less clear in the UK, again observations 
that have been borne out by subsequent developments.
The nature of demand was a central preoccupation o f the work o f Higgins and other early 
writers, and was researched further in the 1990s (Saunders and Harris, 1989; Busfield,1990; 
Higgins and Wiles, 1992; Cant and Calnan, 1992; Thorogood, 1992; Calnan et al,
1993a; 1993b; Black, 1993; Wiles, 1993; Wiles and Higgins, 1996). These studies examine 
which groups use private care, what factors make private care attractive, why women were 
more likely than men to go private, why Black women in particular made greater than
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average use o f private GP consultations, the degree to which patients operated as consumers 
with knowledge of options and outcomes, the role o f GPs in steering patients towards private 
options, and the nature of the private consultation and the balance between mutuality and 
consumerism. Writing from an economics perspective, Besley and colleagues (1999) and 
Propper, Rees and Green (1999) investigated the significance of NHS waiting lists for private 
demand. Some of the findings and theories from this body o f work are discussed in Chapter 
2 .
An additional paper which provides background information relevant to this thesis is 
Thomson and associates (2004) discussion of regulation and quality control in UK private 
healthcare. These authors discuss the roles of the Independent Healthcare Association (IHA) 
and the National Care Standards Commission, and discuss the IHA’s initiative to establish a 
set o f key performance indicators to support quality improvement. They note that private 
insurers are increasingly pressing hospitals to participate in quality improvement 
programmes, and predict that the trend towards commissioning NHS care in independent 
hospitals may also mean that hospitals must become increasingly attentive to purchasers’ 
quality requirements.
Farrington-Douglas and Coelho (2008) provide a useful summary o f the current place private 
spending occupies within the UK health system and make a case for its continuation within a 
system dominated by public funding and provision but once again this is more o f a general 
macro economic analysis than an attempt to understand the dynamics of the UK private 
healthcare sector. Commercial reports by the likes o f industry commentators Laing and 
Buisson do attempt such an analysis but are not in the public domain and expensive to 
purchase. For example Laing’s Healthcare Market Review 2010 costs £390, whilst Market 
and Business Development’s ‘UK Private Healthcare Market Research Report 2009’ costs 
£600.
Plan of the Thesis
The thesis attempts to answer the following questions:
1. How has the UK private healthcare market operated historically? What dynamic has 
underpinned the operation of this market?
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2. How has Bupa as the dominant UK insurer tried to influence that market?
3. How successful has it been in this regard and what lessons can be drawn from 
this?
The subsequent layout of this thesis attempts to address these questions as follows:
Chapter 2: The Structure of the United Kingdom’s Public and Private Health System
This chapter examines the key structural elements o f the UK private health system, 
highlighting those features of the private sector deemed particular to the UK. It explores the 
impact of the historical relationship between the public and private sectors on the 
development o f private sector and of market based initiatives within it.
Chapter 3: Market Reforms and the Hospital Sector in the UK
This chapter examines the current structure and dynamics of the private hospital sector, with 
a particular emphasis on the historical forces that have shaped it. These characteristics are 
explored in terms o f the response of hospital providers to attempts by insurers (particularly 
Bupa UKM) to establish networks and reduce prices (or price inflation).
Chapter 4: Consultant Reimbursement and the Prospects for Cost Control
This chapter examines the principal methods of reimbursing consultants in the NHS and the 
UK private sector. It discusses insurer initiatives to reform consultant reimbursement by 
introducing relative value scales and to exert downward pressure on costs by use o f benefit 
maxima schedules. The high level of consultant charges in the UK PMI market is examined, 
and an explanation is offered of why payers have been largely ineffective in pushing prices 
down. An assessment is undertaken of the prospects for reform that would lead to lower 
prices without sacrificing clinical quality. Particular reference is made in this chapter to the 
approach adopted by Bupa Health Insurance in relation to these issues. This represents the 
first published account of a major insurer’s reimbursement methodology, and its attempts to 
influence prices and the general market for clinical services.
Chapter 5: Bupa’s Specialty Network Initiatives
This chapter discusses recent initiatives by UK insurers to establish specialty networks. The 
main case study presented is Bupa UKM’s attempt to introduce an ophthalmology network, 
and the resistance it provoked from providers. The chapter also considers AXA/PPP’s
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successful roll out of a more limited cataract surgery network with less professional 
resistance, and Bupa’s recent establishment o f a physiotherapy network.
Chapter 6: Promoting Clinical Quality: Concepts, Issues and Experiences in the USA 
and the British NHS
This chapter discusses the concept o f quality in health care and some o f the key issues in this 
area. It moves on to examine the approaches to quality in the pluralistic US health care 
system (where notions of purchasing for quality originate) and the NHS (the public system 
that now offers significant opportunities for an expansion o f UK private sector activity).
This chapter sets the scene for a detailed study of the promotion o f clinical quality in UK’s 
private sector.
Chapter 7: Quality and the UK Private Sector
This chapter describes how quality issues are currently dealt with within the UK’s private 
sector. Central to this are a series o f case studies which review Bupa’s quality initiatives over 
the last decade.
Chapter 8: Conclusions
This chapter draws together the evidence presented in the thesis and presents conclusions.
28
CHAPTER 2
The Structure of the UK Public and Private Health Systems 
Introduction
This chapter sets out to examine:
(i) The key structural elements of the UK public and private health 
systems;
(ii) Features of the private sector particular to the UK;
(iii) The impact of the historical relationship between the two sectors on the issues 
under consideration in this thesis.
The main aim is to highlight key features of the environment that Bupa UKM operates 
within, rather than provide a detailed review o f either the public and private system per se. 
The subsequent chapters, which examine the particular characteristics of the UK ‘markets’ 
for both hospitals and doctors provide more detail in any case.
UK Public Health Care
Since its formal establishment on the 5th July 1948, health care in the UK has been dominated 
by the National Health Service (NHS). The National Health Service Act, 1946, aimed to 
create a comprehensive health service and although there have been changes (of increasing 
frequency) in the administrative arrangements for delivering these services, the operative 
provisions o f the initial legislation remain essentially in force.
As such the fundamental characteristics of the NHS were set over 60 years ago. These might 
be summarised as follows:
• A single payer system (government) principally funded by taxation;
• Comprehensive care, universally provided;
• Hospitals owned and operated by the public sector;
29
• With the exception o f general practitioners, dentists and opticians (who are 
mostly independent practitioners supplying services to the NHS) staff 
(including hospital doctors) are salaried;
• Ministerial accountability for the funding and operation of the NHS;
• Most care is provided free at the point of treatment..
The architects o f the NHS wanted to create a healthcare system that provided care based 
purely on relative need - not ability to pay. Aneurin Bevan (1952 p. 100) stated that:
‘The collective principle asserts that.... No society can legitimately call itself 
civilized if a sick person is denied medical aid because o f lack o f means’.
That vision still remains essentially intact with co-payment charges restricted to primary-care 
prescribed drugs (even these became free in Wales from April 2nd 2007), dentistry and 
spectacles. A large number o f UK citizens (those claiming disability or unemployment 
benefits, children, pensioners, pregnant women) have always been exempt in any case.
Unsurprisingly, such a radical and comprehensive state funded and administered system has 
dominated health care in the UK. Until comparatively recently the conventional wisdom, 
publicly expressed by successive health ministers was that the NHS, as a public sector 
monopoly supplier of health services, represented the best value for money health system in 
the developed world. The private sector and the notion of market based competition had little 
or nothing to offer. The emphasis was squarely on central planning and a reliance on political 
direction coupled with clinical autonomy to deliver operational objectives. Whilst the attempt 
by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative administration to introduce both an internal market and 
general management to the NHS in the early 1990s signalled that this mindset was changing, 
it was not until the second Blair administration that there was any serious questioning o f the 
NHS as a monopoly provider or indication that market mechanisms might have a wider role 
to play.
The manner in which the NHS was established also effectively set the shape and nature o f the 
private sector. For the most part they have been separate systems - with the private sector 
acting as a substitute service (mainly for elective care) rather than the kind of supplementary 
insurance role operating in a number of European countries. This had been aided by a 
traditional hostility from many to any mixing of the two sectors. Despite this, a central
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feature o f private healthcare in the UK has been the dependence on staff who have been 
trained by the NHS and more particularly on consultants who spend much o f their working 
week employed by the NHS.
This historical relationship was set by the compromises Aneurin Bevan (the first Minister for 
Health) considered were required to get the NHS established in the first place. He had to 
overcome political opposition not only from the Conservative Party and sections o f his own 
party, but also from the British Medical Association (BMA). The absence o f professional 
support threatened to derail the NHS before it was created. After a protracted period (18 
months) of ongoing dispute between the Ministry o f Health and the BMA, Bevan finally 
managed to successfully win over the support o f the majority o f the medical profession by 
offering what may have seemed then as relatively minor concessions. Bevan allegedly uttered 
the now oft quoted remark to a colleague that in order to broker the deal he ‘stuffed their 
mouths with gold’. The essence o f that deal was to allow consultants considerable autonomy 
o f practice and freedom to treat patients privately in their spare time, in return for their 
becoming salaried doctors within hospitals. General Practitioners (GP’s) remained private 
contractors albeit with a near monopoly payer - the State.
The legacy o f that ‘deal’ has had far reaching consequences. Whether Bevan needed to reach 
such a seemingly generous arrangement with consultants is a moot point as many consultants, 
unlike GP’s, needed (and continue to require to this day) large teams and costly buildings and 
equipment to do their work. Nationalization o f the hospitals meant most consultants would 
have had nowhere else to go. Like it or not - and most of them certainly did not -  realistically 
they needed the means o f production (hospitals) that only the State could provide. However 
one consequence o f that agreement has been that until recently most NHS medical salaries 
had arguably been set below the level which a doctor might expect to earn in a market that 
was not dominated by a single organisational employer. Against this there is the potential 
counter-argument that the medical profession in the developed world has been highly 
successful in harnessing the support of the State to create barriers to entry and regulate 
workforce numbers so as to ensure higher income than otherwise would be the case in an 
unregulated labour market. Overall, the degree to which doctors operate within the context of 
a monopoly employer or not is secondary to their ability to exert influence in the manner 
described above. This phenomenon has been discussed in an extensive literature -  especially 
as it relates to the USA (Johnson, 1972; Larson, 1977;Freddi, 1989; Rosner, 1982;
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Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990; Light 2000, 2004) but also with regard to other developed 
countries, including the UK ( Larkin, 1983; Rivett, 1988; Willis, 1989; Wilsford, 1991; 
Immergut, 1992; Yates, 1995)
However, with regard to the UK, the implicit expectation was that consultants (particularly 
in the ‘demand’ specialities - such as orthopaedics, surgery, and anaesthetics) would make up 
any potential ‘shortfall’ between their NHS salary and the income a consultant expected, by 
recourse to private practice. This dynamic is explored in detail in chapter 4 and for the 
present we shall confine ourselves merely to noting its existence. Such a ‘laissez faire’ 
attitude to employment practices and potential conflicts o f interest for consultants had been a 
marked feature of the UK health system. Recent changes (not least the cost inflation brought 
about by the 2005 Consultant and GP contracts) have brought these ‘understandings’ under 
increasingly critical scrutiny. However to date they still remain largely in force.
The Private Sector
Bevan had been prepared to allow private practice to persist as part o f the ‘compact’ with the 
doctors, but it is unlikely that he would have anticipated the growth of private provision in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The private sector has had to exist in competition with a huge 
competitor that provides free (and for the most part) comprehensive care. As previously 
noted, the doctors who work for the private sector are almost exclusively NHS consultants 
(thus reducing claims of a quality differential). Private insurance is considered by much of 
the population to be prohibitively expensive (as is self pay) (Propper, Rees and Green 1989; 
Propper and Maynard 1993). This does not sound an encouraging basis from which to 
generate profits. However the very fact that for much o f its history the UK private health 
sector has not been considered a serious rival to the NHS in service terms but rather a niche 
provider, gives it a number o f advantages compared to the same sector in other developed 
nations.
First and foremost, both private providers and insurers have for most o f their history been 
subject to considerably less regulation than in other developed countries. Health insurers in 
particular, enjoy a very ‘light touch’ compared to their European and American counterparts. 
Insurers have not been bound by the usual restrictions of community rating, risk equalisation,
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comprehensive cover, ‘Any Willing Provider’ (AWP) reimbursement, obligations to offer 
insurance to anyone seeking it, caps on profits etcetera that are features o f health insurance 
regulation in many countries.
Secondly, although the Competition Commission has intervened occasionally to veto or 
investigate proposed takeovers (such as Bupa’s proposed purchase o f Community Hospital 
Ltd in 2000), (Competition Commission, 2000) for the most part the industry has not been 
subject to the same kind of scrutiny that one finds elsewhere - especially in the USA. Whilst 
only 29% of private beds were in commercial hands in 1949 this proportion had increased to 
56% in 1979 (Busfield, 1992) and the trend continues. Recent evidence to support the 
assertion that this shift has taken place with relatively little interference from the regulatory 
authorities will be subsequently supplied in both the hospital and consultant chapters in this 
thesis.
Thirdly, the cost o f building or acquiring a hospital is typically considered to represent a 
considerable barrier to entry. In the UK private market this has been compounded by the 
network policies o f most insurers (described in some detail in the next chapter). In addition 
hospitals compete for a limited supply o f NHS consultants - a position that often favours 
incumbent providers.
Fourthly, there are the historical ‘failings’ of the NHS - long wait times, relatively poor 
physical environment and food, a reliance on junior medical staff to perform much direct 
medical care. Underpinning this has been a culture that still owes more to paternalism than 
the kind of customer-centric focus typically seen in other service industries. This has made 
for a ready market o f potential subscribers, with arguably the principal limitation being the 
cost o f premiums rather than ideological rejection of private healthcare per se.
Certainly it was the conventional wisdom at Bupa that many people in the UK would wish to 
arrange cover with a private health insurer (and particularly with Bupa) only if  they 
considered themselves to have sufficient disposable income to do so. Whether this was 
indeed the case is debatable. It contrasts with the argument advanced by Calnan, Cant and 
Gabe (1993) that the majority of the UK public prefer the NHS, and would not use the private 
sector if there were sufficient improvements in that sector and/or their employer had not 
made health insurance a feature of their overall benefits package.
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The characteristics of consumer demand for private health care that results from a health 
system dominated by a public sector provider, funded by general taxation and free at the 
point of delivery, is somewhat different from one where much greater plurality of funding 
mechanisms and service provision occurs (such as in much o f mainland Europe). In the 
former case private health care is much more likely to be seen as a luxury good (Propper 
2000). Economists define a luxury good as one where demand rises more than 
proportionately as income increases, and where the consumer exercises discretion to purchase 
a higher level of service or product than is available to the majority of the population. By 
contrast in a mixed pluralistic system, use o f the private sector is more likely to be regarded 
as part of a gamut of choices available to almost everybody, based on traditional notions of 
relative price/value of competing ‘products’. This is an important difference between the 
health care ‘market’ in the UK and most other developed nations. One consequence o f the 
above has been to channel private providers and insurers to make their profits through 
operating in a niche market, with only limited overlap with the larger public health care 
system.
Following on from this we have a fifth ‘advantage’ - namely that the public and private 
sectors had been operating for most of the last 60 plus years in parallel areas of healthcare but 
with little crossover or point of contact beyond a reliance on the same consultants. This 
general lack of a symbiotic interrelationship between sectors reinforced a marked propensity 
of both sectors to develop distinct organisational cultures, operating methods, and target 
audiences. It also meant that historically the two sectors had little or no tradition of 
competing against each other, aside from some (very) limited competition between private 
hospitals and the private patient units o f NHS hospitals. As will be noted later in this thesis, 
the Blair/Brown governments made it a central plank of NHS reform in England to create 
more competition via the use of the private sector - a policy that increased competitive threats 
for the current incumbents of the private as well as the public sector -  and which looks set to 
continue under the present coalition government (DoH, 2010a). However this has been a 
relatively recent innovation - and stands in stark contrast to the situation that had been in 
place for most o f the post-war period, where the overall structure of the UK health system not 
only subdued competitive forces but also ensured that the great majority of the British public 
had no experience o f healthcare as an area in which to make consumer choices. Again this
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has been a distinguishing feature of the UK health system compared to many other developed 
countries.
The above left both the NHS and private sectors with a dearth o f experience in terms o f 
providing services in each other’s traditional area o f operations. Private hospitals are 
typically very small by NHS standards, reflecting the fact that they concentrate on elective 
procedures and diagnostics for a relatively small percentage of the local population. They are 
also often o f a noticeably higher aesthetic standard. NHS Hospitals - by contrast - are usually 
much larger, reflecting a significantly wider range o f specialties, case mix, patient volumes 
and need to balance elective work against emergency demands.
The dominant private sector contract currency has been (and remains) fee-for-service, 
sometimes also using a per diem methodology. This results in a degree o f uncertainty about 
future income levels, which is very different from the traditional NHS situation. For many 
years NHS hospitals’ income was effectively fixed through a series o f block contracts, which 
guaranteed a lump sum payment irrespective of the precise volume o f patients treated.
A similar lack of shared experience and expertise can be found amongst purchasers. UK 
private health insurers can effectively choose what they will and will not cover and as a result 
have little or no experience in purchasing services that provide for those with either 
emergency or chronic conditions. They do have expertise in actuarial analysis - which is 
almost completely absent amongst NHS commissioners. They are used to regarding their 
members as customers who can take their business elsewhere. As such the prevailing culture 
is o f a service industry - something typically lacking amongst NHS commissioners who will 
have a propensity to view themselves as an agency o f government.
A point of similarity is that both insurers and NHS commissioners undertake negotiations 
with providers. Historically health insurers had greater experience o f undertaking ‘real’ 
negotiations -  particularly with clinicians - as in reality much o f this is negotiated centrally in 
the NHS. However, NHS hospital managers are becoming increasingly experienced in 
forging local agreements with clinicians to undertake work outside o f their contracted hours, 
and determining the content of their job plans in contracted hours. NHS hospital negotiations 
take place against a backdrop of centrally-determined inflation and productivity clauses, 
defined tariffs, and a mediation process whereby the Strategic Health Authority or the Welsh, 
Scottish and Northern Irish equivalents are expected to resolve major points o f dispute.
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Notwithstanding this, the negotiations between commissioners and Foundation Trusts result 
in legally-binding contracts and so have the potential to take on an increasingly commercial 
character. Documented evidence to support this view is less than conclusive despite it being a 
widely held belief amongst NHS managers (the author has witnessed on a number of 
occasions the commercial enforcement o f contracts being put forward as a significant 
advantage o f securing Foundation Trust (FT) status. Monitor have issued a series of 
statements reinforcing the point that FT contracts are legally enforceable and that 
consequently commissioners cannot subsequently refuse to pay charges set out in those 
contracts -regardless o f their financial position (Harding, 1997; Monitor, 2011). In contrast 
Hughes et al’s 2011 study concluded that there were few differences in the way de facto 
dispute resolution arrangements involving Foundation Trusts and conventional Trusts worked 
in practice.
One conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that this has left the UK private sector 
rather less well placed to take advantage o f the desire o f the Government to inject private 
sector expertise into the commissioning o f NHS services than might first be imagined. As a 
result the immediate beneficiaries o f this policy were largely overseas (often American) 
companies such as United Health Group, Action and Evercare with regard to disease 
management and Nations Healthcare and Netcare in relation to provision. The UK-based 
companies - including Bupa - had to play ‘catch up’ and are still in a situation where their 
claims o f significant expertise in the areas above struggle to remain credible under detailed 
scrutiny. In the area of commissioning, Bupa has evidently been working hard to do so, as 
they were one of 14 companies appointed onto the Framework for External Support to 
Commissioning (FESC) in 2007. (See Appendix 1).
This has a direct bearing on the overall thrust o f this thesis because it indicates that the 
historical development o f the UK private health care market has been such that that those 
operating within it are relatively ill-prepared to take advantage o f potential market-based 
solutions to any perceived shortcomings o f the public sector. This will become even more 
apparent when we consider in more detail the dynamics of private health insurance in the UK.
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The Health Insurance M arket in the UK
Despite what might be considered an highly unfavorable starting position for marketing 
private health insurance - namely that a comprehensive ‘free at the point o f  consumption" 
health service (the NHS) exists which all citizens contribute towards through taxation on a 
progressive basis relative to income - private healthcare in the UK has mostly grown steadily 
( if  slowly) since 1948. This can be measured both by numbers insured, and private sector 
beds. Over that time the proportion o f  people using the private sector via health insurance has 
also grown. In 1975, 40 per cent o f  private sector bills were still being paid by patients rather 
than insurance companies. By 1989 it had fallen to 30% and half  o f  those were overseas 
patients (Calnan, Cant and Gabe. 1993). The proportion o f  out-of-pocket payments from 
patients has continued to fall since then (Laing and Buisson. 2008). but may well be set to 
rise again as cosmetic procedures (which are rarely covered by insurance) gain in popularity. 
One o f  the most marked features o f  UK private health care is its high cost. This is reflected 
both in the reported high charges made by both hospitals and consultants (see Nuffield Nera 
report quoted in chapter 4 as an example o f  this) and also the long-term trend o f  above 
general inflation premium rises charged by insurers. Industry data shows that individual 
subscribers have bom  a disproportionate brunt o f  these increases (see table below):
Table 2. Private Medical Insurance (PM I) inflation versus Retail Price Index (RPI) inflation 
1999-2004 (Laing and Buisson, 2005)
Y E A R RPI PMI INFLATION  
TOTAL
PMI IN FL A T IO N  
IN D IV ID U A L
PMI INFLATION  
C O RPO RAT E
1999 100 100 100 100
2000 103 105 113 101
2001 105 117 120 118
2002 107 125 132 125
2003 110 132 137 132
2004 112 137 141 137
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Further evidence that this long established trend continues can be seen from Datamonitor’s 
2010 report on UK Private Medical Insurance. This shows that whilst average premium rates 
for both group and individual policies continued to grow in 2009, that rate o f growth varied 
significantly for different types of policies - being 2.2% for group policies versus 7.2% for 
individuals (Datamonitor 2010).
Company (and particularly corporate) subscribers achieve better rates through a combination 
of use of brokers and the simple buying power that numbers bring. They also tend to have an 
actuarially more attractive base than individual subscribers, as typically the average age of 
their workforce (and dependents) will be below that of the average private subscriber. The 
margins - and hence profitability - o f the company and corporate market are significantly 
below that o f the individual market, but they do bring volume - and hence negotiating power, 
and an improved cash flow. In Bupa UK Membership for example, in 2006 approximately 
51 % of its business was within the corporate sector, 28% in company (defined as 2 to 10 
covered lives) and just 21% with individual subscribers (Laing and Buisson, 2008).
Unsurprisingly, with the combination of above inflation premium rises and the abolition of 
tax breaks for private medical insurance in 1997, the market for individual subscribers has 
been steadily shrinking. Bupa has been relatively successful in protecting this important 
market segment, but with average price increases of 11% between 1999 and 2003 alone, 
many managers regard this as an unsustainable trend. On this argument either price increases 
must fall back into line with general inflation or this valuable market will eventually wither 
away. It is the individual market that is usually considered the most directly threatened by 
improvements in the NHS. This sets the background against which many o f the changes 
examined in this thesis have been, and continue to be, played out.
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Changes in Market Share
Within the general trends noted above there have been some changes in the relative fortunes 
of individual companies in terms of market share (although we should take care not to 
assume that this automatically translates to profitability). During the 1950s three insurance 
companies dominated the small private insurance market (Higgins, 1988). This market 
catered for only about 1.2% of the general population in 1955 slowly rising to 2.7% in 1965 
(Calnan, Cant and Gabe, 1993, p.2). However, as private health care continued to expand it 
attracted new entrants, and that put the incumbent insurers under increased pressure. The 
three largest - British United Provident Association (Bupa), Private Patients Plan (PPP) and 
Western Provident Association (WPA) were all provident associations (see box) and these 
came under growing threat from commercial companies such as Norwich Union and Sun 
Alliance. By 1991 there were 28 private health insurers in the UK market and Bupa’s share 
had fallen from 80% in the 1970s to under 50% by 1990 (Calnan, Cant and Gabe, 1993, 
p. 13). Bupa’s fortunes continued to take a downward turn when it followed up its first 
recorded loss in 1981 with a record loss of £63 million in 1990.
It was evident that the company needed to adopt a more commercial attitude and the 
appointment o f a new Group Chief Executive (Val Gooding) recruited from British Airways 
in August 1998 saw a change in fortunes. The twin pillars of that success were a sustained 
focus on customer service and steep rises in premiums (an average 20% rise in 1991 alone) 
(Calnan, Cant and Gabe, 1993, p. 14). The latter recovered the company’s finances whilst the 
former helped mitigate the loss of customers. However it did mean that Bupa continued to 
lose market share in the early 1990’s even whilst its profitability recovered.
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Provident Associations
Provident Associations are a type o f legal organisational undertaking whose principle 
characteristics are:
There are no shareholders;
Any profits are reinvested in the company;
Funding cannot be obtained from the stock market (as there are no shares that can be 
sold). Instead funds have to be raised either from profits raised or from loans 
Provident Associations were a favoured organisational form for the original private 
insurers/not-for-profit organisations that that emerged following the creation o f the 
National Health Service. Provident Associations included Bupa and Western Provident 
Association (WPA).
In Bupa’s case oversight is provided by a Board o f Directors and 100 ‘members’ who 
have no direct economic interest in the company. Members in this context should not be 
confused with the general term ‘member’ used by Bupa to describe its insured customers 
in the UK.
In 2006 Bupa changed its legal status to that of a company limited by guarantee. In 
British company law this is an alternative type of corporation used primarily for non­
profit organisations that require legal personality. A guarantee company does not have 
share capital, but has members who are guarantors instead of shareholders. The 
guarantors give an undertaking to contribute a nominal amount (typically £1) towards the 
winding up o f the company in the event of a shortfall upon cessation of business. It 
cannot distribute its profits to its members, and is therefore eligible to apply for charitable 
status if  necessary. Conceptually this appears near identical to Provident status.
Bupa UKM saw subscription income grow by 47% between 1999 and 2002 compared to an 
industry wide increase o f 29%. A proportion of this was because of UKM’s success in 
recovering some o f the lost market share from earlier years. As of 2009 the division covered
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around 2.6 million people and has 1.4 million subscribers - approximately 17% higher than in 
1999 (Bupa, 2009).
This leads to two further observations. Firstly, Bupa has been relatively successful in the UK 
market compared to other insurers- as overall in that period UK PMI subscribers had 
increased by only 4%. Secondly, that as subscription income had grown, and with it the 
profitability margin (which had risen from -5% in 1999 to +5% in 2003 (Laing and Buisson, 
Bupa, 2005) in a market with relatively little overall growth, the principal cause o f increased 
profitability related to premium increases. This illustrates the (historically) notably inelastic 
nature o f private healthcare demand in the UK- and particularly as far as Bupa is concerned.
The only other viable explanation would be a falling cost base, but this is not the case. The 
continued growth o f medical expenses - both hospitals and clinicians -  is a recurring concern 
o f all UK insurers. This is compounded by medical costs having a relatively high baseline. 
UK private healthcare has long been relatively expensive compared to most other developed 
countries (Bramley-Hawker and Adam, 2003) and further rises makes the gap worse.
All of the above has left the marketing and sales executives of Bupa and their commercial 
rivals with a persistent challenge. The cost of their product is rising year on year. Demand 
(generally) has remained (surprisingly) buoyant but the personal market ‘cake’ continues to 
shrink. How does any insurer convince customers (a) that they should purchase/retain 
insurance cover and (b) to choose its company instead o f a rival?
A characteristic of insurance products, like financial products, is that they are largely 
invisible to the purchaser for much o f the time. This creates two inter-connected problems. 
How to convince the purchaser o f their utility (both initially and over time), and how to 
differentiate between insurance companies? The nature o f these two issues is such that prima  
facie  one might expect health insurance products to have very low net profitability. Yet this 
is generally not the case.
In the US some critics of the insurance industry have claimed that insurers enjoy good profits 
because of monopolistic pricing -  in part through company consolidation and also because 
the regulatory system makes it difficult for insurers to compete across states (HCAN, 2009; 
Cannon, 2009). Given the large geographical size and populations o f most US states, this
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does not seem a particularly convincing reason for local monopolies to emerge, although 
insurer consolidation is an issue. In fact, insurers had a history o f profitability prior to the 
recent wave of mergers. This suggests that profitability is not solely dependent on insurers’ 
ability to create monopolistic provision, but can arise from factors such as their ability to 
forecast likely claims and set premiums accordingly, the already noted price inelasticity of 
health care consumption, and the ability to limit claims expenditure through underwriting and 
utilisation review. Moreover the above drivers are not mutually exclusive.
The median 2009 net profit margin of 11 major US healthcare insurers was 3.9% (the range 
was -0.3% to + 8.4%) ( Flynn, 2010). This is roughly in line with Perry’s (2009) ranking of
thhealth insurance as the 86 most profitable industry in the USA. However ‘The Economist’ 
(2010) recently made the point that:
‘...the better measurement is not profit, but return on invested capital (ROIC). ROIC 
measures how much money it takes to set up and run an insurance company, versus 
how much profit it brings in. Unfortunately it's not so easy to find good ROIC figures. 
The closest equivalent Yahoo business has is return on equity (ROE), but that can 
vary according to whether firms are financed through equity or debt. Still, across the 
entire industry this hopefully evens out a bit, and what it shows is that ROE in health 
insurance is about 16.1%, roughly the same as for the health-care industry as a whole, 
and a good deal higher than the average ROE in most sectors o f the economy.’
Admittedly profitability is by no means certain in health insurance. Companies can -  and do 
-m ake losses. But what is being highlighted here is the ability o f most insurers to generate 
profits or ROIC in an industry in which -  on the surface - competitors should struggle to 
differentiate their products. As such economic theory would predict that profits would be low 
as pricing moves towards a situation where marginal cost and marginal income converge.
One does not have to rely entirely on explanations centring on monopolistic pricing (in either 
the USA or UK) to explain insurer profits. Other major determinants as previously noted 
include the aforementioned lack of price transparency, inelasticity o f demand, and an ability 
to control claims expenditure. In the UK, where private health insurance is additional to the 
NHS and brings no tax benefits, the ability to generate profits may also be plausibly linked to 
the growth o f the domestic economy.
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Notwithstanding this, part of the explanation for insurer profitability also lies in the barriers 
to entry for new insurers wishing to enter the market. The principal barriers are the financial 
reserves required by the regulator -  the Financial Services Authority (FSA) -  the set up costs 
of marketing and sales and the complexities o f attempting to obtain favourable contract terms 
with the major private hospital chains. Added to this is the innate conservatism of the 
traditional Private Medical Insurance (PMI) buyer in both the private and commercial 
markets in the UK. This latter characteristic also helps to explain the price inelasticity of 
insurance. For a company such as Bupa its ‘brand value’ - the recognition and positive 
associations associated with the name Bupa -  directly translates into enhanced profitability 
and customer loyalty. The UK private health insurance market remains dominated by a few 
companies, o f which Bupa has always been the biggest. Three companies, Bupa, AX A PPP 
and Aviva (formerly Norwich Union), share over 81% of the UK PMI market (Datamonitor 
2009)
To help counter the ‘invisibility’ of the product, the approach at Bupa throughout the time 
that the author was an employee was to welcome a certain level o f customer claims, 
particularly in the first year or two of purchase. The logic o f this was that claiming against 
insurance reinforced its value to the claimant and also provided an opportunity for a 
favourable impression to be gained of the company via contact with service centre staff. 
Clearly there is a risk this experience will be unfavourable through long waits for the call to 
be answered, rude or incompetent staff, denial o f the claim and so on. This is why (as will be 
highlighted once again in Chapter 7) Bupa’s senior executives placed such an importance on 
the culture and operation o f the service centres.
This relative ‘permissiveness’ in response to claims was felt by the author to be one of the 
defining features o f Bupa’s culture during his period with the company. The attitude itself 
inevitably brings a degree of tension between those whose primary mission sits within 
customer service/recruitment/retention/sales and those charged with managing claims costs.
A sub-plot o f that same dynamic was a relative readiness to accommodate relatively small- 
cost claims (for example, physiotherapy consultations) which may fall under the ‘chronic 
conditions’ exclusion found in most PMI rule books.
Such ‘permissiveness’ varies between companies, and this reflects the ‘image’ each company 
attempts to portray to the market. This functions as a differentiator in a market which sells
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products that are not easily distinguishable. The ‘market’ itself can be broken down into 
relatively discreet segments. The personal market (as the name suggests) makes no use of 
intermediaries and is dominated by direct marketing and selling to the individual. Decisions 
within the small company market are also likely to be dominated by a single decision-maker, 
but a wider number of considerations are required to be balanced by that person. Larger 
company/corporate accounts make much greater use of brokers and typically delegate 
decisions to committees.
Within the UK the way companies have approached the differentiation issue is quite 
interesting. An attempt to characterize the ‘brand’ position of a number of the players has 
been made below:
Bupa The ‘IBM’ o f PMI. Peace of mind. Price premium but high
customer satisfaction levels. Liberal interpretation o f rules.
Higher claims cost balanced by price management of providers 
by virtue of its size and expertise. Quality health care is a 
priority.
CIGNA Corporate PMI specialists. Call centre manned by nurses.
Managed care expertise. Niche insurer.
AXA PPP Comprehensive, price competitive. Assertive with providers.
Value for money. Strong on networks. Commercial ‘nous’.
WPA Alliance not conflict with doctors/hospitals. Customer centric.
Anti managed care.
HSA Affordable. No frills. What you see is what you get. Defined
cover for limited procedures.
Prudential Health Innovative. Rewards good health. Aimed at younger market.
New player with fresh ideas.
The point is not whether these characterizations are especially accurate but rather that 
attempts have been made to create market segments and company ‘branding’. The above 
positions also represent different assessments by companies of their relative strengths and 
weaknesses, opportunities to compete and the durability of particular segments o f the market. 
The relative willingness - or lack of it - to highlight the company’s approach to health care 
quality issues as a unique selling point (USP) is worth noting.
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Is UK Membership acting like a Preferred Provider Organisation (PPO)?
The key characteristics o f UK private healthcare described above affect the way the PMI 
market operates. Furthermore the present dynamics o f the private market suggest that, if 
current private sector practices were applied to the NHS, efficiency gains would be much less 
than claimed by the champions of neo-liberalism.
To this analysis one needs to add a further, more specific question - in what manner are UK 
insurers actually operating in relation to providers? The answer will indicate to what degree 
these insurers have an ability to discharge a larger role in a more pluralistic health economy - 
which is an important question within this thesis. The author’s contention is that insurers like 
Bupa UKM are currently operating in a manner akin to that of Preferred Provider 
Organisations (PPO’s) in the USA. That is to say they do not much resemble the more robust 
examples of US managed care organizations -  the health maintenance organizations 
(HMO’s).
The prime reason for this is that Bupa and other more traditional UK insurers do not consider 
the resultant behaviors would be welcomed by their customers, so that it would be 
commercially disadvantageous to move too far towards use of managed care techniques..
This is one o f the central observations o f this thesis. There is an enduring tension between 
the desire to undertake initiatives that aim to reduce provider costs or drive quality 
improvement, and concern that these will provoke an adverse customer reaction. This runs 
throughout the subsequent chapters where specific Bupa initiatives with regard to the market 
are examined.
Characteristics o f a PPO
To understand what a PPO is, and why the concept is relevant to the UK, we need to make a 
brief diversion to the USA. Preferred Provider Organisations (also sometimes referred to as 
Participating Provider Organisations) have been enjoying rapid growth in the USA for some 
time, so that 69% of people with private health care benefits, or more than 198 million
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Americans, now receive their care through these arrangements (AAPPO, 2010). This number 
far outstrips enrollment in HMO’s. However as Hurley, Bradley and White (2004) observe in 
their article on the ‘puzzling popularity of the PPO’, the appeal o f such organizations appears 
to lie in the PPO’s ability to characterize itself by ‘what it is not - namely an HMO’ (p.56). 
According to these authors, the added value that the PPO arrangement provides to customers 
remains unclear: it appears more than anything to be the beneficiary o f a consumer backlash 
against the restrictions imposed by ‘a discredited HMO product’ (Hurley, Bradley and White, 
2004, p.56).
The precise definition of what a PPO is, and how it differs from indemnity insurance on the 
one hand, and HMO-style managed care on the other, is not easy to grasp. Hurley et al 
describe it thus:
‘The PPO health benefit option is best understood as a configuration of benefit design 
features offered through a contracted network (its major distinction from indemnity 
options) that can be assembled in many different ways’ (Hurley, Bradley and White, 
2004, p.58).
The idea o f a preferred provider organization is to bring together insurers and providers for 
their mutual benefit. Within the PPO network, providers (doctors, hospitals, and other health 
professionals) contract with one or more insurers to provide care at a lower than normal rate. 
The insurers will be billed at a reduced rate when insured members utilise the services of the 
PPO preferred providers, and the providers will gain increased business as subscribers are 
directed towards services offered within the PPO. The insured members should also benefit, 
as lower costs to the insurer should result in lower rates of increase in premiums. That at least 
is the theory.
A PPO earns money by charging an access fee to the insurance company for the use o f its 
network. The PPO negotiates with providers to set fee schedules, and handles disputes 
between insurers and providers.
The differences between HMO’s and PPO’s are not clear cut but rather represent a difference 
in scale. Thus whilst some HMO products would provide little or no benefit should their 
members use a non-network provider, PPO members will be reimbursed for utilization of
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non-preferred providers, albeit at a reduced rate. Features such as utilization review and pre­
certification requirements which have been linked to the consumer backlash against HMO’s 
(Lesser, Ginsberg and Devers,2003; Robinson, 2004.) are present in PPO’s but typically 
implemented less aggressively.
PPO’s are the opposite of the ‘one size fits all’ rigidity that HMO’s gained a reputation for, 
and which appears to have resulted in a sharp fall in market share. Through PPO alliances, 
national networks can be created and their malleability allows their component parts to be 
shaped into a near infinite set of arrangements covering broad or narrow networks, expansive 
or meager benefits, intrusive or minimal medical management, greater or lesser cost-sharing 
and so on. Such flexibility is popular with both employers and those being insured. However 
this does nothing to control the notorious complexity o f US healthcare administration. Nor by 
its nature is it likely to be an effective mechanism for cost control, beyond offering low-cost 
insurance options (via cost sharing and/or limited benefits) for some customers.
The nature o f PPO networks also reduces the ability of PPO’s to drive large discounts. Their 
very liberalism tends to mean that they have broad networks - which dissipate the advantages 
of membership for providers, making them less inclined to offer discounts. UK examples of 
the same problem are a recurring theme in subsequent chapters.
The above may reflect an interesting dynamic of US healthcare, but what is its relevance to 
the UK? In fact, a great deal, because the above is an almost perfect description o f the 
dominant business model in the UK for private health insurers. In plain terms, UK insurers - 
including Bupa UKM - either operate in a manner akin to PPO’s or simply provide indemnity 
insurance. The technical objection that PPO’s are not insurers at all but rather a provider 
network may be true, but rather misses the point. The customer proposition offered by Bupa 
is essentially the same as a US insurer offering a PPO-based suite o f products to a US 
consumer. Traditionally the UK approach has been grounded in enhanced choice and quick 
access with minimal or no utilisation review. This is essentially the marketing strategy many 
US PPO’s have adopted to counter the consumer backlash against HMO’s. But as Hurley 
and colleagues (2004) point out, this has weakened the ability of PPO’s to contain costs or 
hold providers accountable for quality:
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‘Preferred provider network developers are not doing much to hold providers more 
accountable or position themselves to systematically improve care. Many such 
networks perceive this as being beyond the scope o f their responsibility, and some 
even take comfort in the fact that their limited field o f vision in care delivery absolves 
them of a need for a stronger sense of responsibility’ (Hurley, Bradley and White, 
2004, p.67).
The above quotation could apply equally to the attitudes o f many UK insurers. It is to Bupa 
UKM’s credit that they have adopted a somewhat more proactive approach than most others 
(as examined later in Chapter 6). However the above throws into question the ability o f any 
UK insurer to break out o f the pattern of providing a PPO-style set o f customer products, and 
to use market levers to improve health care provision. The later chapters return to this issue, 
as they seek to answer the question set at the outset o f this thesis; namely, ‘what might the 
role and limits o f market based solutions be within the context o f UK healthcare, and what 
does Bupa’s experience in this regard tell us about the current market dynamic’?
For Bupa UKM, a further crucial question is whether it too will face a consumer backlash to 
its attempts to implement initiatives centred around proactive cost and quality management of 
providers and (to a lesser extent) subscribers. The author would hypothesise that the closer 
the UK private health market mirrors that of the United States, the less likely are the chances 
that Bupa UKM will succeed in such initiatives, notwithstanding its large market share and 
countrywide sphere of operations.
The background provided above on the experience of US PPO’s should help us to see the 
claims and counter-claims of the various actors in the UK PMI market in proper perspective. 
Thus when the Federation of Independent Practitioners (FIPO) suggests that Bupa is 
‘.. .proposing a managed-care scenario’ (Glazer, October 2005), we need to recognise that 
whilst BUPA’s approach can resemble certain HMO-type practices in practice this is not a 
‘black or white’ issue. FIPO’s stated rejection of ‘.. .the concept that an insurance company 
should control or influence clinical decision making’ captures the opposition of many within 
the provider community to any attempt by purchasers to use buying power to change the way 
health care is delivered. Actually, however, it seems that most UK insurers are largely 
comfortable to operate in a world of indemnity and PPO-like insurance, and that even Bupa 
(which has been more innovative than most) has only attempted a limited number o f modest
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initiatives in this area.. Nevertheless, these initiatives do provide valuable insights into what 
is currently possible, and the extent to which it may be viable to use market levers either to 
improve the UK private sector or the NHS.
The current stance o f UK insurers is determined by assessments o f what motivates UK 
citizens (and companies) to purchase health insurance. If, as seems likely, that motivation lies 
in strongly held views about the importance o f choice, traditional notions o f what constitutes 
a high-quality doctor and a preference for privately run, aesthetically pleasing hospitals, then 
the current standard operating model meets the market demand. However that model is 
relatively indifferent to the supposed price/quality advantages o f ‘managed care’. Ironically 
this rejection of economic rationalism also helps to explain the surprising resilience o f the 
private sector in the face o f increased investment in the NHS and reduced waiting times.
This may also help explain the findings of a number of studies that have examined what 
drives the purchase o f private medical insurance.
Propper, Rees and Green’s (1999) study into the demand for PMI in the UK concluded that 
NHS waiting list changes did not have a significant effect on purchase of PMI; concluding 
that many PMI users are suspicious o f government claims of falling NHS waiting times and 
rising quality. This links with the observation that:
‘The NHS is a highly supported institution in the UK. Its political nature means that
use o f the private sector has been seen as a political statement.’ (Propper, Rees and
Green, 1999, p.6).
The same article also observed generational changes in attitude to private health care with 
younger generations more likely to purchase insurance than older ones. The findings o f this 
study are at odds with earlier work by Besley, Hall and Preston (1999) that stated that there 
was a relationship between waiting times and PMI purchase. King and Mossialos also 
concluded that ‘...a  key motivating factor in choosing to purchase PMI is to avoid waiting for 
treatment within the N H S’ (2005, p. 198) yet there is clearly more to the decision to purchase 
(and retain) PMI than simply a desire to obtain faster treatment. The sociological and 
demographic profile of the average subscriber has been alluded to earlier and King and 
Mossialos profile is that o f ‘ a well-educated individual, most likely male, who politically
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supports the centre-right and comes to consider PMI as his or her age makes health care 
needs more likely’ (King and Mossialos, 2005, p.209).
The above has translated into a subscriber base with a ‘surprisingly’ inelastic demand curve. 
The word ‘surprisingly’ is used because many within (and outside of) PMI have expected the 
imminent collapse o f PMI as premiums year on year have risen above inflation, and the NHS 
have reported ‘quality’ improvements such as falling waiting times (DoH,2010d). King and 
Mossialos (2005) calculated it as being 0.50 (that is, a one percent increase in price would 
result in a 0.5 percent decrease in demand for PMI). Other authors agree that demand to date 
has been relatively price inelastic although unsurprisingly they vary somewhat as to what 
precisely that figure is. This reflects in part the different time periods when these studies 
were undertaken. Propper and Maynard (1989) for example, calculated the short term price 
elasticity to be 0.6 rising to 2.55 in the long run. These authors made the astute observation 
(given the subsequent history of provider price increases) that:
‘The low value for the estimate of the short run elasticity implies that if  providers 
raised their charges aggressively and these costs were passed on in high premise, 
market demand would decline by a relatively small amount.’ (Propper and Maynard,
1989, Abstract p.ii).
Propper and Maynard offer the tentative conclusion that providers could be ‘aggressive price 
makers with little risk o f losing market share’ (1989, Abstract p.ii). This prediction has been 
borne out by the experience of the subsequent 20 years. It is against this backdrop that we 
next examine the hospital sector.
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CHAPTER 3
The Dynamics of the UK Hospital Market 
Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to examine how far a market is operating in the provision of 
private hospital services in the UK and to assess, in association with subsequent chapters, the 
degree to which purchasers are able to influence provider behaviour. As part of this, the 
chapter considers whether market mechanisms will be able to deliver care o f the same (or 
higher) quality at a lower price for those purchasing private healthcare in the UK. In doing so 
an assessment is made as to what degree the cost base and operating philosophies o f hospital 
providers reflect the specific characteristics of demand for private healthcare in the UK, and 
how this is likely to impact on attempts to make changes to the hospital market. Case studies 
based on the experience of Bupa’s UKM Division will be used to illuminate these issues.
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UK Private Hospital Providers: An Overview
i. Composition o f  the Hospital Market
The UK private hospital sector is not large and most o f  the hospitals are owned by one o f  five 
hospital chains. These five independent providers constitute 80% o f  the private hospital 
market. This can be dem onstrated by looking at Table 1 below:
Table 3: Major acute medical/surgical hospital operators with number o f medical/surgical 
hospitals and number o f beds, UK (Ranked by revenue) as of June 2009 
Source: Laing and Buisson HMN Date: June 2009
Operator Hospitals Beds Day
Beds
Operating
Theatres
Latest Annual 
Revenues(£m )
BMI Healthcare 57 2 ,729 226 156 717.4
Spire Healthcare 36 1,808 210 112 460
Nuffield Hospital 30 1,300 116 94 450
N H S Pay Bed Units 79 1,275 151 N /A 408
Ramsay Health Care UK 32 934 124 63 398
HCA Healthcare 6 749 86 36 369
The London Clinic 1 202 N /A 12 95
Care UK (incorporating PHG) 8 125 99 20 94
Covenant Health Care 8 133 0 9 73.3
Circle 6 0 22 11 70
Aspen Health Care 3 121 18 11 66
Bupa W ellness (Crom well Hospital) 1 128 27 6 61
Hospital o f  St John & St Elizabeth 1 155 13 5 33
Interhealth Care Services 52 32 5 29
The Hospital Medical Group 1 31 N/A 4 26
UK Specialist  Hospitals 1 34 N/A 4 25.3
Netcare Health Care (U K ) Ltd 69 N/A 6 24
British Pregnancy Advisory Services Grp 19 30 70 8 23
The Benenden Hospital 1 100 20 3 22
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NHS pay beds/units (not counted here as one of these five) account for 1275 beds-some 13% 
of overall bed availability. Moreover these beds -  and NHS hospitals in general - are often 
used for the most complex operations (as most private hospitals are not equipped or staffed to 
safely undertake them). However unlike the hospital groups, NHS trusts do not operate as a 
single corporate entity in contract negotiations.
Whilst there are periodic changes to the ownership of hospital chains and the precise number 
of hospitals contained within them, the essential structure and dynamic of the market has 
remained unchanged for some time. That dynamic has been driven by a desire o f the 
dominant players to establish a chain o f hospitals that provide either effective local 
geographic dominance of private provision and/or a significant presence in the major 
population centres o f PMI cover. The net result is to make the private hospital providers (in 
the words o f the OFT) ‘...practically indispensable trading partners for PM I’s o f all sizes’ 
(OFT, 2001a). This, coupled with the characteristics o f demand for private healthcare that 
were outlined in Chapter 2 have arguably generated a strong degree o f subsequent ‘path 
dependency’. The theory of path dependency argues that antecedent conditions substantially 
shape subsequent developments, so that, for example, predictable amplifications o f small 
differences at an initial starting point can lead to subsequent entrenchment o f a particular 
solution. One often cited (though disputed) example is the success o f QWERTY over the 
Dvorak keyboard layout (David 1985).
Since 1980 capacity in private hospitals has increased substantially. In 1980, some 154 
hospitals supplied 7,035 beds. When the OFT reported its investigation into private medical 
insurance in 2001 this had increased to 227 hospitals and 11681 beds (OFT, 2001b). 
Interestingly, private hospital beds had been growing throughout a time when the NHS had 
made significant reductions in its bed stock.
Once established, these private hospital chains produced a market in which there has been an 
interdependence between insurers and these groups, with an uneasy ‘balance’ existing 
between demand and supply forces, reinforced by network agreements (as will be described 
later in this chapter) This meant relatively stable groupings of hospitals and insurers 
(although who actually owns the hospital groups has been subject to change), with the 
OFT/Competition Commission periodically being asked to determine if any o f these 
companies can increase their market share by acquisition of smaller companies.
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General Health Care Group
The history and recent acquisition of the UK’s largest private hospital provider General 
Health Care Group (GHG) illustrates this general trend and gives an insight into the complex 
and fast moving financing/ownership arrangements that often underpin company structures. 
GHG evolved though the development and acquisition of a number o f private healthcare 
organizations since 1970. The history of the group started when AMI, a leading US for-profit 
hospital provider, entered the market with the purchase o f its first UK hospital, The Harley 
Street Clinic, in 1970. By 1983, through a combination o f acquisitions and a new building 
programme, the group had grown to 13 hospitals. In 1988 the group was floated on the 
London Stock Exchange as AMI Healthcare Group.
In 1990 Generale des Eaux acquired the Group through its sister company Generale de Sante. 
In 1993 the hospital operating company changed its name to BMI Healthcare and General 
Healthcare Group (GHG) was chosen as the new corporate group name.
In 1997 the Group was acquired by funds managed by Cinven Ltd. In the same year GHG 
was merged with Amicus Healthcare Group Ltd, which had developed its 15 hospitals 
between 1982 and 1995 under the ownership o f Grand Metropolitan Pic and Compass Group 
Pic. Cinven funds had acquired Amicus in 1995 at which time it ranked fourth largest 
amongst all private acute care hospital providers in the UK.
The group's portfolio of over 40 hospitals expanded further, and in 2000 a majority 
shareholding was acquired by BC Partners, a private Equity Company. In May 2006 the 
company was bought by a consortium led by Network Healthcare Holdings Limited 
(Netcare). Network Healthcare Holdings Limited, a South African public company, now has 
the controlling interest in the combined business.
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Bupa Hospitals Ltd
Bupa Hospitals by contrast had its plans to increase its hospital base by acquisition rejected 
by the competition authorities. In 2000 its planned acquisition o f Community Hospitals 
Group was vetoed by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (now known as the 
Competition Commission). The Commission’s conclusion is interesting:
‘Bupa said that competition should be looked at in terms o f local markets and suggested that 
any problems could be dealt with by divestments. We conducted our own analysis of local 
markets and identified some areas where competition would be adversely affected. However, 
we found that the much more important adverse effects o f the proposed merger would be a 
reduction o f competition in the PMS market and higher prices for PMI and PMS than would 
otherwise have been the case, and hence that the proposed merger would be adverse to the 
public interest.
Bupa told us o f its care to ensure the integrity of the separation o f PMI and PMS functions 
and said that it proposed to take various measures to separate its PMI and PMS businesses 
still further, while retaining both within its ownership and control. We considered these 
arrangements carefully but in the light o f our finding we concluded that nothing short o f 
putting the businesses under separate ownership and control would meet the case 
satisfactorily. However, Bupa told us that it would not proceed with the merger on that basis’ 
(Competition Commission, 2000, p.4).
With their hopes of expansion via acquisition thwarted, Bupa initially decided on a different 
course of action - disposal of its smaller hospitals. In 2005 Bupa hospitals sold nine o f its 
hospitals (leaving it with twenty-six) to the newly formed Classic Hospitals Group - which 
became the fifth largest private hospital provider in the UK in the process. The financial 
backers o f Classic were Legal and General Ventures. This was significant in that Classic, like 
General Healthcare Group was principally owned by venture capital organizations 
(increasingly called private equity investors). Their principal aim can be characterised as 
building up the value of the company for eventual sale to another organisation-hence the 
seemingly bewildering changes in ownership within the brief history o f GHG presented 
above.
The above considerations provide an insight into the likely business strategy of such 
organisations - including how they are likely to approach contract negotiations. A proposition
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from insurers based on reducing prices in the short to medium term for the potential o f longer 
term growth is unlikely to elicit a positive response from companies operating in this highly 
leveraged environment backed by private equity investors.
When Bupa disposed of nine hospitals in 2005 most industry observers thought that no 
further restructuring of the hospital business was likely for some time, Bupa Group therefore 
surprised many observers by announcing in April 2007 that it was seeking buyers for the rest 
o f BHL. As if to reinforce the above point, Classic Hospitals was subsequently sold to Spire 
Healthcare in February 2008 reuniting it with Bupa’s other hospitals (see below). Bupa 
subsequently sold its 25 UK hospitals to the European private equity firm Cinven for £1.44 
billion (Bupa Group Press Release, 2007). The reason for the sale was given by Val Gooding 
(then Bupa Group Chief Executive) as follows;
‘The reason we invested in hospitals in the 70s was because there was insufficient 
capacity of the right quality for privately-insured patients. Since then there has been a 
significant increase in the number of quality private hospital facilities -  with a choice 
in most localities’.
The sale was the source of some controversy within Bupa, with the Chairman o f Bupa Group 
(Bryan Sanderson) resigning in protest over the decision (Pfeifer, 2007a). The Board’s 
decision to sell its hospital business provoked speculation that this could be a precursor to an 
eventual sale o f the entire business to private equity groups (Pfeifer, 2007b).
There was a further surprise in store for analysts when Bupa announced in March 2008 that it 
had purchased the Cromwell Hospital in central London for £90 million (Bupa Group Press 
Release, 2008a). This move was clearly intended to create a ‘flagship’ hospital that would be 
a preferred location for Bupa-insured customers and challenge the traditional hegemony o f 
HCA and other private providers in London. At 128 beds the Cromwell Hospital is large by 
UK private hospital standards and has an established ‘brand’ reputation. The sale o f Bupa 
hospitals allowed the Cromwell hospital to be purchased without fear o f the acquisition being 
blocked by the OFT and thus signaled a further round in the continual struggle between the 
insurer and providers in the nation’s capital.
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ii. Determinants of Success in the Private Hospital Market
Evidence of high prices and inelastic demand may make it appear that it is relatively easy to 
make substantial profits from running private hospitals in the UK. Whilst the continued 
interest o f investors would appear to give credence to this assertion, it should also be noted 
that private hospitals periodically go out o f business (for example the North Wales Medical 
Centre in September 2006).Clearly it is not a simple case of opening a facility and watching 
the profits walk through the door.
As will be subsequently illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7 on healthcare quality, private hospitals 
in the UK firmly subscribe to the idea that most customers/patients’ sense o f quality 
healthcare is bound up in the aesthetics o f buildings, staff attitudes and convenience. These 
attributes have been the foundation stones of the UK private market from the outset. Another 
critical success factor will be considered in Chapter 4 on the consultant market - the ability to 
attract the right consultants to work at the hospital - so much so that it is often said within the 
industry that private hospitals do not so much compete for the same pool of patients as for the 
same pool o f consultants. This is bound up with the idea that it is consultants that largely 
determine where patients will be initially seen and treated, not the patients themselves. Thus 
the Competition Commission summarised evidence received from Bupa regarding this point 
thus:
‘Running a hospital was about attracting consultants to use it. Their importance in the 
private hospitals market could not be overstated. They were the key determinant of 
hospital choice...’ (Competition Commission, 2000, p. 125).
The Rise of Hospital Networks
Another major determinant o f the financial viability of a private hospital has been considered 
to be whether it is included in the networks o f the major insurers. Networks constructed by 
insurers have been a controversial issue within the industry. Their creation was initially 
resisted by most of the major hospital groups who feared that - as in the USA - deep 
discounting would be a condition o f membership. Latterly, the uncertainty as to whether 
networks are a good or bad idea has moved increasingly to the insurers themselves.
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Networks are a reasonably recent development in the UK private healthcare market, first 
being introduced during the mid 1990s. Up to that point, insurance products were 
traditionally based on full indemnity with the policy holder able to go to almost any provider 
for treatment. Bupa UK Membership (UKM) was the first major insurer to successfully 
develop a hospital network in May 1996 (there had been an initial, abortive attempt to do so 
in 1992). The network scheme offered members a lower premium price in return for a 
reduced choice o f hospitals.
For hospitals the proposed network was a double-edged sword. On the one hand they were 
being asked to reduce their charges in order to be included in the network. However, the 
insurer had emphasized the supposed advantages of being in that network-namely, increased 
patient volumes as a preferred provider. The flip side of non-network status was supposed to 
be a significant reduction in patient volume as insurers sold increasing numbers of network 
policies; and those members would only be eligible to access network products. The 
advantages and disadvantages o f network members were nearly identical for any provider -  
bar those who were able to attract a significant percentage of their revenues from self-pay 
patients. A key factor in the overall assessment from the hospital side was the perceived 
ability (or otherwise) o f the insurer to shift traditional volumes towards hospitals in the 
network and away from those outside.
Network skeptics had a number of criticisms of the scheme - many o f which were reflected in 
submissions to the Competition Commission. With regard to the UKM initiative, providers 
were suspicious that the construction o f a network was both a ploy to drive increased volume 
into Bupa-owned hospitals and was concerned only with price, not quality. These were 
charges that Bupa has always strenuously denied. The Competition Commission summarized 
evidence presented by Bupa in the following terms:
‘Bupa denied that non-Bupa hospitals were less likely to be selected for inclusion in 
the Bupa PMI network if there was a Bupa PMS-owned hospital in the same area. 
There were examples of Bupa and non-Bupa hospitals in keen competition that were 
both included in the Bupa PMI network, for example in the Cambridge and 
Brentwood areas. Where non-Bupa hospitals in competition with Bupa owned 
hospitals were excluded from the network, there were valid reasons for it’ 
(Competition Commission, 2000, p. 127).
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The decision to include or exclude a hospital from a network was ostensibly based on 
objective criteria relating to clinical quality, servicing, price and overall value. Ownership 
was supposedly not relevant. However the Competition Commission was not convinced by 
this explanation, or the assurance by Bupa that it operated a strict ‘Chinese wall’ policy 
between its hospital and insurance businesses (Competition Commission, 2000, p. 123), and 
subsequently ruled that the company would have to put its hospital business under separate 
ownership if it wished to acquire further hospitals.
The robustness of Bupa’s quality criteria will be considered in some detail in Chapter 7 on 
quality. For the present it is simply worth noting that in the evidence provided above, Bupa 
sketched out a situation where both a Bupa and an independent hospital might sit within the 
network but failed to provide an example where a Bupa hospital had been excluded.
However from the author’s experience in the company, internal organisational pressures 
would have made it very difficult for UKM to have excluded a Bupa facility from the 
network. There would be the impact on the ‘brand’ o f advising members that their local Bupa 
hospital was not available, and there was also a management reporting structure that saw both 
the heads o f Bupa hospitals and UKM reporting directly to the Chief Executive of Bupa 
Group.
The Competition Commission noted that Bupa UKM had stated that it took a different 
approach to network construction from that of AXA/PPP. The Commission summarized 
Bupa’s position in the following statement.
‘Bupa PMI said that PPP’s network was built up on a tendering process in contrast to 
its own which was based on a process o f selection and negotiation. The other insurers 
with networks, Norwich Union and Standard Life, followed Bupa PM l’s approach. 
Bupa PMI had initially attempted to put together a network by tender, but the lessons 
that had been learned had caused it to move to its present approach. All insurers 
sought additional discounts from hospitals for their network products in order to keep 
costs down. Bupa PMI believed that on balance its judgment on building networks 
this way had been vindicated - customers could now choose a network product and 
over one million had done so, making material savings as a consequence. Bupa
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believed that networks had also helped to drive up standards’ (Competition 
Commission, 2000, p. 128).
It is a moot point as to what really separates a tendering process from one based on selection 
and negotiation. The implied difference is that tenders concentrate primarily on price and 
represent a fixed offer against a formal specification; whilst selection is more quality-based 
and negotiation uses an iterative process to produce a non-confrontational means to an 
agreement. None of the above is necessarily true. In practice, the major hospital chains’ 
response to this type of negotiating process was to try and insist firstly, that all their hospitals 
were o f a high quality (and thus should be in the network) and secondly that Bupa UKM 
would have to agree a contract based on all hospitals being in the network .. .or out of it.
Most hospital groups also negotiated from a position that they wanted a single schedule of 
charges to apply across all the hospitals of that group, thus negating any opportunities the 
insurer may have to take advantage of local market conditions across the UK by agreeing 
hospital specific prices.
It is difficult to reach an assessment of whether insurer or hospital groups came out on top in 
the negotiations over networks that Bupa initiated. The Competition Commission summed 
up the picture emerging from Bupa’s evidence by suggesting that the major chains ended up 
playing a central role, largely on their own preferred terms:
‘When the current Bupa PMI network product was put together in May 1996 the 
major chains had provided the central spine o f the network and independents had 
tended to be included in areas not covered by them’ (Competition Commission, 2000, 
p.127).
Network products have subsequently proved popular with customers and for some time UKM 
executives considered the network they had created as clearly beneficial to the company’s 
fortunes and a major contributor to keeping costs down. Aside from the discounts negotiated 
from participating network hospitals, the view was that the existence o f the network was 
acting as a significant barrier to new providers. It is certainly true that it did erect a significant 
further barrier to entry - as a new entrant would much prefer access to all PMI customers, and 
unless it could gain entry into the network, a significant percentage o f PMI patients would be 
denied to them. Network incumbents were particularly watchful o f any attempt by the insurer
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to add providers to the network, as it would increase competition and reduce the value of 
network membership.
This barrier to entry was supposedly keeping hospital costs under control by firstly, 
persuading network hospitals that it was worthwhile to continue providing discounts, and 
secondly, avoiding local medical ‘arms races’ between existing incumbents and new entrants 
- with both chasing the same patients and with two sets o f running costs to cover. Partly as a 
result of insurers’ network initiatives the number of private beds actually dropped from 
11,600 in 1993 to 9,800 in 2003 (the high point was 11.800 in 1995), whilst the value o f the 
private market grew from £1.8 billion to £4.4billion over the same period (Laing and 
Buisson, 2005). The June 2009 figure stood at 9975 beds, although it should be noted that in 
addition to the 9975 inpatient beds some 1214 day beds are also reported (Laing and Buisson, 
2009).
However, over the time that the author was employed at Bupa many senior managers formed 
a more jaundiced view of the impact o f the network, holding that it had a number o f 
significant disadvantages and had effectively ‘gone past its sell by date’. There was, firstly, a 
perception that a network consisting of 369 hospitals (of which 180 were ‘partnership’ 
hospitals) was arguably too large. The network allowed members to access practically all the 
private hospitals that a member on a non-network product had access to. As a result, there 
was very little added value to customers on a premium-priced product compared to those who 
had purchased a budget policy. For example, the only private hospital in London that a Bupa 
network customer did not have access to compared to an A scale member (see Box) was 
Cromwell hospital, and even that hospital became available in 2005.
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Scale Products and ‘Price Targeting’
The lack of a significant differential between a network versus a ‘Scale A’ 
product was a source of constant concern to many managers within UK 
Membership. Scale A products carried a significant price premium and thus the 
company was keen to retain members on them. At the same time sales and 
customer service staff would be asking ,‘ What can 1 say are the advantages of 
Scale A, what is the differential?’
The price inelasticity of the A scale policy is probably best explained as an 
example o f ‘price-targeting’ by consumers. Tim Harford (2006) uses the analogy 
of the coffee shop to describe this process. The Scale A customer ‘on average’ 
was saying ‘I’m not sensitive to price. I want the full package....because I can’. 
The concern was always that the actual difference between product offerings was 
too small. However the focus needs to be on the customer perception of that 
differential and why they pay it? Harford says that the difference in the real cost 
of a cappuccino and a Venti White Chocolate Mocha is very small compared to 
the price differential (£1.85 to £3.09), but people pay this because they know it is 
an indulgence - ‘hey I’m special, I feel greedy and I deserve it’. In economist’s 
jargon they are not price sensitive at this point. In private healthcare this is 
reinforced by information asymmetry. Unlike the quality of coffee which can at 
least be tasted, the quality of healthcare is hard for the average consumer to 
assess. Consequently people tend to use price as a proxy, reasoning that 
expensive care must be high quality care.
In fact at the time of writing UKM has by far the largest number of network hospitals o f any 
UK insurer. Norwich Union’s network is the next biggest with 305 hospitals, followed by 
Standard Life Healthcare’s network of 270 hospitals and AXA PPP’s network o f 226 
hospitals.
The second perceived problem was that network hospitals had expected to see an increase in 
patient volumes, which for many failed to materialize. Several hospitals subsequently
62
attempted to raise prices to compensate. This also resulted to some provider skepticism about 
the benefits of subsequent initiatives that were network based.
A third problem was that a wide network made it difficult to exclude the more expensive 
hospital providers. Members could access these hospitals regardless o f their relative costs - a 
decided advantage for members on network products but not helpful to cost control within 
Bupa.
A fourth difficulty was that failure to establish a tight network resulted in members 
effectively being able to access all registered clinicians with little or no attempt by UKM to 
influence patient choice, again something which tended to increase costs.
Finally there was the observation that the conscious restriction o f new providers into the 
market was not only inherently anti-competitive, but was also likely to hamper attempts to 
force existing providers to reduce their prices. It is interesting that the DoH and UKM had 
diametrically opposite policies with regard to new providers. The DoH has pursued a 
conscious policy o f positively encouraging new providers and creating capacity - and through 
this it has hoped to provoke competition. The expectation is that this would (amongst other 
things) help contain prices. UKM, (as seen above) spent much o f the 1990s and the first five 
years o f the 21st century trying to do the opposite. In fact Bupa’s approach has been closer to 
that o f Governments, such as the Netherlands and Germany which have tried to limit provider 
numbers as a mechanism of cost control (Lewis et al 2006).
One analysis of the situation familiar to senior Bupa managers was that provider costs were 
unacceptably high in the UK and that this was a reflection in part o f relatively weak 
purchaser power. But tackling this would require significant changes to way UKM dealt with 
both hospitals and consultants. Central to the debate within Bupa was the idea that UKM 
could not realistically hope to obtain price reductions from providers -  and hence make PMI 
more affordable - unless the company was able to bring to bear a significant degree of 
‘directionality’ to those members who had purchased a network product (i.e. channeling these 
patients to a narrower group of providers). Furthermore, the gains to providers - both 
hospitals and clinicians - o f being a member o f the network had to translate into increased 
patient volume. This would require a tighter network e.g. a smaller number o f hospitals and 
clinicians. At the same time this would reinvigorate the premium-priced products that offered
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members unrestricted access, as there would now be ‘clear blue water’ between these 
customer propositions.
Enthusiasm for a policy geared to lower provider prices was counterbalanced by anxiety that 
this would impose choice restrictions on members and result in conflict with powerful 
providers. The outcome of this policy debate was a series o f initiatives subsequently 
described in this thesis. Throughout, UKM tried to convince both its members and highly 
skeptical-and often outright hostile-providers, that these initiatives were about re-invigorating 
the private healthcare market, and concerned with quality healthcare, rather than price 
reductions per se, and/or increased profits for Bupa.
NHS Driven Changes to the Private Sector
Whilst Bupa UKM were considering how it could influence providers and reduce costs, there 
was arguably a much more significant series of changes taking place as a by-product o f 
government reforms directed at the NHS. The net result was that the private hospital 
providers were faced with a number of new opportunities and threats specifically derived 
from government policy initiatives for NHS patients. These came in two forms.
One was the potential threat to the existing private market from an improving NHS - 
particularly lower waiting times. Another consisted o f the opportunities that would arise 
from an increasing use of private providers to deliver services for NHS patients. Most private 
hospitals had undertaken some NHS waiting-list initiatives work in the past - effectively as 
the provider o f last resort for NHS commissioners desperate to meet a wait-time target. This 
work was typically unplanned and opportunistic in character. The difference now was both 
one o f scale, and that the government had signaled it wanted to get into a longer-term 
relationship with the private sector.
Successive governments have been keen to encourage private sector involvement in the 
provision of NHS services for four main reasons:
(i) As a mechanism to rapidly increase capacity so as to tackle problems in 
specialities/areas with long waiting times for treatment;
(ii) To increase the number of potential providers so as to stimulate competition;
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(iii) To accelerate reform within the NHS. Timmins (2005 p i 193) states that whilst private 
sector treatments for NHS patients have ‘ . had a limited effect on the numbers, they 
have had a huge effect on behaviour. Faced by the threat o f competition... surgeons 
and NHS managers have raised their game.’
(iv) As part of 1 -3 above, to create a stronger labour market, especially for services 
provided by doctors (and weaken the power o f consultants and their professional 
bodies).
The impact of that involvement is considerably greater than the actual statistics of treatment 
in private sector facilities would indicate. The first wave of independent treatment centers 
(ISTC’s) provided around 170,000 procedures a year over a five-year period. The NHS was 
to purchase a further 250,000 annual treatments, but this number looks set to be considerably 
smaller as a number of these schemes have been cancelled (Timmins, 2007). The original aim 
of government was that the ISTC’s would provide 7-8% of non-emergency procedures by 
2008 (the NHS undertakes about 5.5m elective procedures per year). In May 2005 the 
Secretary o f State for Health (Patricia Hewitt) announced an intention that £3 billion would 
be spent on 1.7 million elective operations over the next five years. This would bring the 
proportion of NHS operations undertaken within the private sector up to 11%. (Kmietowicz, 
2005).
Actually the volume of NHS work performed o f ISTC’s until April 2006 appears to have 
been lower than anticipated. Moore (2007) calculated that the new private centers had done 
only 59% of the average annual number of operations planned (Moore, 2007). A subsequent 
Health Service Journal article by the same author estimated the value o f the gap between 
guaranteed payments and actual patients treated at £350million (Moore, 2008). However as 
The Economist pointed out, the debate about the waste associated with funded treatments that 
were never completed neglected a second policy aim.
‘It also misses their most important purpose: to break the monopoly o f provision 
within the NHS. That is why so many health-service staff dislike them. And that is 
why they are so vital if the whole of the NHS is to deliver better value for money’
(The Economist, 2006, p.27).
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Commentators have differed in their assessments of the strength o f the Government’s 
commitment to the growth o f the private health care sector. As the authors of a recent Kings 
Fund report noted:
‘.. .it is not clear whether the government is fully committed to a supplier market, or 
whether it merely wants to use the stimulus o f limited competition from the 
independent sector as a tool intended to improve the performance o f NHS-run 
organizations’ (Parston et al., 2006, p.7).
Nevertheless the size and potential profitability of the ISTC program was such that most 
private providers did not feel they could simply ignore this ‘new’ market. However, the 
companies that dominated the UK private hospital market received an unpleasant shock when 
none of them were awarded contracts for the first round o f treatment centers (with the 
exception o f the Bupa/NHS joint venture at Redhill which opened in January 2003, predating 
the national procurement o f treatment centers and was not followed by any further contracts 
awarded to Bupa in that first phase).
Instead, a new wave o f providers such as Nations Healthcare, Netcare, Care UK, Afrox and 
Mercury received preferred bidder status. Five o f these companies were overseas-based (from 
South Africa, the USA and Canada) and only two from the UK. Industry insiders believed 
that one of the reasons that the DoH had chosen ‘non traditional’ providers was to challenge 
the traditional hegemony o f the UK private hospital groups, and o f NHS consultants who 
supplied clinical services to them. A significant attraction o f the overseas companies to the 
DoH was their willingness to recruit overseas doctors to operate in the treatment centers. This 
was to become a controversial issue among NHS consultants, who were quick to raise 
concerns about the quality o f the treatment undertaken at treatment centers and call for the 
publication o f clinical audits (Wallace, 2006).
This unexpected loss to new providers meant existing hospital groups needed to consider 
both their current business propositions and whether they wished to seriously compete in the 
new market. The companies concerned - BMI, Nuffield, Capio, (now called Ramsey 
Healthcare following Capio’s acquisition in November 2007) HCA and Bupa hospitals - took 
different approaches.
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Nuffield Hospitals’ Approach
Both Nuffield and Capio viewed the prospect of NHS work as a significant business 
opportunity and quickly developed a strategy for working in partnership with the NHS. As 
part o f this they cut their prices to the NHS to near HRG tariff rates.
Concurrently Nuffield gave notice to insurers with whom it had existing contracts that new 
prices would apply from 1st January 2006. Nuffield’s new pricing structure involved three 
tiers of prices (T1 toT3) based on different service propositions.
T1 would be the NHS HRG tariff and would be restricted to the NHS until at least 2008. It 
would also be an all-inclusive price, thus requiring Nuffield to tackle the long-standing 
preference o f consultants to bill separately (see chapter 4). The service model underpinning 
these prices was based on the principle that payers would have restricted access based on 
time o f treatment, requiring advanced booking with treatment dates that would be set by 
Nuffield hospitals. In addition there was to be no guarantee of continuity of consultant, with 
care based on standardized pathways and limited ‘peripheral’ customer services.
T2 pricing would be set at a level higher than T1. It would be more flexible and guarantee 
treatment within a shorter time-scale then T1. However payers would still have restricted 
access based on time-to-treatment, requiring advanced booking, and a treatment date set by 
Nuffield Hospitals. There would be a guarantee of a consultant undertaking the treatment, but 
Nuffield would choose that clinician - not the patient. Standardized care pathways would be 
used. Discounts on T2 prices would be available to insurers who offered guaranteed levels of 
volume and purchasing patterns.
T3 pricing would be set at a higher level again from T2 (Nuffield talked about this being in 
the region o f 15%) and would be based on the current ‘bespoke’ approach that was the 
dominant idiom of private healthcare in the UK. It would allow unrestricted choice of 
consultant, hospital and treatment dates. Discounts would not be available to any purchaser. 
Whereas T1 and T2 pricing would be procedure-based and inclusive o f consultant fees (with 
a view to moving to episode based pricing), T3 would continue the practice of separate
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billing by hospitals and consultants. Nuffield also stated that the charging structure for all 
tiers would change to more accurately reflect the cost of providing various treatments (which 
by implication meant that Nuffield believed the prices charged/reimbursed for both 
consultants and hospitals for many procedures inadequately reflected actual costs).
Nuffield’s new strategy was an unwelcome challenge to insurers. They feared that their 
current insurance products would lose in competition with the cheaper Nuffield service 
proposition (T1 and T2). Insurance policies have defined benefits -  including where members 
can be treated and what prior authorization (if any) is required from the insurer. These are 
potentially expensive to change with costs being incurred in everything from legal fees and 
printing through to staff training and software adaptations. Customers typically view changes 
to their policies with suspicion, with the risk o f non-renewal. The pace of Nuffield’s 
proposed changes thus confronted the insurers with the unwelcome prospect o f re-designing 
their ‘products’ within a six months timescale that most considered inadequate to transfer 
their customers across to new terms
Another issue was that Nuffield’s service proposition for T1 and T2 pricing was considered 
to offer a lesser standard o f service than that currently enjoyed by insured patients. Nuffield’s 
approach was thought to be reducing the ‘clear blue water’ between private insurance and 
reliance on the NHS. Although Nuffield did not enjoy national dominance, the distribution o f 
private hospital ownership meant that there were few alternative providers in certain 
geographical areas. The question raised by some senior insurance company managers was: 
would customers in those areas conclude that there was insufficient differential between 
private and NHS care to justify the cost o f private insurance?
There was also a particular concern for Bupa UKM both as the market leader, and because 
the company believed it was currently benefiting from the best prices from Nuffield. This 
was that Bupa would lose its existing advantage if prices for T2 and T3 care went up and 
were uniformly applied across all insurers in line with Nuffield’s proposal. It appeared that 
Nuffield was proposing a price increase well-above inflation for T2 patients on a single rate 
that would ignore whether members were in a network product or not. Thus from an insurer’s 
perspective Nuffield’s proposals could be interpreted as offering its members a lesser service 
at a higher cost. Nuffield was in effect saying that it believed its long-term future lay less 
with the traditional insured patient, but rather ‘in partnership’ with the NHS. Moreover,
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unless prices to deliver the traditional PMI care model went up it was likely to wind down 
that side o f the business.
Nuffield’s actions indicated that they considered the discounted prices offered in recent years 
had not brought sufficient benefit in terms of increased patient volumes. It is worth noting 
that we have returned to the issue of the benefits (or otherwise) o f the network and also to the 
question as to the degree to which price signals apply in this market? For UKM members 
with network policies it made no difference if they used a Nuffield hospital or a more 
expensive provider, as long as those hospitals were in the network. There was no financial 
benefit or cost in such a ‘decision’ as these price differences were invisible to the member.
Negotiations between Nuffield and Bupa UKM continued for many months, with neither 
party wishing to provoke conflict but neither conceding ground. In early January 2006 
(almost twelve months after Nuffield gave UKM six months notice o f changes to existing 
contracts) there was a flurry of activity as Nuffield signalled that in the absence of an 
agreement it was going to unilaterally raise prices. UKM retaliated by making it clear that 
this action would cause it to de-recognise a number o f Nuffield hospitals from its network 
and that further hospitals could follow. At the same time UKM wrote to consultants who had 
billed Bupa in the last year for work undertaken in a Nuffield hospital making it clear that, if 
the dispute with Nuffield was not resolved, the consultants would need to make alternative 
arrangements to get UKM members treated at other hospitals.
The threat and counter-threat brought the parties back ‘to the table’ and within about a week, 
a new contract was agreed. Who was the main beneficiary? Commercial confidentiality does 
not allow an analysis o f the agreed contract. However it is likely that both parties felt they 
had achieved some of their aims. For UKM however there was also a palpable sense that 
hospital groups were starting to take the initiative and that the company needed to become 
more proactive. Traditional certainties about product propositions and who should deliver 
them were being challenged. This helps set a context for the UKM’s initiatives described 
later in this thesis.
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The Hospital/Insurer Dynamic: HCA International /UKM Case Study
O f the five major hospital chains, HCA was the one company that consistently made it clear 
that it had little interest in changing its core business to accommodate NHS work. In contrast, 
during 2004/2005 both BMI and Bupa hospitals had effectively shifted their stances by 
explicitly changing elements o f their service proposition to accommodate NHS patients and 
thus win contracts. BMI created a new division - Amicus Healthcare - which according to its 
website was created ‘.. .to meet the specific needs of public health sector patient contracts and 
in the future will have its own separate staff teams working in dedicated facilities’ (BMI,
2005). BMI’s strategy was to keep its NHS and private healthcare patients separate - both 
physically and in terms o f the actual care processes. Its fear was that mixing the two in the 
same hospitals would effectively lead to ‘cross contamination’ with insured patients 
becoming dissatisfied with having to share facilities with NHS patients, whilst cost 
escalations would occur on NHS cases because the same care processes would be applied.
The NHS contracts would have much tighter profit margins and therefore would require 
stricter adherence to cost-effective care pathways.
Bupa Hospitals, by contrast, believed it could accommodate this ‘mixed economy’ of NHS 
and privately insured patients within its exiting hospitals. Managers reasoned that the rigour 
associated with defined patient care pathways for NHS cases could also be applied (in part or 
in whole) to insured cases on the assumption that this was also a quality assurance process. In 
fact Bupa hospitals had been slowly adopting care pathways for a number of years.
Given the above, HCA’s decision to continue with its existing business model meant that it 
bucked the general trend. This put the company on a collision course with insurers who were 
looking to all providers to contain or reduce costs. As UKM was the largest insurer in the 
UK, and its senior executives had publicly stated that the industry needed to tackle rising 
costs, the stage was set for a confrontation as to which view would ultimately prevail.
Relationships between UKM and HCA
During the time the author was at Bupa the relationship between HCA and UKM deteriorated 
into a series of wrangles over contractual terms, and culminated in protracted disputes over
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UKM’s tenders for Magnetic Resonance Imaging and subsequently, for Ophthalmology 
services (described later in this thesis).
The seeds o f this poor relationship lie in two sets of figures. UKM has about 43% share of the 
PMI market, whilst HCA Healthcare is a major player in the London area where it operates 6 
private hospitals totalling 749 beds (Laing and Buisson, 2010a). HCA healthcare (UK) is part 
o f the large ‘for profit’ hospital chain HCA, based in the USA. The company has a reputation 
both for commercial acumen and aggressive price negotiating. Its approach to overseas 
ventures probably mimics its US operation and might be summarised as: ‘Buy good hospitals, 
get as large a market share in any area as possible, attract consultants with a good reputation, 
give them good quality equipment and facilities and they will bring the customer base. For 
that you can charge ‘premium prices’.
This is a simple strategy which has proved effective and commercially resilient. HCA’s 749 
beds dominate London’s private sector provision. There are only 5 other dedicated private 
hospitals in London. It is worth noting that with the exception of BM I’s London Independent 
(which is in East London) the major UK hospital chains do not own any private hospital in 
London. The afore-mentioned purchase by Bupa of the Cromwell hospital in 2007 was after 
Bupa Group had sold its Hospital’s Division. HCA in aggregate is almost four times larger 
than its largest competitor, the London Clinic which has 202 beds.
The juxtaposition of dominant provider versus dominant insurer creates an interesting 
dynamic. This is particularly so when set against to the peculiarities o f the London 
marketplace - which might be regarded as somewhat atypical of the rest o f the UK for the 
following reasons:
1. The insurance component o f private practice is smaller than elsewhere because of 
the large number of overseas/self-pay patients attracted both by the clinical 
reputation o f the London hospitals and the general amenities o f the city;
2. London has more doctors undertaking private practice than elsewhere but also has 
a larger percentage o f consultants with significant private practice earnings. These 
‘prestigious’ doctors secure considerable business, as they attract many referrals. 
They are key to hospital revenue generation (hence the wisdom of a hospital 
strategy that majors on attracting and retaining such consultants). This also leads 
to duplication of expensive equipment as hospitals try to retain consultant favour
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by ensuring that have access to the latest technology. Although the above might be 
regarded as implicit in private practice throughout the UK, it is most marked in 
London;
3. Although some NHS hospitals in London have better established private practice 
facilities than many NHS hospitals elsewhere in the UK (dedicated private 
practice units (PPUs) for example) they remain ill equipped, both physically and 
culturally, to meet the total private practice demand. Insurers are thus very reliant 
on private hospitals to meet the demands o f their members;
4. London-based corporate customers are a particularly important segment o f the 
PMI market. Such clients are often highly demanding - expecting access to the 
‘best’ hospitals and consultants. As will be illustrated in Chapters 4, 6 and 7, this 
often translates into the notion that ‘expensive must equal best’;
5. Finally, HCA’s size relative to the overall market - especially in certain key 
specialities such orthopaedics and cardiology/cardiac surgery - creates significant 
barriers to entry for other providers.
Whilst a case can be made that UKM’s market share could force HCA to discount prices, 
based on UKM’s purchasing power as the largest insurer, the experience to date has been 
very different. HCA prices are known throughout the insurance industry as the most 
expensive of the hospital chains. Whilst commercial confidentiality does not allow price 
comparisons to be published, the history of frequent disputes over time between UKM and 
HCA reinforces the view that UKM has historically been forced to be a price ‘taker’ rather 
than acting as the price ‘setter’. Further evidence on this point will be presented later in this 
chapter. The following should also be considered in interpreting the subsequent actions o f 
the two parties.
Firstly, as previously noted, HCA had been successful in capturing a significant percentage of 
London’s private sector capacity and also of ‘prestigious’ consultants. Any insurer that 
excluded - or was excluded from - HCA’s hospitals, would be vulnerable to an exodus of 
corporate and individual customers to competitor insurers.
Secondly HCA, like most other hospital chains, tried to negotiate on an ‘all in or all out’ basis 
with respect to hospitals being ‘in network’. Attempts by insurers to purchase only the
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capacity they truly need for each local area is thwarted by such a stance (if it is allowed to 
prevail).
Thirdly, UKM was well aware that any conflict with HCA would be likely to result in some 
loss o f customers. Organisations that reward performance on the basis o f in-year customer 
growth and profits will tend to produce managers who tend to avoid conflicts that will result 
in short-term losses, even if they might bring long-term gain.
The above led to an ongoing internal debate within Bupa. On the one hand there were those 
managers who believed that private medical insurance (PMI) was on a ‘burning platform’ of 
declining membership, revenues, and net profitability, caused by the year-on-year above 
retail price inflation (RPI) costs of premiums and shortening NHS wait-times. The other 
camp consisted of those who considered PMI to have an inelastic demand curve that would 
persist even under worsening market conditions. The public pronouncements o f Bupa senior 
management, for instance Fergus Kee’s (then Chief Executive o f UKM) speech at the Laing 
and Buisson 2005 PMI conference (Kee, 2005) and Bupa Group Financial Director’s Ray 
Kings’s 2006 interview with Healthcare Market News (Healthcare Market News 2006), 
emphasised the former viewpoint. However, the dominant culture within the company 
(arguably reflecting the conventional wisdom of the UK PMI industry) remained one of 
commercial conservatism closer to the second view.
This was based on the core idea that the UK private healthcare market was both essentially 
stable (and static) with customer demands relatively unchanging over time. Those demands 
were considered to be well-known and already being met by the existing ‘product 
proposition’. The foundation of this belief was that customer support for PMI delivering 
private healthcare in the ‘traditional’ manner remained strong. The term ‘commercial 
conservatism’ has been used to express an aversion to ‘risk-taking’, especially with regard to 
activities that might damage or devalue the Bupa brand. From this perspective, engaging in a 
high profile conflict with a major hospital group would be regarded as just such an activity. It 
would raise difficulties with the strong emphasis on customer satisfaction as defined by 
minimum inconvenience -  as customers would be affected by events such as de-recognising 
hospitals, and threaten the corporate focus on achieving the aforementioned growth and 
profitability targets. These attitudes and arguments will re-surface many times in later 
chapters when we examine UKM’s relationship with doctors and its approach to quality.
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They help explain why UKM (and indeed all insurers and providers) have historically 
operated as they do in the UK PMI marketplace.
A further debate within Bupa centred around whether the increased investment in the NHS 
and the increasing plurality of public sector provision coupled with the downturn in the 
general economic downturn has led to a fundamental change in market conditions and the 
demand for PMI, or whether this will turn out to just temporary ‘noise’ that leaves matters 
essentially unchanged. Public statements tended to support the former view but actual 
decisions and behaviours again remained broadly ‘conservative’; reflecting a more cautious 
interpretation of the market.
The public statements tended to emphasise the changes that were occurring in PMI and the 
adjustments by insurers that would be necessary. For example, the UKM Managing 
Director’s speech at the aforementioned 2005 Conference (Kee, 2005), contained the 
following statements:
‘Bupa insurance conducted a strategic business review last year. One o f the main 
conclusions from that review was that future premium increases are a bigger threat to 
the future o f private healthcare than an improving NHS. We have to slow the rate of 
premium increase to the levels that customers accept with other things they buy - that 
means at least halving the historic rate of increase. We cannot just accept medical 
inflation as a given and simply continue to pass it on to the customer. The only way to 
address this fundamental issue is for insurers and providers - hospitals and consultants 
- to work together. Most funders and, I believe, the majority of providers now 
recognise the need for change.’
And:
‘It is...disappointing that some private hospital providers still seem to believe that 
consumers will simply keep on paying more and more for the same thing. I’m sorry, 
but they won’t. We have to ruthlessly drive for clinical quality and value for money.’
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Sowing the Seeds o f  Conflict: UKM/HCA's 2002 Contract
UKM considered HCA an expensive provider of services, but for the reasons mentioned 
above was reluctant to take decisive action to challenge HCA’s hegemony in London. 
However a series o f contractual wrangles meant that a major dispute did blow up.
UK private hospital contracts with insurers are typically fee-for-service, per diem contracts. 
Prospective payment systems, such as DRG’s, HRG’s, or simple per-case payments, are the 
exception rather than the rule, although contracts between the NHS and Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres (ISTC’s) operate on prospectively based prices (based on HRG plus an 
agreed percentage rate). When the author worked at UKM the main reason he heard for the 
company not adopting case rates or DRG’s more generally, was that these might be set at too 
high a rate, thus allowing hospitals to make large profits. Sitting alongside this was usually an 
optimistic view o f the ability of the company to control provider costs; especially via detailed 
scrutiny of hospital invoices to ensure that only agreed items were charged, and at the correct 
rate.
There are clearly advantages and disadvantages for any particular contractual arrangement 
and its associated currency. However as previously noted by the author (Royce, 1997) it is 
one thing to agree particular contract arrangement and another to administer them. Those 
negotiating and those administering contracts are rarely the same people. For example, a 
contract agreement that ‘carves out’ an item -  for example, a drug or type o f prosthesis - from 
the main contract for payment based on a particular rate, presupposes that those compiling 
hospital invoices can identify and separately charge the items in question (a risk for the 
provider) and that the insurer is able in turn to identify, and correctly process for payment, the 
item in question. The former is a risk to the provider, the latter to the insurer. There is a risk 
that those setting the contract do not ask those who create and receive invoices whether such 
an arrangement is practical to administer on a routine basis.
For insurers, this can lead to situations where invoices are received that the organisation 
cannot properly administer. In those circumstances the decision may be made that such 
invoices have to default to automatic payment - the alternative being hundreds, or even 
thousands, o f invoices that stack up ‘in suspense’ with the result that members are then 
chased by hospitals/doctors for payment.
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The above needs to be borne in mind when discussing the manner in which hospital 
negotiations take place. Typically, a private hospital contract will have the following 
components:
Bed-day rate;
Theatre charges;
Prosthesis;
Consumables;
High cost drugs;
Special Nursing;
Critical care;
Day case charges;
Outpatients;
Radiology;
Pathology;
Payment terms.
A central point of contention is likely to be the rate o f inflation (or very rarely deflation) that 
will be applied to the main tariff. That inflation element is likely to apply - at a minimum - to 
the bed-day rate. The bed-day rate is (seemingly) easy to understand and both those 
negotiating the contract, and the managers they report to, may well focus on this element of 
the contract. A contracts manager on the insurer side may be instructed not to go beyond a 
certain percentage inflation increase.
Any increase above this figure applied to the bed-day rate is easily identified, and easily 
modelled by the finance department.
However the cost impact of other elements of the contract may be less transparent. For 
example, the cost o f consumables, prostheses, and ‘high cost’ drugs are very heavily 
influenced by consultant choice. Moreover, accessing the impact of a change to either the 
agreed ‘mark up’ on such items and/or o f what is deemed eligible as a ‘high cost’ drug is not 
easy to model.
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This is a source o f risk in contract negotiations. The negotiator may agree what are 
considered to be low bed-day rates and a low inflation increase, but find costs arising from 
other poorly-specified areas of the contract to be much higher than anticipated.
This is complicated because there is no consistency in private healthcare in the pricing o f 
consumables, prostheses and drugs. What, for example, is considered to be a ‘high cost 
drug’? One hospital may have negotiated a threshold o f £100 at which a drug becomes a 
separately chargeable item; another as little as £10. There may also be different definitions of 
what the £100 or £10 applies to -  for example, per dose, per day or per episode o f treatment. 
Furthermore, there may not be certainty about whether the cut o ff point for the drug is the 
actual cost to the hospital, or its list-price, or indeed the price after a mark up has been 
applied to the list price. The mark up for drugs/prosthesis etc allowed within the contract 
might be three times the list price. If drugs above £10 - after mark up - are all allowed to be 
separately charged, then a long list o f billable items may be presented to the payer. Such an 
arrangement also provides a perverse incentive to the provider to use the most expensive 
drugs, prostheses and consumables possible.
It is also likely that not all elements of a hospital contract will receive the same scrutiny, 
reflecting - in part - the strengths and weaknesses of the administrative systems used to pay 
invoices and monitor contracts. There is a natural bias to focus on the highest-cost items. As 
such, inpatients normally receive more attention than day cases, which in turn will tend to 
receive more attention than outpatients. Outpatients consist o f a large number o f (relatively) 
small cost items. Pathology items dwarf even outpatients in terms of volume. The degree to 
which the payer is able to compare what is charged against what is in the contract is 
dependent upon the administrative systems in place. Some contracts may not even attempt to 
set prices but merely agree to pay ‘all reasonable charges’, or simply to pay whatever is 
billed. Whilst it might be expected that hospitals would be required to provide ‘charge 
masters’ showing the prices against which they should be charging, the author encountered 
many instances where they do not. A similar problem can occur with doctors’ charges in 
relation to the relative scrutiny given to outpatients in comparison to inpatient charges -as 
will be noted in the next chapter on consultant reimbursement. In the USA hospital charge 
masters (the list o f billable items) range between 12,000 and 45,000 items (Davis, 2010) 
which provides an indication of the potential administrative task, even assuming that better 
invoicing systems are developed
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Returning to UKM’s contract with HCA, although specific details cannot be given, some 
problems of this type arose. There were also interesting issues in this case about the delay in 
re-negotiating the UKM/HCA contract. Not having a signed contract can have a number of 
advantages. Minimum notice periods for a change in provider status, or for new prices, no 
longer apply. Accordingly, it is not surprising that in the period before and after the expiry of 
the 2002 contract, the contract negotiation process between HCA and UKM dragged on for 
many months. After a period when agreement could not be reached the two parties went to 
(non-binding) mediation by a third party. This process also went on for months, but without 
an agreed outcome. During these contract negotiations HCA raised their tariffs and (tellingly) 
UKM decided to pay such charges in full rather than enter in an escalating dispute.
Ultimately some at UKM rationalised HCA’s charges as acceptable, as long as every other 
insurer was paying even more, on the basis that this was likely to hurt the smaller insurers 
more than UKM. The logic works (to a point) presupposing that other insurers are actually 
paying more. The claim is based on the assumption that Bupa would be obtaining the lowest 
prices because it was the largest insurer. For example, Bupa told the Competition 
Commission in 2006 that it obtained discounts of 25-35 per cent from hospitals’ standard 
master charge rates (Laing and Buisson 2006). Information on whether HCA did in fact give 
Bupa a relative price advantage, despite the price rise, is not in the public domain and not 
known to the author.
The above case suggests that UKM was far from successful in its efforts to counteract HCA 
prices and practices despite its 40% plus market share. UKM’s reluctance to engage in 
confrontation reflected both a business strategy which determined that the risks out-weighed 
the benefits, and a cultural predisposition to delay the fight until ‘another day’. While 
customers remained prepared to pay the resultant premiums this strategy remained viable, 
though its sustainability into the future was less clear.
UKM ’s Magnetic Resonance Imaging Tender
It is within the above context that one can best understand the response of HCA and other 
providers to UKM’s decision to undertake a national tendering exercise for Magnetic
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Resonance Imaging (MRI) services. Hospital Doctor reported this in April 2006 under the 
headline ‘HCA starts legal action in Bupa MRI network dispute,’ noting that:
‘HCA has been negotiating on its overall contract with the insurer for almost two years. 
These talks are believed to have collapsed in mid-march, although Bupa patients are still 
being treated at HCA hospitals’ (2006b, p.2).
To understand the background to the issuing of a tender for MRI services (and HCA and 
other providers reaction to it) it is necessary to take account of the following. Firstly, there 
were significant variations in price (in excess of 250% from lowest to highest cost) that 
existed in private MRI scanning in the UK. Secondly, such charges had a significant impact 
on overall costs given that UKM was billed for over 80,000 scans a year. Finally, 
considerable growth in MRI capacity in the UK had taken place over the previous decade. 
This latter development had been given further impetus by the decision of the DoH to 
purchase a large number o f MRI scans from private providers. In October 2004 Alliance 
Medical Ltd were awarded a five year contract to deliver 650,000 scans. The DoH’s actions 
served to further commoditise a procedure that lends itself to tendering. About 90 per cent of 
scans are performed as outpatient procedures and in many parts of the UK a genuine market 
with choice o f provider exist, or could easily be created by the use o f mobile scanners.
For UKM, an attraction of tendering the service was to make it a contractual condition for 
providers to provide composite bills -  to submit a single bill covering both the fee for the 
equipment and the radiologist’s fee. This not only simplified the billing process, but would 
avoid the common problem of radiologists’ fee exceeding the insurer’s proposed 
reimbursement, leading to a ‘shortfall’ which the patient must pay (see chapter 4). Thus from 
UKM’s perspective the MRI tender had the potential to deliver that all too rare prize in 
healthcare - a reduction in costs.
UKM was careful to frame its tender as being essentially concerned with the promotion (and 
assurance) o f a quality service. Healthcare Market News (HMN) reported a claim by Bupa 
that:
‘.. .over 60% of the evaluation for the new MRI network related to quality standards 
and patient service criteria and just one third related to commercial criteria’ (2006 
p.85).
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Unsurprisingly, providers were quick to suggest a different interpretation - that the tender was 
solely concerned at price cutting, regardless of quality. The HMN  article contains a number o f 
quotes from providers to this effect. HCA Commercial Director Raj Vasudevan told HM N :
‘Bupa said the scheme was about quality control but they are talking about hospitals 
with no MRI services so how they have quality assured them is a mystery’ (2006, 
p.87).
At that time HMN  reported that UKM had not put HCA’s MRI facilities onto their list o f 
approved network facilities. At the same time St Anthony’s hospital in Cheam (a 91 bed 
private hospital that had only recently emerged from a prolonged contractual dispute with 
UKM that had seen the hospital de-recognised at one point) was not included in the MRI 
network. Hospital Director Brian Clarke was quoted in HMN  as saying:
‘The whole thing has been done in an extraordinary and unsatisfactory way. Bupa 
talks about improving quality and access for its members when in fact it has done the 
reverse and eliminated the two golden horses in the healthcare stable-access and 
choice’ (2006, p.87).
Opposition to the tender was also reported as follows by the London Consultants’
Association on its website:
‘HCA Hospitals in London and St Anthony’s Hospital, Cheam in conflict with Bupa 
Insurance over the MRI tender.lt has just been announced that the HCA group of 
hospitals in central London has not been recognized by Bupa Insurance in their recent 
MRI tender. Many consultants will have received a letter from Bupa Insurance that 
puts the blame for this entirely onto HCA hospitals. HCA for their part has denied this 
and is seeking to clarify this matter through the Courts.
The LCA has been assured by HCA that this is not an issue of price as their bid for 
MRI work was initially accepted by Bupa Insurance.
The London Consultants’ Association does not believe that the first rate consultants 
who work in the HCA radiology departments can be criticized for the quality o f their
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professional work, indeed many have international reputations. Nor do we believe that 
the service, provision and delivery by the various MRI units in the HCA group are 
unsatisfactory.
We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that Bupa Insurance’s action masks some 
other undisclosed agenda. This is supported by the fact that at least one hospital in the 
new approved Bupa Insurance network does not actually have its own MRI machine 
and others have services provided by a mobile MRI which can only provide limited 
appointment times.
Another hospital to be left out of the MRI network is St Anthony’s Hospital in 
Cheam. St Anthony’s is also well known for its up to date technology and high 
standards of care. Neither the hospital nor its consultants can understand why it has 
been left out of the network and its questions to Bupa Insurance remain unanswered.
The London Consultants’ Association believes that this is a clear example of what 
may increasingly happen if tendering for front line specialty services goes ahead for 
orthopedics, ophthalmology and then others at a time when the notions o f choice and 
access are very topical issues in the NHS. Bupa Insurance appears to be disregarding 
both’ (London Consultants Association, 2006).
The LCA’s stance is essentially identical not only to the hospital providers quoted above, but 
also to that o f FIPO (of which it is a constituent member). FIPO and The Association of 
Independent Radiologists (AIR) also conducted a questionnaire of AIR members on the 
UKM tender in December 2005 (see Appendix 2). The survey, based on the views o f 357 
Consultant Radiologists, showed that a majority disagreed with the tendering initiative and 
with insurers having any role in driving clinical quality.
Despite the manifest unhappiness o f certain hospitals and consultants - Bupa Group was able
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to put out a press statement on the 10 March 2006 announcing that the UK’s ‘first ever 
specialist MRI network’ would be operational by April (Bupa Group Press Release, 2008b). 
This stated that more than 400 sites across the UK had applied to become Bupa approved 
units and around 230 private and NHS hospitals and imaging facilities would make up the 
network. Patients would be able to get an out-patient appointment for an MRI scan within 48 
hours, with their report returned to their consultant within another two working days.
81
The network included some o f the units operated by private hospital providers like BMI, 
Capio, Nuffield and Bupa Hospitals. Around 50 NHS hospitals were also included. The large 
number of applicants illustrates that despite the public opposition of some providers, MRI 
was becoming a ‘commoditised’ service. As such it was difficult even for a company such as 
HCA to successfully boycott the tender.
Hospital Doctor (2006c, p3) reported on the 3rd August 2006 that:
‘Bupa and HCA have resolved their dispute over their contract and the inclusion of
HCA hospitals in the insurer's MRI network. Three HCA hospitals have been
included in the network, but the Princess Grace Hospital is not included.’
It is reasonable to conclude that UKM was the victor in this particular power struggle with 
HCA. It was able establish a lower-priced national MRI network and Derek Machin, the 
Chairman of the BMA Private Practice Committee, was quoted as saying that there was 
evidence that consultants’ fees had been reduced by between ‘18 and 40 per cent’ (Fox,
2006). UKM was also able to exclude a key HCA hospital from its network. That inclusion 
of three HCA hospitals into the network may be seen as a concession on UKM’s part, but the 
exclusion of the Princess Grace broke with the traditional negotiating position o f ‘all in or all 
out’ and appeared to be a setback for HCA.
Further evidence of the commoditisation of MRI was provided by the announcement in April 
2008 that Bupa had managed the not inconsiderable feat o f both increasing the number of 
MRI units within the network by one-third, and a claimed reduction in MRI costs of 20 
percent (Bupa Group Press Release, 2008b). This extended network included the 
aforementioned St Anthony’s in Cheam and although Bupa’s press release contains no details 
on individual pricing, it seems reasonable to conclude that we have observed a rare 
phenomenon -  the extension of the size o f a network coupled with price deflation.
From Bupa’s perspective, the MRI network initiative was judged successful because prices 
fell. Providers had to adjust to new market conditions, namely, that for MRI at least, it was a 
buyers’ market. Providers who have attempted to retain higher prices found their customer 
base disappearing. Local evidence for this can be found in the following from the Clinical 
Director of Radiology in a Welsh NHS Trust on the subject o f contract negotiations with 
Bupa.
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‘.. .we are losing a shedful o f private work in our Trust as our rates are way too high. 
All the private suppliers have drastically cut costs, in particular o f MRI. You can get 
a scan plus report for £250 in some areas of South Wales now .. .you can go to 
Cheltenham and have a report and scan for C.£300, reported by top musculo-skeletal 
guys from Bristol’ (Evans, 2008).
Notwithstanding the above case, there is a need to reserve judgment on the prospects for 
change in the hospital market until both the particulars of consultant reimbursement for 
services (in the next chapter) and further attempts to create networks (in particular for 
ophthalmology) are explored. These are the subjects o f the next two chapters.
Conclusion
The general dynamic between hospital groups and the larger insurers can be understood as a 
manifestation o f the theory of countervailing powers as outlined in Chapter 1. To this general 
position needs to be added the leverage that near monopsony market share that providers in 
certain geographical locations.enjoy. HCA’s commercial success (and premium pricing) 
reflects not only managerial acumen but also the negotiating power that controlling such a 
large percentage of Central London’s private beds provides. It is noteworthy that those 
negotiations often take an adversarial form; with both parties threatening economic sanctions 
on the other. Insurers threaten de-recognition o f hospitals -wholly or partly, for some, or all 
o f their members. Providers threaten to unilaterally increase prices, directly bill patients for 
any resultant shortfalls and state to those patients that their insurer is being unreasonable 
(both actions threaten defection to com petitors)..
These are market based responses from both parties, but interestingly Galbraith (1952) 
speculated that one conclusion of such a relationship could be the abandonment of 
competitive behaviour in favour of oligopoly or crypto-monopoly:
Galbraith saw this as a market failure, which however much it might suit the individual 
parties (both provider and purchaser), created a sub optimal equilibrium-and that without 
outside intervention, this equilibrium might persist. Galbraith makes it clear that this might 
require government intervention in the market place through regulation. Interestingly there is
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no indication that the UK government has ever considered such a course o f action with regard 
to the private health sector -beyond periodic investigations by the OFT into proposed 
hosptial acquisitions by various hospital chains.
Indeed an alternative way o f interpreting the UK insurer/hospital dynamic is that the actuality 
o f adversarial action is relatively infrequently seen (although often threatened), and that 
historically the more common position has been for the insurer and provider to settle on a 
position that allows both parties to operate with significant surpluses above operating costs.. 
The sustainability of that position is speculated upon at various points in this thesis bound up 
as it is with questions as to the elasticity o f demand for private health insurance/care and the 
state of the UK economy.
The position with regard to MRI was different because its increasing supply and resulting 
commoditisation shifted the balance of power in favour of the purchaser. This allowed price 
competition to apply in a way essentially as predicted by classical economic theory
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CHAPTER 4
Consultant Reimbursement and the Prospects for Cost Control 
Introduction
The previous chapter discussed how payers reimburse UK private hospitals, and the thesis 
now turns to the parallel system of payments to consultants. This chapter is divided into a 
number o f sections. First it describes how NHS consultants are paid, and then reviews the 
principal methods of reimbursing consultants in the UK private sector. Next it examines two 
insurer initiatives aimed in part at cost control: (a) an initiative to reform the reimbursement 
mechanism, based on the development of relative value scales, and (b) the use o f benefit 
maxima schedules (maximum amounts payable for given procedures). In the penultimate 
section, the chapter discusses the high level o f consultant charges in the UK PMI market and 
suggests an explanation o f why insurers have been unable to use purchasing power to apply 
downward pressure on consultant charges. Finally, the chapter assesses the prospects for 
future reform of the UK PMI market that might lead to lower prices without sacrificing 
clinical quality.
Once again, particular reference has been made to the approach adopted by Bupa Health 
Insurance with regard to the above issues. Given that Bupa is the largest purchaser in the UK 
PMI market, its approach has been highly influential and illustrates some o f the main 
approaches to cost control that have been tried.
An examination of consultant reimbursement provides important insights into the relative 
sophistication - or otherwise - of the market mechanisms in place, and of the relationship 
between purchasers and providers in the UK PMI market.
Reimbursing Consultants in the NHS
As a reference point, let us briefly consider the mechanisms for paying consultants in the 
NHS. Employment in the NHS is underpinned by a national contract which casts consultants 
in the role of employees working for a salary, albeit with the possibility o f augmenting the 
basic salary with payment for additional sessions and o f being selected for a distinction
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award. In general a consultant’s pay does not vary according to the volume o f treatments 
provided or the quality of outcomes. The new NHS consultant contract introduced in 2003 
provided a substantial pay rise to consultants (an almost 50% increase between 2001 and 
2005), but left the basic position unchanged and made no attempt to link remuneration to 
activity. The contract has prompted considerable debate and suggestions that current pay 
mechanisms do nothing to address variations in consultant activity and productivity (Bloor, 
Maynard and Freemantle , 2004; Williams and Buchan, 2006).
Currently the NHS does not reimburse the costs of consultant inputs as a separate item. Such 
costs are subsumed under whatever contracting currency a hospital has in place, for example 
block, cost and volume plus finished consultant episodes, or HRG’s and provider spells. 
Having stated this, the increased focus on meeting various waiting times targets and the 
opportunity for consultants to undertake additional work within the NHS to tackle them, has 
prompted greater attention to contractual terms. In the author’s recent experience (gained 
from working for three NHS Trusts in the last four years) this issue generates considerable 
discussion of the rate that should apply for additional work, with consultants sometimes 
putting forward private sector fee-for-service- rates as a benchmark and NHS managers 
typically seeking a lower cost solution.
Historically NHS consultant contracts, which combined comparatively low salaries with 
freedom to practice privately, resulted in a system in which overall salaries were boosted by 
significant volumes of private work (Yates, 1995). O f course not every consultant undertakes 
private work: 30% of consultants effectively do none and 20% of consultants gross less than 
£10,000 from this source (Ford, 2004). Nevertheless the majority o f consultants working in 
the UK PMI market also hold NHS contracts. Where NHS work is almost exclusively 
rewarded by a fixed salary that does not vary with volume o f activity, private work is 
reimbursed in quite a different way, according to the work undertaken.
Reimbursement in the Private Sector
The most common form of consultant payment methodology in the UK private sector is fee- 
for-service according to a schedule o f procedures and services. Whilst the USA has seen 
various attempts to bring in more sophisticated forms o f reimbursement for doctors, including
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risk sharing arrangements and capitation (Zuvekas and Cohen, 2010), changes to the 
methodology by which consultant payments are made in the UK private sector have had the 
more modest aim of simply updating the procedure codes that underpin reimbursement. At 
the same time the industry set out obtain much greater consistency between procedures in 
terms o f the value assigned to them. Examining why this aim proved so problematic will help 
to illustrate some of the key dynamics and limitations o f the current UK private sector, in 
terms o f its ability to establish clearer links between the cost o f care and the prices charged. It 
will also illustrate a recurring theme in the ongoing debate about the best method by which to 
pay providers - whether to base this on published, pre-set tariffs, or allow floating, negotiable 
prices.
Across the world, there had been few attempts to establish a systematic methodological basis 
for setting consultant charges. Some doctors may have had specified fees for certain 
interventions. Others charged based on time taken up ‘caring’ for the patient, or per visit. Still 
others varied their charges based on what they thought the patient would pay (Kessel, 1958; 
Anderson, 2007). Over time, some informal links were probably established between the size 
of fees and the complexity of the case, but it was not until after the advent of organised 
insurance that institutional pressure grew to systematise and regulate such fees. Indeed, one 
can still observe discernible variations in fee setting within the UK self-pay market, which 
allows the judicious ‘spot’ purchaser o f healthcare to shop around for the ‘best’ price.
For insurers, the desirability o f establishing a recognised system whereby clinicians billing 
for particular treatments receive a standard payment is bound up with the importance o f 
predictability in assigning and managing risk - a feature underpinning all insurance based 
activities. Such predictability is also desirable in helping to mitigate the financial risk 
associated with policy terms that state that bills from doctors will be paid in full. If there is 
no direct connection between the services a clinician provides and what is charged, then the 
insurer’s task of managing the risks associated with the insured population in question 
becomes more difficult.
It is also the case that the updating o f condition categories and pricing codes is necessary 
because of the changing nature o f medical practice. New diseases such as Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and new treatments appear. Internationally, this updating is 
undertaken via modification o f the International Classification of Diseases (the most current
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being Version Ten). The NHS utilises this classification, but much of the private sector in the 
UK uses a customised procedure-based system - a version o f International Classification of 
Diseases, Version Nine (ICD-9).
This system had become gradually out-dated to the point where clinicians were increasingly 
vocal about the need to review and update the procedures. In response a group o f insurers 
announced in 1997 that it had commissioned a ‘Relative Values Review’ aimed at 
establishing a new reimbursement mechanism. Newchurch (a healthcare consulting company 
that is now part of Tribal Group) were commissioned to undertake the work on behalf the six 
participating insurers: BCWA, Bupa, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Norwich 
Union, Royal Sun Alliance and Standard Life Healthcare. The exercise was overseen by a 
Clinical Classifications and Schedule Development (CSSD) group formed by the insurers.
The Relative Values Review
The principal objective of the Relative Values Review (RVR) was to develop a scale of 
procedures whereby the position of each procedure on the scale reflected its clinical 
complexity relative to other procedures. These relative values could then be used to form the 
basis o f an alternative to the existing systems for reimbursing clinical activity. The RVR also 
represented the first major improvement in the coding description of private sector clinical 
activity for a decade.
The RVR only covered inpatient and day case interventions, with two separate scales 
covering respectively:
• Procedural Interventions (PI);
• Anaesthetic, Sedation and Monitoring Services (ASM)
These were based on the methodology of the Harvard resource-based relative value scale 
(RBRVS), developed by Hsiao and colleagues (1999) to derive a fee schedule for the US 
Federal Medicare programme.
The two scales covered over 1,600 procedures and were developed with the assistance o f 
over 130 clinicians working in both single and cross-speciality groups. As a result of this 
process it was hoped that RVR would be regarded as robust, transparent, independent, and 
having clinical credibility.
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Insurer Opposition to RVR
Not all insurers were in favour of such a review. AXA Private Patient Plan (AXA PPP) 
publicly opposed the review on the grounds that it believed that use of such a scale would 
cause price inflation. In October 2001 the Office o f Fair-Trading (OFT) received a complaint 
that adoption of RVR by insurers would lead to convergence of pricing by both insurers and 
consultants and would lead to higher medical fees. The complainant (widely thought in the 
industry to be AXA PPP) suggested that an increase in payments to clinicians and/or ‘price 
fixing’ would be detrimental to the interests o f consumers.
The OFT complaint argued that the RVR process would be inflationary for two reasons. 
Firstly, clinicians were likely to expect that the baseline for future reimbursement would be 
set on the basis of the least complex procedures. In practice many o f these procedures had, 
overtime, become ‘overvalued’, with regard to their relative complexity vis-a-vis other 
procedures, and it seemed likely that doctors would oppose any re-basing that involved 
‘deflating’ current prices for non-complex treatments, even if other prices were raised. 
Secondly, the complainant was concerned that in situations where single procedures were 
sub-divided into a number of procedures with different levels of complexity, a phenomenon 
of ‘code creep’ might result. The fear was that if the relative value scales were implemented 
very few cases would now be recorded at the lower level of complexity.
The Office o f  Fair Trading Decision
Despite the arguments of those opposed to RVR, the OFT decided that an industry standard 
methodology for assigning weights to procedures was not anti-competitive per se. However 
they added a caveat. Each insurer had to set its own values to those weights (and 
reimbursable amount) to each procedure independently of other insurers. To do otherwise 
was deemed anti-competitive by the OFT. The judgement undermined the key rational for 
having a system of publicly-weighted procedures. Specifically, that both clinicians and 
patients could immediately tell by reference to a chart how one procedure was weighted 
against another and hence come to a judgement as to the ‘fairness’ or otherwise of the 
proposed reimbursements. By separating out the industry wide weighting from the 
reimbursement assigned by any particular insurer it re-opened the ability o f an insurer to have 
a reimbursement schedule that ignored the weightings.
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The Diminishing Attractiveness o f  the RVR Initiative
Other developments were occurring as the RVR was underway that reduced its attractiveness.
Delays in implementation meant that some medical consultants came to see the RVR as a 
mechanism used by insurers to delay raising reimbursement rates. During the author’s time at 
Bupa, reference was often made to the review as a justification for not allowing an increase in 
rates for particular procedures at that time. Part of the delay was due to the need to consult 
with the medical profession and the somewhat Byzantine organisation o f the clinical sub­
committees of the various specialties.
The methodology for creating relative-value weightings contains both objective and 
subjective elements, relating to the ‘value’ of each procedure, and it was unsurprising that 
this generated considerable debate. It soon became apparent that there was a limited appetite 
for the creation of a set o f relative weights that would rank all procedures, regardless of 
speciality, against one another. For example, it took considerable debate to get the 14 sub­
speciality committees of the British Orthopaedics Association to agree weightings within 
orthopaedics, let alone compare those weightings against non-orthopaedic procedures. Thus 
although RVR was initially promoted as a methodology that would transcend speciality- 
based values, it became apparent that it was likely to apply only to those procedures that span 
more than one speciality.
Whilst AXA PPP had consistently been opposed to RVR, a number of other insurers had 
reserved their positions. Providers unsurprisingly wanted all insurers to adopt the same 
system - so as to minimise the administrative load of servicing more than one system. 
Discussions on this issue took many months. Eventually even AXA PPP announced that it 
would adopt the new schedule. However a further delay to the implementation schedule was 
required to allow AXA PPP to prepare for the changes. Time passed as providers and insurers 
woke up to financial implications and the impact on their administration and billing systems. 
Clinicians started to complain that some new codes were already out o f date, alleging in some 
instances that inappropriate professional advice had been given on their weighting and 
construction.
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Healthcare Resource Groups -  a Viable Alternative?
Meanwhile, another - largely unanticipated - development further undermined the appeal of 
relative values as Healthcare Resource Groups (HRG’s) were introduced as the main contract 
currency in the English NHS. The significance of HRG’s was boosted both by the Concordat 
between the NHS and private sector (Maynard, 2000) and the announcement that a fixed, 
HRG payment would apply both to NHS Trusts and private hospitals contracting with the 
NHS (DoH, 2000). Traditionally the private sector had virtually ignored the NHS’ pricing 
regime. However increasing use of private hospitals by the NHS and a belief that a more 
genuine mixed economy model was likely in the future was leading to a reappraisal at the 
time the author was with Bupa.
One option for an insurer like Bupa was to move over to HRG’s (rather than relative values) 
as the payment method for clinicians. However this raised two sets o f problems.
Firstly, HRG’s are principally determined according to the amount o f health care resources a 
typical patient is likely to ‘consume’ in hospital, and are influenced by the age and co­
morbidities of the patient, and weighted by length of stay in hospital. This often fails to 
capture in great detail the input of the consultant (and especially the surgeon or anaesthetist), 
whose contact is typically greater towards the beginning of the patient’s hospital stay. In 
contrast the relative value scales had been specifically designed to reflect consultant time and 
effort for each procedure, and is arguably a better measure of this.
Secondly, there are far fewer HRG’s than there are RVR codes. The 558 HRG’s are designed 
to cover nearly all NHS activity whereas there are 1,628 RVR codes focused principally on 
those procedures most often undertaken in the private sector - which means they are 
dominated by descriptions of elective surgical procedures. This meant that conversion to 
HRG’s involved a difficult translation exercise from many to few codes which raises new 
issues of relative weightings of procedures (Bloor and Maynard (2007). There were fears 
that clinicians might favour those interventions that are more generously weighted (in effect 
the less complex procedures) and avoid the less well compensated (complex) procedures.
From the foregoing, the obstacles facing either the private or public sector in moving over to 
the other’s coding/weighting system are all too apparent.
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B upa’s Implementation o f  the R VR
In the event Bupa eventually decided that it would introduce a limited version o f the relative 
value scales, but without any material change to consultant reimbursement levels. The 
Clinical Classifications and Schedule Development (CSSD) group (which had been 
overseeing RVR) had developed a schedule of procedural interventions that was adopted by 
Bupa in January 2006. This was made public in a letter and briefing note to Speciality 
Associations (signed by the author in his then capacity as Head of Policy, Quality and 
Provider Relations) and the following explanation given:
‘We have stated for the past seven years that we will never again uplift fees across the 
whole range o f procedures within the Schedule. We would like to be able to adjust 
fees to reward at a higher level those procedures that are worthy o f higher 
reimbursement. In order for this to be affordable to our members, we would expect 
this to be accompanied by reductions in the Benefit Maxima for procedures that have 
become technically quicker and simpler over time. Despite extensive consultation and 
discussion with the profession over recent years, we do not believe that consultants 
would change their charging practice to reduce their fees for more simple procedures. 
The overall consequence o f reducing our Benefit Maxima for these procedures would 
be that it would lead to a much higher rate of member shortfalls, which is 
unacceptable. Bupa has therefore reluctantly concluded that we cannot use the new 
Schedule to introduce widespread changes to reimbursement across all specialities 
and procedures. Therefore we have neither introduced significant uplifts to Benefit 
Maxima nor have we reduced the Maxima for any procedures’
On the subject of procedures with multiple codes the following was said:
‘After review we have decided not to differentiate the fee where a single procedure 
has been split into a number o f different codes. Experience in the past has been that 
where this has been tried, both here and in other countries, it leads towards what is 
called “code-creep”. This is where the code for the higher classified procedure, 
attracting the higher fee rate, is used out of proportion to the number o f the higher 
classified procedures actually being conducted. We have seen this in the UK in 
relation to gastrointestinal biopsy, for example’ (Royce, 2005).
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This was followed up by an article in Independent Practitioner (also in the author’s name) 
which reiterated the message and talked about the need to find,
‘ . .a mechanism which allows us [Bupa] to adjust fees to reward at a higher level 
those procedures worthy o f higher reimbursement. However for our PMI members to 
be able to afford this, the mechanism would need to allow for reductions in 
reimbursement for procedures that have become simpler over time. But after 
extensive discussions with the profession, we are convinced that consultants would 
not accept this approach and Bupa has reluctantly concluded that we cannot use the 
new schedule to introduce widespread changes to reimbursement across all 
specialities and procedures’ (Royce, 2006).
Consultant Reaction
Such an approach was never likely to curry favour from the consultant community. This was 
particularly so given the widespread expectation that the introduction of the new schedule 
was going to be the occasion when historical anomalies in fee reimbursement would be 
tackled to consultants’ satisfaction (which meant that such reimbursements were expected to 
rise).
Reaction from consultants was probably less vocal than was expected - perhaps because 
many o f them had long doubted that Bupa would undertake large scale increases in the 
Benefit Maxima. However one exception to this was the reaction o f the foot and ankle 
consultant community. A flavour o f the correspondence on the issue can be gauged from the 
following letter. Nicholas Geary, a previous president o f the British Orthopaedic Foot 
Surgery Society (BOFSS) wrote a long letter to Bupa (copied extensively to BOFSS 
members) detailing objections to the reimbursement UKM was proposing against the new 
schedule.
‘.. .It is disappointing that Bupa do not have the courage o f their convictions. If you 
commission a study to judge the relative worth of procedures and get agreement from 
all specialist groups, if there is a financial constraint on your remuneration levels to 
your clients, you should perhaps distribute the finances broadly across all 
subspecialties in line with the relative values agreed between the subspecialties. This 
would mean downgrading the remuneration levels for some procedures. It would be
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far more honest to give up the pretence that Bupa cover indemnifies patients against 
the complete costs of surgery and state that the Bupa policy makes a contribution 
towards surgery at a certain level’ (Geary, 2005).
This response highlights the consequential nature o f Bupa’s decision at the outset o f the RVR 
to give assurances that there would be no procedures for which the maximum amount 
reimbursable was reduced. This created an inflationary pressure because it meant that ‘over­
valued’, non-complex procedures could not be visibly downgraded, and that increased 
differentiation between simple and complex procedures could only be achieved by raising the 
value o f the latter.
Part o f the reason why Bupa ended up with so little room for manoeuvre was that another 
long-term initiative to get consultants to price in accord with Benefit Maxima (already 
discussed in the last chapter in relation to hospitals) had only had limited success. So far this 
chapter has been concerned with attempts to improve the methodology by which 
reimbursement rates for given procedures are determined in the private sector. The events 
described above show that insurers have found it very difficult to reform the traditional fee- 
per-service system based on a schedule of charges to achieve fairer relative pricing. That said, 
Appendix 9 illustrates that post RVR the values (if not the actual reimbursement) insurers 
assign to particular procedures remain generally -bu t not completely- consistent. We will 
now turn to consider the fate of Bupa’s parallel drive to control consultant charges within that 
system, using the Benefits Maxima.
Bupa’s Benefit Maxima
Bupa’s Benefit Maxima (BM), the published schedule o f maximum amounts reimbursable for 
particular interventions/services, are not designed to engineer any change in the relative 
pricing of procedures. The BM are, however, intended to apply general downward pressure 
on consultant fees by limiting what the Association will pay.
Unsurprisingly, this is a source o f tension with consultants. Many hold the position that their 
‘contract’ is solely with the patient, who they regard as the one ultimately liable for any bill 
for services. The insurer is considered merely a financial intermediary in the process. Many
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doctors believe they have the right to bill whatever they feel the ‘market’ can stand. As such 
they may bill over and above the amount that an insurer will reimburse and ultimately will 
hold the patient responsible for settling the resulting ‘shortfall’. By contrast, insurers are keen 
for doctors to waive this ‘right’, agree to charge to a defined reimbursement schedule, and 
bill the insurer direct. Although technically patient shortfalls are the patient’s problem, in 
reality they are disliked by insurers. Members who experience shortfalls tend to complain, 
and have a greater propensity not to renew their insurance. Insurers would prefer to eliminate 
such shortfalls and get providers to accept the reimbursement rates they offer.
U KM ’s Consultant Partnership
Bupa’s initial efforts in this area centred on the launch of the ‘Consultant Partnership’ 
programme in 1999 (which is still in operation). Consultants were invited to apply to become 
‘partners’. Partners enjoy certain financial and service benefits, such as a bonus payable on 
top o f the total annual value of invoiced activity and access to a fund to support clinical audit. 
In return they agree to bill within Bupa’s Benefit Maxima in normal circumstances. Where a 
consultant feels there might be special circumstances justifying billing above Benefit Maxima
- a case with unusual complications for example requiring substantially longer time in theatre
- they commit to contacting UKM to discuss extra payment rather than simply billing the 
patient any extra charge.
Despite the inducements offered many consultants were - and remain - suspicious o f Bupa 
‘Partnership’ arrangement, and the BMA was publicly opposed to its creation. Nevertheless 
by 2005 around 8300 consultants had joined the Partnership (out of a total of 19,000 ‘Bupa 
recognised’ consultants) and these individuals performed approximately 70% of all episodes 
o f care. Generally speaking, consultants were more prepared to join the partnership (and 
hence fix their fees to a pre-set upper limit) in specialities with the lowest demand for private 
healthcare and in those areas of the UK where private medical insurance cover was lowest. 
Partnership coverage was relatively low in orthopaedics (only 46% o f episodes in 2005) and 
particularly low in Southeast England. Anaesthetists require special mention as a group with 
low numbers in the partnership. In 2005 over 40% were billing above benefit maxima 
(shortfalling members). This reflects three factors:
Firstly, the Association o f Anaesthetists o f Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI) had a long­
standing objective o f actively seeking fee parity with surgeons. Within Bupa’s benefit
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maxima and more widely in the private sector, anaesthetists’ reimbursement rates are set at a 
lower rate than surgeons - for an example see the fee schedules discussed previously for 
cataract surgery. Many anaesthetists feel strongly that the fee limits set by Bupa (and other 
insurers) are too low (see: Hospital Doctor, 2006a, p.3; Harrop-Griffiths, Prineas and Grant, 
2010)
Secondly, anaesthetists unlike many other consultants, have relatively little face-to-face 
contact with private patients. The patient may well not have any contact prior to admission. 
Because of the historical reticence o f private hospitals either to employ or enter into 
arrangements to charge on behalf o f consultants, the patient is often left not knowing who the 
anaesthetist is going to be, and whether their fee will be above that paid by the insurer.
Thirdly, anaesthetists have a reputation both within the NHS and the private sector, for being 
a speciality whose members have been better able to organise themselves into groups. In the 
case of private practice they have often formed formal partnerships. This has led to a 
widespread suspicion that one function of such ‘groups’ is to act as a mechanism for local fee 
setting.
The Office o f  Fair Trading Investigation o f  Anaesthetists Groups
In May 2001 the OFT started an investigation following a complaint that anaesthetists in a 
number of local areas had formed themselves into groups, and agreed within each group the 
prices that each anaesthetist would charge. The OFT examined the operation o f 10 different 
anaesthetic groups. The OFT’s eventual judgement - after a year long investigation - was 
complex and the logic questionable, but its outcome was simple. The anaesthetic groups were 
found not guilty of infringing the Competition Act 1998.
The judgement was made public on the OFT website (OFT, 2003). In essence the OFT 
considered that the anaesthetic groups (with one exception) operated as a single undertaking 
for the purposes o f competition law. It followed from this determination that an agreement 
between the members o f each group (within their respective groups) as to the levels o f fees to 
be charged for their private professional services, would not amount to an agreement between 
undertakings. The resulting conclusion was that no ‘price fixing’ as defined by the Act had 
taken place.
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Whatever the ‘rights or wrongs’ of the ruling, the current legal position therefore supports the 
activities o f anaesthetists and other consultant groups who wish to agree a common price in a 
local market. In such an environment it is unsurprising that large numbers o f consultants 
continue to set fees above that which insurers have set. The position taken by the OFT on 
both RVR and anaesthetic groups thus in effect undermined insurers’ efforts to bring 
downward pressure on consultant rates.
However insurers are not entirely powerless to counter a particular specialty group in a local 
area, should they consider their fees unreasonable. There are in theory a number of options 
available to an insurer in such a situation. These include:
(i) Threaten to de-recognise some /all of the group in terms of their ability to treat 
members unless they revise their fees;
(ii) Give hospitals and/or surgeons an incentive to take on responsibility for the 
anaesthetist component of the overall bill;
(iii) Direct members to a network comprising only to those anaesthetists who have 
agreed rates with the insurer;
(iv) ‘Parachute’ into a local area alternative providers.
i
! All o f the above require considerable effort (and resources) on the part o f an individual
| insurer (co-ordinated action between insurers is not possible as this would be deemed anti­
competitive) and carries a very real risk of a damaging dispute with consultants that would 
negatively impact on customers/patients. Consequently, although the industry as a whole 
might want to gain better control of fees nobody wants to risk being a first mover. Apart from 
the opportunities this would afford competitors to ‘poach’ disgruntled members; it is also 
I likely that other insurers would benefit from any changes in the market that such an action
; would produce. This classic ‘moral hazard’ helps sustain an environment that strongly
favours the indefinite continuation of the ‘status quo
Fee setting and the British Medical Association
The BMA does not negotiate fee structures for its members, largely because it has been 
judged unlawful for it to do so. In 1994 the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 
(now known as the Competition Commission) ruled that the BMA’s attempts to set 
guidelines on fees for private work amounted to an attempt to create a ‘complex monopoly’ 
(MMC 1994)
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Then, as now, Bupa’s use of the benefit maxima was being resisted by the medical 
profession. The reasons why the MMC recommended prohibiting the BMA guidelines, while 
at the same time allowing insurers to publish reimbursement schedules such as such as 
Bupa’s Benefit Maxima, were essentially twofold.
First, the MMC accepted that it was legitimate for insurers to publish maxima scales in order 
to inform their subscribers of what their entitlements were under a medical insurance 
contract. Second, the MMC took the view that while Bupa’s maxima may have had a 
restraining effect on consultant fees, Bupa itself did not have sufficient market power to 
impose on consultants an unreasonable level of remuneration. In essence, the MMC view was 
that private patients are in a weak bargaining position vis-a-vis consultants over fees and that 
it was o f ‘crucial importance’ that insurers should continue to exercise their ‘countervailing 
power’ on behalf o f their subscribers.
The Benefit Maxima as a Mechanism fo r Cost Control
The consultants’ biggest complaint against Bupa UKM has long been that the company has 
failed to sufficiently increase reimbursement rates since the inception o f the Benefit Maxima 
(BM). This is countered by UKM’s claim that the BM has been a highly effective instrument 
o f consultant cost control. Both claims contain an element of truth, but are subject to 
important caveats.
Consultants often claim that BM reimbursements have remained essentially unchanged for 
over 15 years (Stubbs, Ward and Pandit 2010). The author heard doctors on many occasions 
state that Bupa’s behaviour has been unreasonable in not raising BM in line with inflation.
For many consultants the continued above-inflation rise in premiums and insurer profits set 
against a refusal to increase reimbursement levels - despite rising malpractice insurance and 
office costs - was evidence of insurers’ unreasonable behaviour. Statements that there had 
been no increase in Bupa’s reimbursement rates were not strictly factually accurate, as over a 
ten year period (1995-2005) overall maxima payments increased by just below 3%. Much of 
this had taken place between 2000 and 2003 with a total of £ 14.5m put into rate increases.
Such monies were applied by analysing the volume and value of procedures. Maxima monies 
were targeted at particular procedures, rather than in terms of a general uplift, ‘shortfalled’
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payments, considering the values given through the RVR process, and through discussions 
with, and guidance from relevant speciality groups and associations. As a result some 
increases had been made in response to historically high levels o f patient shortfalls for certain 
procedures.
For example, over the period 1998 to 2002 the amount Bupa paid consultants increased from 
£197m to £282m (an increase of 43% before inflation). Whilst some o f this will be related to 
increases in the numbers of Bupa members over that period, the proportion o f overall benefit 
spend paid to consultants had remained broadly the same. In an industry that experienced 
well above-average inflation with regards to hospital and drug costs over that period, this 
points to a more complex picture than the simple claim that ‘our reimbursement rates haven’t 
risen for a decade’ would suggest.
The two main confounding factors were likely to be a rise in clinical incidence and outpatient 
fees. Rising incidence has a number of possible causes - one of which (theoretically at least) 
can be that the health of the presenting population was worsening. However Bupa’s 
membership is solidly grounded in social classes 1 and II, who enjoy above UK average 
health status (Black, 1980). Also, whilst the ability to treat more disease grows over time 
there is little to suggest that this potential increased that significantly in the above time period 
(Dybczak and Przywara, 2010).
The more likely explanation is that there had been some changes to the threshold for clinical 
j  intervention either generated by clinicians or from patients and/or clinicians were seeing the 
patient on more occasions when they did decide to treat. Were such behavioural changes to 
take place it would most likely to be reflected in an increasing number o f outpatient 
attendance’s. This fits with the general pattern of clinician behaviour with fee for service 
medicine elsewhere (Brodenheimer, 1999). It should also be noted that rising incidence 
| means in effect that consultants have to work harder (or at the very least differently) so as to 
\ see more patients... or the same patients more often.
The rising outpatients costs in this period have to be set alongside the fact that a significant 
proportion of consultants continued to ‘shortfall patients’ (40 % o f Bupa's patients faced a 
shortfall in their consultant fee reimbursement according to an article published in the Sunday 
Times, 27th January 2002). This suggests that the success of BM in controlling consultant
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costs has been at best partial. Nevertheless, when the OFT ruled in 1999 that the private 
medical insurance (PMI) and private medical services (PMS) markets were indeed 
competitive, it stated that:
‘The Monopolies and Mergers Commission’s (MMC’s) 1994 conclusions on the Bupa 
Benefit Maxima remain valid and that the removal of Bupa’s Benefit Maxima, with 
no comparable replacement, would lead to significant increases in consultants’ fees’ 
(OFT, 1999).
The earlier 1994 MMC judgement - as previously noted - had held that Bupa’s publishing of 
a national upper-limit on fees did not operate against the public interest. The MMC had also 
suggested that there was ‘...virtually no price competition between consultants’. Moreover, 
because o f the power o f consultants ‘.. .the countervailing power of the insurers is of crucial 
importance. The evidence suggests that until recently they have been less than robust in using 
it.’ (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1994, p.4).
The evidence presented in this thesis helps demonstrate that the MMC’s judgement was 
accurate. Bupa’s BM had the potential to counter the power of the providers but the evidence 
of effective use of ‘countervailing power’ to date is quite limited.
Other Insurers ’ Use o f  Reimbursement Schedules
Bupa was not the only insurer that published a reimbursement schedule. Cigna, Aviva, Pru 
Health and Western Provident Association (WPA) also publish such schedules.
Yet historically the use o f such schedules has been controversial within the UK PMI industry. 
Bupa’s BM have been a particular focus for controversy. Some insurers believe that Bupa, in 
publishing its BM rates was not setting a maximum fee level (as the term maxima suggests), 
but rather had established the minimum level that consultants would charge. The argument 
goes that consultants know that they can charge up to that amount and will be paid in full.
Not only does this give them no incentive whatsoever to charge less, but as Bupa has 
approximately 40% of the market share that it has de facto  set the minimum market rate.
Historically AXA PPP did not publish its reimbursement schedule. Instead its terms referred 
to reimbursing consultants within the confines o f ‘reasonable and necessary limits’. The usual
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interpretation o f this is that if a fee submitted by a consultant falls within the normal range as 
set by peers it will be paid in full. However because a fee schedule is not published this gives
| the insurer the freedom to vary reimbursement rates between practitioners and to take 
advantage o f any geographical differences in fees charged and/or patient demand for that 
particular consultant’s services. From an economics perspective, this approach might be 
considered the one more likely to stimulate market-driven fee setting. However the degree to 
which real differences in fees charged - and paid - would occur across the UK may well be 
less than classical market theory would lead one to believe. Whether there are real gains to be 
had from this approach relates in part to the established propensity o f many consultants to 
charge either to a standard rate to all insurers and/or to charge the same rate as their 
colleagues in a certain geographical area (Kessel, 1958; Herrick and Goodman, 2007). 
Standard charges are administratively convenient, particularly if those rates are paid in full by 
insurers, whilst aligning prices with those of colleagues has the self-protective effect of 
removing any local price competition.
The AXA PPP approach theoretically allows an insurer to make differential payments to 
consultants on any number of grounds - volume, market power, reputation, outcomes, 
economy of use of resources, length of stay, etcetera. Adherence to published tariffs would 
seem to unduly restrict a purchaser from adopting innovative reimbursement methods for 
clinicians. That historically so few insurers have attempted to adopt such differential 
payments is illuminating in terms of assessing the relative ‘assertiveness’ of UK private 
healthcare sector contracting with clinicians.
A significant constraint has been the desire of insurers to limit both the incidence and size of 
any shortfall between what a consultant charges and what the insurer is prepared to pay. 
Uncertainty on this issue is a major source of customer dissatisfaction with the insurer in 
question, and this is the main concern behind Bupa’s attempts to limit shortfalls and thus give 
increased confidence to members that their care will be fully covered. The growth of 
regulation in the insurance industry seems set to push in the same direction. The Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) has increased pressure over time via regulatory requirements for 
insurers to make ‘transparent’ to their members their benefits entitlement. If  members are not
I
\ certain whether an insurer is going to cover in full any aspect o f their treatment (including
i
I consultant fees), prior to treatment, then arguably their benefits are not ‘transparent’. This
I raises questions about the long-term viability of a consultant reimbursement system based on 
i  non-published rates.
Such an approach would be sustainable if member policies guarantee a full refund on 
consultant fees. The problem for insurers with this approach (historically) is that such 
guarantees attract a higher premium unless they are also accompanied with significant 
restrictions on which consultants can be seen and/or what conditions are covered. In the 
meantime for members who do not have such guarantees, the limits o f coverage remain 
uncertain. This is an area likely to come under further regulatory scrutiny in future.
Controlling the Level of Consultant Fees
Earlier sections have dealt with the limited efforts by UK insurers to control consultant costs 
via reforming the reimbursement mechanism and use of Benefit Maxima. This section 
assesses the level o f consultant fees and discusses why insurers have been unable to push 
them lower.
Mention has already been made of the historically high cost o f private healthcare in the UK, 
and how this is supported by the willingness of insurers to reimburse at those levels. When an 
expression such as ‘high fee level’ is used, the objection might be raised that a subjective 
judgement is being made in respect of what is in fact merely a price determined by supply 
and demand. However, there is good reason to suppose that the current market for consultant 
services in the UK private market is organised so as to create pricing mechanisms that depart 
significantly from the classical economics model as espoused by the likes o f Ricardo (1817).
The Economics o f  the Market fo r  Consultant Services
In a well functioning market - as envisaged within classical micro-economics - fees paid to 
private specialists would be expected to be set at a market-clearing rate that equalled the 
marginal cost of the service provided. However such a market requires well-informed 
consumers (be it patients or their agents such as insurers) with perfect knowledge of fees 
charged by other specialists, who base their choice o f a particular specialist solely on 
perceptions of price and quality. Of course such an ideal market bears little resemblance to
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the actual UK PMI market, or indeed to most real-world health care markets. Among the 
confounding factors likely to be observed are:
s i. Asymmetry of information - as previously noted in the introductory chapter - typically the 
provider knows considerably more about the illness and proposed treatment that the patient. 
Whilst there are some signs (Health Care Advisory Board, 2007) that the internet in particular 
is being increasingly used by patients to help educate them, this imbalance looks set to 
remain the norm. This is often accentuated by the emotional vulnerability o f patients who 
deem themselves (often rightly but sometimes just perceived) as suffering from an ‘illness’ 
requiring medical treatment. This area, and indeed the wider subject o f market failure through 
the existence of uncertainty in the incidence of disease and the efficacy of treatment, remains 
essentially as highlighted by Kenneth Arrow (1963);
ii. Demand decisions tend not to be driven by price considerations, partly for reasons outlined 
in (i) above but also because in the developed world many patients are either fully insured, or 
funded via public healthcare schemes, and thus do not generally worry about fee levels for 
their care;
iii. Payers (government and insurers) tend to use standard fee rates for reimbursing specialists 
rather than negotiating individual arrangements;
|
; iv. In the UK the choice of specialist is often driven by the general practitioner (GP) making 
the initial referral. The GP has no direct incentive to consider the price/fee charged by that 
specialist. Moreover as will be subsequently illustrated in Chapter 6, general practitioners 
j often do not have ready access to objective knowledge of the quality of the clinical services 
| being provided (although he or she may have accumulated some knowledge based on the 
f outcome of previous referrals for the more common procedures);
v. There are high barriers to entry in the market for private consultants because:
a. There are long training periods, plus a traditionally restricted volume of consultant posts 
and medical school places, all affecting the supply of doctors in the short/medium term 
and;
b. More specifically to the UK, it is normally the case that consultants wishing to undertake 
private practice are required to have been or currently hold a consultant NHS post to be
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recognised by insurers as eligible to treat their policy holders. Moreover, patient referrals 
are often based in part on relationships with local general practitioners developed through 
NHS work.
The above are general factors which suggest the existence of weak demand-side mechanisms 
and supplier dominance. To these must be added some additional features which help 
explain the high level o f UK private sector consultant fees. We will now examine this further 
using the example o f cataract surgery fees.
Case Study: Cataract Surgery Specialist Fees
There are two significant grounds for believing that many consultants are charging relatively 
high prices for undertaking cataract surgery and that overall (hospital and consultant charges 
combined) the prices being paid for such surgery in the UK are abnormally high. The first 
relates to the output o f the RVR, which (unsurprisingly) adjudged that cataract surgery had a 
relatively low complexity score compared to many other procedures. This may not be entirely 
conclusive, since some consultants argue that cataract prices appear relatively high because 
the more complex procedures are undervalued.
However the second reason is more telling in that it relates not to any subjective view as to 
‘fairness’ but from observations of both the cost o f the procedure in other developed
I
| countries and self-pay prices in the UK. Overseas prices, as one might expect, vary
L
| considerably, but one is hard pressed to find a healthcare system that pays more for this 
I procedure than the UK private sector. Set out below are clinician reimbursement rates for a
i
| variety o f countries that were the subject o f a study by NERA on behalf of Norwich Union
I
\ and the Financial Times (Bramley-Hawker and Aslam, 2003).
I
[
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Table 4. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SPECIALIST FEES 2002
O P C S
C od e
Procedure UK I S A Canada Germany Spain Australia
National currency units £ $ C$ € € AS
Q0740 Total abdominal 
hysterectomy
636 909 386 161-371 519 1.185
T2000 Inguinal hernia 360 468 327 75-173 n.a. 725
W3710 Total hip replacement 864 1.343 695 216-496 714 2,515
G6500 Endoscopy 156 338 95 70-161 n.a. 380
115100 Haemorrhoidectomy 312 392 270 54-124 227 650
K4100 Coronary artery 
bypass graft
2.304 1.936 1.281 437-1.005 1.298 3.160
F3440 Tonsillectomy adult 360 271 175 43-99 162 565
1.8510 Varicose veins 420 364** 291 70-161** 292 950
C7120 Cataracts 780 673 417 204-469 389 n.a.
LSS purchasing power parity rate
Q0740 Total abdominal 
hysterectomy
978 909 322 168-387 674 871
T2000 Inguinal hernia 554 468 273 78-180 n.a. 533
W 3710 Total hip replacement 1.329 1.343 579 225-517 927 1.849
G6500 Endoscopy 240 338 79 73-168 n.a. 279
115100 Haemorrhoidectomy 480 392 225 56-129 295 478
K4100 Coronary artery' 
bypass graft
3.545 1.936 1.068 455-1.047 1.686 2.324
F3440 Tonsillectomy adult 554 271 146 45-103 211 415
L8510 Varicose veins 646 364** 243 73-168** 379 699
C7120 Cataracts 1.200 673 347 213-489 506 n.a.
Notes:
** Current data is a poor match to the OPCS codes or the previous data
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As can be seen above, when the $US purchasing parity rate is applied, the UK cataract 
removal price is almost twice as high as that in the United States, and represents an even 
bigger premium over the prices charged in Spain, Germany and Canada.
!
The Federation o f Independent Professional Organisations (FIPO) reaction was to dismiss the 
NERA report. It quoted the British Medical Association (BMA) Health Policy and Economic 
Research Unit which had regarded the systems of healthcare in the overseas areas chosen by 
the NERA researchers as ‘inappropriate’. FIPO said that this ‘refuted’ the report: ‘essentially 
the NERA report is comparing apples with oranges and quite apart from the differences in 
general prices, taxation and economies it is inappropriate to compare consultants’ earnings in 
a nationalised or government sponsored healthcare system with those in a fee paying service’ 
(FIPO, 2006a).
However as Laing’s Healthcare Market Review pointed out, the NERA findings were 
supported by other research. Specifically:
‘A study carried out by Laing and Buisson a decade before in 1992, also funded by 
Norwich Union (UK Private Sector Fees-is the Price Right? (Laing and Buisson,
1992) also found that UK private specialists’ fees were the highest in the developed 
world at that time’ (Laing and Buisson, 2005).
Within the UK the cost o f self-pay treatment provides further evidence that Bupa’s BM for 
cataract surgery procedures were significantly over-valued. Prices vary significantly but are 
often below those historically paid by UKM. In 2003 Optimax Ltd was advertising self-pay 
cataract service at £2010 (both eyes) or £1055 for a single cataract (Optimax, 2003). The 
Coplow clinic was quoting £1,450 (Coplow, 2003). By 2007 some prices had dropped. 
Optimax prices were £995 for a single cataract -  inclusive of up to one year’s aftercare 
(Optimax, 2007). In contrast (as already noted earlier) Bupa’s BM to the surgeon and 
anaesthetist at that time (hospital fees to be added) for a single cataract operation was £1011.
This is hardly what one would expect if prices were determined by market purchasing power.
I
| Bupa is the market leader in terms of PMI membership. On that basis one might expect it to 
command the lowest prices. What can account for the failure of the private sector in general,
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and Bupa in particular, to get consultants to reduce their fees? Why does the main purchaser 
often get a worse price than an individual seeking a self-pay option?
| The explanation most commonly afforded is that those in the self-pay market are purchasing 
marginal capacity, and that providers offer lower prices secure in the knowledge that their 
fixed costs are already covered through the cases paid for by the insurance industry. This may 
indeed be what is happening but it does not explain why insurers allow it to happen? It is not 
a purchasing pattern often seen in other industries, nor is it seen in US healthcare where the 
uninsured are typically charged considerably more that those covered by insurance for the 
same procedures (Barlett and Steele, 2004; Reinhardt, 2006).
Three explanations (by no means mutually exclusive) can be proffered for this state of affairs. 
They might be summarised as:
• A reluctance to direct patients to certain providers;
• The profit UK insurers currently make (leading to an insufficient desire to change);
• Not wanting to upset providers given their perceived influence on members.
These are explored in more detail below.
Consultants ’ Influence on Patients
Insurers do not consider consultants to be passive suppliers o f services. As previously noted, 
the doctor/patient relationship is typically characterised by a major power imbalance. There 
is often considerable trust displayed by the patient with regard to the wisdom and integrity of 
the doctor. Despite some erosion in that faith since Arrow’s observation (Schlesinger, 2002), 
it remains the conventional wisdom that patients trust their doctor more than their insurer 
(Hall, 2001).
As previously noted - one consequence o f this has been to regard the consultant as de facto  
the ‘customer’ as he or she is seen as instrumental in bringing the patient to that particular 
hospital. For insurers this translates into a belief that consultants have the ability to influence 
patients to renew or lapse their membership on the basis of how well-disposed the consultant 
is to the insurance company in question. The theory is that consultants can put up barriers 
such as:
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‘If you’re with company ‘X ’ I’m afraid that you’ll have to pay in advance and claim 
your money back from them, as I have terrible trouble with that company’
Conversely they might praise a company along the lines of:
‘You’re with company ‘Y’, that’s good, I find them very helpful’.
The conventional wisdom within the PMI industry is that such conversations are relatively 
commonplace and that this impacts on patients’ propensity to renew their insurance with a 
particular company.
One result of this is that most insurers subscribe to an annual randomised survey of 
consultants called ‘Silver Fern’. The survey is undertaken by an independent market research 
company and tracks consultant satisfaction across a number of areas. These include their 
views on reimbursement levels, and the service they receive from insurers in terms of time 
taken for invoices to be paid, telephone service etcetera. During the time the author worked 
for them, both Bupa Group and UK Membership set considerable store upon the results of 
Silver Fern - including setting year on year improvements of certain scores as a corporate 
objective.
Significantly, in 2004 UKM had a corporate objective o f increasing the Silver Fern score by 
1 %, and in 2005 o f it not dropping. This made it extremely difficult for insurance executives 
to push hard on initiatives that were attracting professional opposition.
Both insurance and hospital executives are well aware that consultant power in the UK 
derives in part by a relative shortage o f supply. The UK has considerably fewer doctors per 
1000 population than almost any other developed country (see table below).
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By the time o f  the publication o f  the NHS Plan in 2000 (DoH, 2000) the Labour government 
had identified the consultant workforce shortage as a key weakness in its ability to improve 
the NHS (and also reduce the power o f  the medical profession). The result has been a drive to 
increase doctor numbers in the longer term through increased medical school places. This 
was initially accompanied by shorter term initiatives to increase overseas recruitment and 
entice qualified doctors (particularly those who had left to have children) back to the NHS. 
These measures had some success but were significantly undermined to a degree by the 
following:
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• The combined impacts of the European Working Times Directive/Junior Doctors Hours 
both of which effectively reduce the amount of time doctors are available to work 
(Temple 2010);
• The changing ratio of male: female doctors in favour o f the latter. Female doctors have 
been shown to be more likely to either go part-time or leave medicine altogether. The 
principal reason for this remains that associated with the demands o f childcare, but other 
changes within western society also means that the traditional notion o f choosing a 
‘career for life’ is no longer so applicable-even in medicine (Goldacre, Lambert and 
Davidson, 2001);
• The tranche o f doctors recruited from overseas in the 1960’s are approaching retirement. 
This has a particular impact on general practice (Taylor and Esmail 1999);
• The impact o f the NHS 2004 Consultant Contract, which has given a positive inducement 
for consultants to identify any work they were performing above their contracted 
sessions. Where such additional work has been deemed unaffordable in terms of its 
inclusion in the new contract, workload has often dropped. If included, the resultant cost 
pressure can ultimately result in reduced clinical activity as a means by which NHS 
Trusts try to keep within their budgets (Williams and Buchan, 2006);
• Restrictions on the recruitment of overseas doctors from outside the EEC. This has had a 
particularly significant negative impact on NHS hospitals’ ability to staff junior and 
middle grade medical rotas in a number of specialties (BMA 2009).
The traditional barriers to entry into the medical marketplace have already been noted. For 
the private sector in the UK the three elements most likely to liberalise the labour market are:
(i) The introduction of Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTC’s) and the use of 
overseas medical teams;
(ii) Greater use o f general practitioners (GP) and specialist nurses to undertake 
tasks which previously only a consultant had sole recognition to perform;
(iii) Selective contracting with doctors based on an explicit price/quality matrix.
These innovations are all somewhat problematic for the private sector (and insurers in 
particular). Whilst they may well reduce the costs o f healthcare, the following concerns are 
typically aired by insurance executives. Firstly, that the use of non-consultants undermines 
the ‘brand’. At Bupa this was associated by the claim that members are treated by
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j  consultants. Historically this was always felt an important selling point as it conveyed a clear 
j notion o f a superior service compared to the NHS where treatment by a doctor still in training 
is common. Secondly, that any use of overseas recruited teams would raise concerns (both 
perceived and sometimes actual) about their quality and finally, that the use o f GPs and nurse 
practitioners would not only undermine the ‘consultant only’ treatment proposition but might 
also lead to an increase in the volume o f treatments provided. The basis o f this latter 
argument is an interesting one as it is founded upon the suspicion that although unit costs 
would drop, total costs would increase as clinicians would in effect lower the clinical 
threshold for which treatment would be offered.
Why D on’t insurers Use Alternative Providers to Reduce Costs?
The historic reluctance to utilise alternative suppliers, or encourage new suppliers into the 
market has already been noted. This seemingly paradoxical feature o f a UK marketplace 
given historic supplier costs is best explained by reference to a number of factors which 
combine into a near overwhelming inertia. Arguably, chief amongst these factors is probably 
the sustained profitability of private health insurance for its main players. At its simplest, if 
‘the business’ in terms of profitability/margins were in a more difficult environment, there 
would be greater downward pressure on fees. However the long-term ability o f much of UK 
private healthcare to remain profitable in future is an open question.
The three greatest threats to profitability are as follows. Firstly, that those purchasing PMI 
will view the NHS as improving, so they consider private insurance unnecessary. Secondly, 
that the above-inflation premium increases seen in the past continue into the future. Laing’s 
Healthcare Market Review estimated that the average premium paid by a UK personal 
subscriber increased from £373 in 1989 to £1261 in 2004 (Laing and Buisson, 2005, p i 39). 
Thirdly, that there is a sustained economic downturn which results in individuals lapsing due 
to reductions in their disposal income, and corporate clients either lapsing their membership 
entirely or reducing the value of their policies.
The latter appears to be happening as a consequence o f the severe slump in financial markets 
worldwide in 2008/09 that has subsequently triggered a general economic downturn. As the 
economy contracted sharply in 2009, the number of insured members covered by PMI and 
employers’ medical insurance schemes, fell by 4.8% from the previous year to reach
4,112,000 at the start of 2010 (Laing and Buisson, 2010b)
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Whilst company-funded policies (covering both PMI and employers’schemes) fell by 4.7% in 
2009, the number o f individual subscribers fell by 5.2% in 2009 to reach a new low of
1,062,000 at the start of 2010 (Laing and Buisson 2010b). According to Laing and Buisson, 
Corporate PMI revenue and individual PMI revenue fell equally. Claims costs from medical 
insurance grew in 2009 (up 1 % in real terms), and insurer margins dropped sharply to their 
lowest level since 2000.
Should insurer’s profits continue to get squeezed and translate into losses, it is unlikely that 
suppliers would remain untouched. One consequence may be that insurers become more 
proactive in fee-setting negotiations, and in particular seek to have more influence regarding 
which provider sees and treats their members. Chapter 3 highlighted the trend towards 
developing hospital networks. As previously noted, these had the effect of discouraging new 
entrants from building private hospitals or otherwise generating additional capacity. The 
conventional wisdom had been that additional capacity would have to be paid for, and that 
would translate into increased incidence of claims. Any reduction in charges from increased 
competition would be more than wiped out by the overall increase in health-related 
expenditures. This has been very much the traditional view of healthcare dynamics in the UK. 
In short, there was a particular scepticism about the ability o f competition to reduce costs, or 
indeed that much genuine competition would ever be generated.
Members buying hospital network-based products are bound by certain restrictions as to 
where they will be treated. However, this may or may not limit the choice o f consultant. The 
impact o f hospitals networks on consultant options varies geographically and by specialty. 
The effect is likely to be greatest where there is more than one private provider in an area (i.e. 
where some genuine competition might occur) and in a high volume specialty (for example, 
in orthopaedics as opposed to neurosurgery).
In such an environment the consultant in question may find that s/he cannot admit a patient to 
his/her preferred hospital - as it is not in the network. Some consultants have admitting 
privileges to more than one hospital so that this represents an inconvenience rather than a 
genuine threat to their income, and does not affect the fee charged. However, where there is a 
surplus of a given specialty in a particular geographical area it would be possible for the 
network hospital in question to make fee-setting a factor in determining consultants’
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admitting privileges. In practice this happens infrequently, as to date there is usually no 
pressing market requirement to do so.
Furthermore, there are many parts of the UK where the network hospital effectively picks 
itself (being the only private hospital in the area or is part o f a chain where admission of the 
network has been negotiated as part o f an agreement between a hospital group and the 
insurer). In these circumstances there is no pressing need for consultants to adjust their 
behaviour with regard to the status of the hospital beyond the relative local supply of 
competing consultants in that speciality.
Consultant Networks?
Given the limited potential o f the current hospital networks to moderate consultant fees, why 
are insurers not more active in creating a restricted consultant network whereby members 
would be actively directed to consultants who were prepared to charge lower fees?
Dependent upon the quality criteria used, such networks have the potential to help ensure and 
promote quality healthcare. Economic theory would lead one to believe that:
(i) Providers need patient volume to stay in business;
(ii) The ability to bring (or reduce) patient volume to the provider is a powerful 
negotiating tool;
(iii) Providers will trade price for volume - particularly if that volume can be 
‘guaranteed’.
Clinicians might be expected to oppose such an initiative (and they do) on the basis that it 
says nothing about clinical quality. However there is nothing per se in such an approach that 
excludes taking definable quality issues into account as a legitimate discriminator. The key 
word is ‘definable’. The profession's historical failure to make such quality differentiators 
either explicit, or routinely collected, has in-part led purchasers to discriminate principally on 
price. After all, the consultant pool is made up of ‘registered’ consultants. In subsequent 
chapters the general issue of the measurement of quality and the degree to which it is acts as 
an effective point of differentiation between providers is explored in more detail.
However in the UK to date this approach has been notable largely by its absence. Why are 
insurers so loath to adopt policies that restrict access only to those considered to be of high
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quality and/or those offering lower fees? As previously stated, the quality issue will be 
explored in depth later in this thesis, but what of lower fees?
We have already seen that insurers display a marked reticence for upsetting the provider 
community. Somewhat paradoxically, insurers have been loath to take on such vested 
interests in pursuit of lower fees because they believe it would also be unpopular with their 
members. It may seem counter-intuitive that a measure designed to lower costs - and hence 
premiums -  is not pursued because it would be too unpopular with members whose biggest 
complaint is the increase in premiums. On the surface this takes some explaining.
The most rational explanation - beyond lack of a sufficient market requirement to change - is 
that the particular nature of UK private healthcare has traditionally militated against an 
aggressive approach to consultant selection into a network. As previously noted, people 
typically obtain private medical insurance to increase their choice - for place o f treatment, by 
whom and when. Private medical insurance is often expensive, and becomes progressively so 
as the member ages.
Restrictions on choice of provider will tend to be viewed very negatively, unless a 
compelling case can be made for them... perhaps not even then. For those who obtain their 
PMI via their employer this is usually seen as a perk-a status symbol within a company 
and/or as an attractive feature of employment with the company in question. Unsurprisingly 
then (when these factors are added to the previously noted moral hazard features of third 
party payment) few employees will be particularly motivated to keep the costs o f their 
particular treatment down. Employers do have such an interest but this is counterbalanced (in 
part) by their concern to keep their workforce content with the benefits offered. For 
employers the historical evidence is that they are more likely to pursue reducing absolute 
numbers of employees eligible for PMI or trading down their level of cover (Laing and 
Buisson, 2010a).
The end result is that the primacy of ‘choice’ - which in practice more often than not means 
choice for the referring GP, as many patients will take a passive role in such matters - has 
become the conventional wisdom for those designing PMI products in the UK. The 
dominance of ‘choice’ - which is a concept easily understood by consumers - is in part a 
reflection of the difficulties and relative lack of attention given to ‘quality and value for
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money’ issues.. .both for purchasers and consumers of healthcare. This is a subject that we 
shall return to. For the present one can merely observe the end result. Namely, UK insurers 
have a particularly strong predilection to believe that their members will not tolerate any 
significant restriction in their choice of provider - despite the potential benefits in terms of 
cost and quality control. Historically the cost/benefit (including dealing with consultant 
opposition) equation has favoured inertia. Whether declining profits will force insurers (and 
providers) to be more radical is an open question. Logically the answer would be ‘yes’ but no 
one wants to be the first mover...and risk widespread customer lapses to other insurers.
We have returned to the observation made in Chapter 2, namely that the particular dynamics 
o f the UK’s private healthcare market encourage insurers to act in a manner akin to that of 
PPO’s in the United States. Ultimately a greater premium is placed within the industry on 
retaining ‘choice’ than tackling the cost structure...and the result is an expensive healthcare 
system.
Even if insurers were convinced of a favourable member response, the legality o f limiting 
recognition principally (or purely) on economic grounds is not altogether certain. No insurer 
wants to risk the cost and unfavourable publicity of a legal challenge (probably on the 
grounds o f undue restriction of trade). Insurers could try the approach o f asking consultants 
to respond to tenders for services (e.g. ‘we wish to channel anaesthetist services in each part 
o f the UK only to anaesthetists meeting certain price and quality criteria’). This is a realistic 
option only for the largest insurers, and perhaps not even then, as examination o f Bupa’s 
efforts in this area in chapters 5 and 7 will demonstrate. Arguably this is what the 
Department of Health did when it first tendered for independent sector treatment centre work. 
In doing so it appears to have made the decision not to use incumbent private providers from 
supplying the service on the basis that they were unlikely to generate genuinely new capacity, 
new methods o f working or a lower cost structure.
In the case of a tender undertaken by a private insurer there is a question as to whether 
consultants in areas where there is widespread above benefit maxima charging would actually 
respond to the tender. Insurers might attempt to ‘parachute’ in alternative consultant supply 
to problem areas. ISTC’s are an example o f this principle. For insurers the use o f the ISTC’s 
is a seemingly attractive option, as they offer opportunities to negotiate lower prices. 
However, the lack o f differentiation arising from the use o f ISTC’s by the NHS is seen as a
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problem, as is their use of non-NHS consultants to undertake operations. Bringing in new 
consultants is expensive and there are also concerns as to whether local GPs would refer to 
them.
Interestingly the requirement for GP-based referral even within private practice is a 
characteristic of UK healthcare not found in many overseas PMI markets. UK insurers tend to 
insist upon GP referral to consultants ostensibly as a mechanism for controlling incidence. 
However, perhaps because of the dominant NHS model British subscribers rarely appear to 
see the requirement for a GP referral as a matter for complaint.. Whether this really exerts 
much control on referral volumes is open to question, given that GPs have no incentive to 
control referrals. All the above initiatives are only really practical for the largest insurers to 
employ. In any case they require both a large customer base so as to make it worthwhile for 
alternative providers to bid for the work and a significant infrastructure to support such 
initiatives. Many insurers are not in this position and are thus ‘price takers’ in the PMI 
market.
Conclusion
From the foregoing it can be seen that the market conditions prevalent within the UK’s 
private sector are peculiarly conducive to the maintenance of ‘high’ medical fees. At one 
level this should not be that surprising. It had been the unwritten understanding at the 
establishment o f the NHS that consultants would be paid by the NHS below the rate one 
would expect for their skills and length o f training in return for the opportunity to supplement 
their income via private practice. That insurers (and ultimately private patients) should permit 
such generous remuneration for this private work is less easy to understand. However, the 
structure o f the PMI market and the power asymmetries alluded to earlier are major factors.
Undoubtedly the position of private practice as a profitable niche market (serving corporate 
customers and comparatively wealthy private individuals), against a backdrop o f an NHS 
which historically had a poor reputation for consumer responsiveness, created a market 
notably indifferent to cost efficiency. Those who chose private healthcare as a substitute for 
the NHS overwhelmingly had higher than average incomes. Both Arrow (1963) and Kessel 
(1958) have noted the propensity of medical professionals to display ‘...extensive price
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discrimination by income’ (Arrow, 1963, p953) and the UK market represents a further 
example o f his point.
For consultants there is more at stake than abstract notions o f their freedom to practice as 
they choose. For many, their private practice income is a substantial proportion of their total 
earnings. There are differing estimates o f just how much is involved. The Monoplies and 
Merger’s Commission’s (1994) investigation, based on a postal survey of consultants, found 
that mean gross private practice earnings varied from £49,000 in the south east region to 
£18,000 in Northern Ireland. In most regions the range was £33,000 to £45,000 a year. 
However, this was distorted by the top earners, 10% of whom received more than £67,000 a 
year and 1% whom earned over £150,000 a year.
In 1992 median NHS earnings were about £42,000 compared to a median private practice 
income o f £25,000 a year. The MMC estimated the gross earnings per hour from private and 
NHS practice from these figures at £133 and £25 respectively (with some significant 
variation by speciality). These figures although nearly two decades old, help illustrate the 
gulf between private and NHS practice hourly rates and thus the importance placed on private 
practice by many consultants.
This picture is supported by more recent figures published in Independent Practitioner (a 
supplement published by Hospital Doctor) in November 2007 (Standbridge, 2007) that give 
the average gross and net incomes from private practice by speciality. These range from a 
gross income of £166,000 (before expenses) for Orthopaedic surgeons down to £56,000 (also 
before expenses) for anaesthetists.
Finally, the BMA (2004) has itself estimated that private practice income for those 
consultants who do private work was, on average, approximately 50% of their NHS income 
in 2004
This chapter has discussed certain factors that explain the generally high consultant charges 
seen in the UK private sector and the barriers to reform that exist. It has been suggested that 
insurers’ efforts to exert downward pressure on charges have been quite limited and that 
those initiatives attempted have had only mixed success. Given that medical cost inflation is 
likely to be a continuing problem for insurers and subscribers in future years,, what are the
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prospects of such reforms taking place from the ‘voluntary’ actions o f those in the 
marketplace as opposed to through compulsion /pressure via regulatory change or 
government intervention?
The experience o f the UK PMI market to date would lead one to conclude that a number of 
conditions would need to be present for any meaningful reform to take place. These are:
1. By far the most likely lead agency would be a major insurer. Small insurers lack sufficient 
purchasing power to cause providers to make the required changes. Hospital groups are 
unlikely to take forward the necessary innovation to reduce fees on their own as:
(i) They will fear that key consultants will move to a competitor hospital (see hospital 
chapter) and they will lose the patient income they bring;
(ii) They see little pressing reason (in the absence of insurer pressure to do otherwise) to 
make substantial changes to their business model or operational processes.
2. The increasing use o f private sector providers by the NHS might persuade one or more 
hospital groups that they need to dramatically change their relationship with consultants so as 
to be able to compete (profitably) for General Supplement Funding Projects (GSup) and 
patient choice contracts. This issue was discussed in Chapter 3. For the purposes o f the 
present chapter the question is whether such initiatives as working strictly to clinical 
protocols, limited prosthesis lists and reduced fees/session payments/salaries, for NHS 
contracts are going to transfer across to private sector work - particularly involving insured 
patients. This is dependent, in large part, on the degree o f support from insurers, as without it 
they are once again in danger o f key consultants moving to a rival hospital that retains the 
existing model.
3. At some point the volume of NHS business to a particular hospital group may become so 
significant (in terms of overall revenue/profitability) that it will make a decision (as Nuffield 
Hospitals appears to have done) to change fundamentally its operational model. The question 
then becomes whether that hospital group then becomes a marginal provider o f private care 
or whether the changes it makes are going to significantly impact on the private market.
4. At least one major insurer makes the strategic decision that its current business model - as 
it relates to its relationship with consultants and costs - is unsustainable. This is likely to
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centre on reducing fees and/or making clinical quality more transparent. In doing so that 
insurer will have to be prepared to endure some short to medium term ‘pain’ in the forms of 
consultant opposition, negative publicity, member complaints, loss o f some corporate and 
individual subscribers to rivals, etcetera. Such negative consequences are extremely likely 
because the changes to the status quo will undermine member confidence in the security of 
that insurance product and is aggravated by a likely reduction in choice of consultant as the 
insurer tries to promote a particular consultant network. As mitigation of risk is a key driving 
force in purchasing insurance and choice is a key selling point in UK private health insurance 
these are substantial hurdles to overcome.
The above should not be interpreted as saying that insurers are making no attempts to control 
medical costs or that all their attempts are unsuccessful. Bupa itself has made some inroads 
as we have seen with its implementation o f the CSSD schedule in this chapter. In the next 
chapter we will consider another example in the shape of Bupa’s attempt to create an 
ophthalmology network.
In 2008 AXA PPP announced a major change in its historical approach to reimbursing 
consultants by enforcing a Schedule of Fees and new Terms and Conditions that would apply 
to newly appointed consultants. This is the first time the company has published a Fee 
Schedule. Unsurprisingly this elicited a strong negative reaction from FIPO (FIPO, 2008) 
who noted both that the fees were lower and that consultants bound by these new terms and 
conditions would not be able to charge the patient for any shortfall. In March 2010 AXA PPP 
followed this up with a letter to a number of previously recognised consultants which in the 
words to the FIPO website:
‘....suggests that they should comply with a new fixed fee schedule issued by AXA 
PPP and which is exactly the same as the schedule enforced on newly appointed 
consultants for the last 18 months. Broadly speaking the fee reimbursements for 
patients are lower than current BUPA rates’ (FIPO, 2010b).
AXA PPP has yet to directly link acceptance o f these fees to recognition for currently 
accredited consultants although this may well be the next step. In the meantime the company 
has requested consultants to give patients an estimate of their potential fees. The implication 
is that AXA PPP will use this information to make patients aware o f any potential shortfall,
119
should a consultant fail to agree to charge at the new lower fee rate and a patient insists on 
seeing that consultant.
Perhaps emboldened by the AXA PPP approach, BUPA announced in July 2010 new terms 
and conditions for new consultants applying for recognition (FIPO, 2010c). Those seeking 
BUPA Insurance recognition would be required to adhere to the BUPA Maxima for in-patient 
fees, and additionally there would be discussion about outpatient consultation fees with each 
consultant. These consultants would be required to sign a contract which allows BUPA to 
request detailed personal, administrative and clinical details (audits, work analysis, 
complications, clinical incidents, complaints, appraisals) at any stage.
FIPO complained that the documents appeared to suggest that established consultants, as well 
as those seeking recognition fro the first time, would be covered by these arrangements, 
although BUPA stated there were no immediate plans to alter established consultant fee 
arrangements. Taken together the above indicates the direction of travel that insurers such as 
Bupa and AXA PPP appear to be taking in an attempt to control (and even reduce) consultant 
fees although the pace of change remains quite slow.
Taking the issues set out in the chapter as whole it can be seen that whilst change is more 
likely today than in the past, there are still substantial ‘hurdles’ to overcome. Moreover the 
historical record o f the private sector in both the promotion of clinical quality (see Chapter 7) 
and demonstrable value for money has been open to question. From this it is fair to conclude 
that there is no built-in logic in private healthcare in the UK that will ensure that these issues 
of ‘market failure’ are addressed. Indeed this author would contend that features o f the UK 
private healthcare make it particularly difficult for a market-based solution to force changes 
in provider behaviour. We might hypothesize that, as long as the PMI market remains 
profitable, the present equilibrium will persist and the power o f private sector purchasers to 
force cost and quality improvements will have been shown to be severely limited.
In Chapter 5 this hypothesis is further tested by reference to the experience o f Bupa UKM ’s 
attempts to introduce an ophthalmology network. This draws together threads from both the 
hospital and consultant reimbursement chapters, and presents further evidence on the relative 
power o f purchasers and providers in the UK PMI market.
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CHAPTER 5
Bupa’s Specialty Network Initiatives 
Introduction
This chapter returns to key themes explored in the previous two chapters on the markets for 
hospital and consultant services, and adds depth to the analysis by discussing a small number 
o f initiatives by UK insurers in recent years to establish specialty networks. The main case 
study presented is Bupa UKM’s attempt to introduce an ophthalmology network, an initiative 
noteworthy for the intense professional opposition that it provoked. However, the chapter 
also considers AXA/PPP’s successful roll out o f a more limited cataract surgery network with 
less professional resistance, and Bupa’s recent establishment of a physiotherapy network.
The main theme o f the chapter is the considerable resistance offered by consultant 
organisations and some hospital providers to insurer initiatives aimed at lowering prices or 
improving quality, though it is noted that Bupa and AXA/PPP have had some measure of 
success with more limited forms o f network organisation. The chapter shows that such 
insurer-initiated ‘reforms’ have high opportunity costs, take up much time and resources, face 
difficult implementation problems, and have an uncertain outcome.
The Ophthalmology Network Proposal and the Professional Reaction
If provider opposition to the Bupa MRI tender discussed in Chapter 3 was muted by 
competitive realities, the same cannot be said for Bupa UKM’s next initiative - the proposed 
creation o f an ophthalmology network. The opposition to this initiative was noticeably 
greater and o f a more sustained nature than with the MRI network. This may reflect a number 
o f subtle differences between the two.
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Firstly, different treatment modalities are involved (MRI being heavily technology/ 
equipment driven, whilst ophthalmology services conforms much more to the traditional 
clinician driven model of health care). Secondly, as previously noted, MRI services have 
been progressively ‘commoditised’. Thirdly, ophthalmology services represent a traditional 
part o f the core private provider market. An attempt to create a new network would impact on 
ophthalmologists, anaesthetists and hospitals and was perceived by consultants as a threat not 
only to all ophthalmology-related work but also to traditional work practices and contractual 
arrangements across all specialities. By contrast MRI is a more self-contained, equipment- 
based treatment modality which lends itself to discrete ‘spot’ contracting. These features that 
also help explain why the DoH chose MRI as one o f its first services to involve the private 
sector in the provision of services to NHS patients.
Ophthalmology may seem initially to be a strange choice, in that it is by no means the 
speciality that has the biggest spend or the greatest patient volume. Actually these very 
factors may help explain why UKM selected ophthalmology for a tendering initiative. The 
risks were less than would have been the case, for example, with orthopaedics (with bigger 
volumes and more members involved), or cancer services (which though not presenting large 
numbers o f claims is a highly emotive area of healthcare). However the principal reason for 
choosing ophthalmology is that one procedure (cataract surgery) represents such a large 
percentage o f the 21,000 ophthalmology procedures Bupa were funding back in 2004 at a 
cost o f £32 million (Bupa Group Press Release, 2006a).
Cataract surgery had become a commonplace intervention, capable in most cases of being 
performed as an outpatient or day case procedure. The reimbursement assigned to the 
procedure for both hospitals and consultants was widely regarded as significantly overvalued. 
Bupa faced charges of up to £3,500 from private providers compared to the NHS tariff cost of 
between £702 and £1,015 (Bupa Group Press Release, 2006b). £3,500 represented the ‘high 
end’ of a wide spectrum of charges, and if one utilises the price guide within WPA’s 
‘Flexible Health’ product literature (Western Provident Association, 2005) a more typical 
private sector cost at that time would be in the range of £2,190 to £2,680. As was noted in 
Chapter 4 these concerns were amplified by the propensity of many ophthalmologists to 
charge above the rate paid by UKM and thus to ‘shortfall’ the member. With new providers 
entering the ophthalmology market via the DoH-led independent treatment centre initiative, 
Bupa saw both an opportunity and a pressing need to make changes in this area.
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UKM’s ophthalmology initiative had a long gestation (the author being involved in extended 
discussions on options for his first three years at UKM and intimately involved in detailed 
project planning in his final year). The initiative was not actually ‘launched’ until May 2006 
(a further three months having elapsed from when the author left UKM). Despite attempts 
during the planning phase to persuade both consultants and hospital groups o f the benefits of 
change, the subsequent reaction of large sections of the provider community quickly dashed 
any hopes there might have been that implementation would be either smooth or quick.
UKM’s intention was to invite both existing and new providers to tender for the delivery of 
ophthalmology services. From these submissions UKM intended to create a preferred 
provider network. As with MRI there would be explicit quality criteria and a ‘value for 
money’ test. The hope was that a tender exercise would engender price competition-at least in 
most parts of the UK. There were certain parts of the country where the relative scarcity of 
providers (either ophthalmologists and/or hospitals) created opportunities for monopolistic 
pricing, but if this materialised active encouragement to get members to travel to other 
providers, or introduce new providers, could be initiated. Senior Bupa executives believed 
that there was a real prospect of creating a more price-sensitive market for ophthalmology 
services (particularly for cataracts), and it may have been the very practicability o f the plan 
that provoked such sustained opposition from providers who knew they had much to lose.
FIPO and the BMA signalled their opposition to the network proposals from the outset and 
have maintained that position. This well-publicized resistance from the consultant lobby 
allowed the hospital groups to take more o f a backseat in the subsequent ‘war of words’. The 
FIPO website put the organisation’s concerns in the following terms:
‘Bupa Insurance is currently trying to implement the Ophthalmology Approved 
Network in two phases and all relevant consultants and hospitals will have received 
information about this. Phase 1 requires private hospitals or other facilities to combine 
with local consultant ophthalmologists and anaesthetists to form ‘teams’ and then to 
submit detailed documentation about their services.
In the case o f consultants this document is extremely complex and involves 
professional issues that have never been requested before by any insurance company.
It also requires consultants to sign a declaration (in essence a contract) which is one
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sided and totally biased in favour o f the Insurer. As an example, it would allow Bupa 
Insurance to de-list consultants on the basis o f complaints (number and content 
unspecified) by Bupa personnel or patients without any independent appeals process.
If hospitals and their consultants do in fact agree to apply together for this Bupa 
Insurance ‘Approval’ they will move in to Phase 2 of the process which will involve 
the agreement of a price for their combined services with Bupa Insurance. Those 
hospitals not recognized will be unable to treat Bupa subscribers and similarly with 
consultants (although there may be just a few patients that can be seen by so called 
“Bupa Recognized” consultants).
The impact o f this tendering process, if completed nationally, would be a limited 
number o f preferred providers, restriction o f choice for the patients, loss of 
independence for the profession and Bupa control of the referral patterns o f patients. 
There are also clinical “guidelines” suggested by Bupa for the care of patients. This is 
a Managed Care Scenario (although this is denied by Bupa)’ (FIPO, 2006b).
Concerted opposition to these proposals manifested itself in a joint letter to all consultants of 
the 12th June 2006 signed by the heads of the BMA, FIPO, the Associations of Anaesthetists 
and Ophthalmologists, the British Ophthalmic Anaesthesia Society, the Independent Doctors 
Forum and the Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgeons.
In the letter they set out their principal concerns including the following:
• ‘The accreditation of consultants is the role of the Royal medical colleges, post-graduate 
deaneries and the GMC and not that o f a medical insurer;
• Private medical insurers should not be regulating healthcare facilities which is the remit 
of the Healthcare commission;
• Quality guidelines are drawn up by the profession and the royal medical colleges. The 
quality criteria documents that form part o f Bupa Insurance Limited’s ophthalmology 
network procedure have misrepresented guidelines issued by the Royal college of 
Ophthalmologists;
• Audit assessment of consultants is a local hospital governance issue and not the remit o f a 
medical insurer;
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• The network is detrimental to patient choice...;
• The network may interfere with the existing doctor-patient relationships;
• The network could result in a reduction of fees paid to ophthalmologists and anaesthetists
as it is the overall cost of treatment that is assessed for Bupa ‘approval’. It is likely that
private hospitals will offer ophthalmologists and anaesthetists a set fee for undertaking 
work. The network will therefore give hospital providers control over consultants;
• The contractual relationship has always been and should remain between the patient and 
their doctor and not between the insurance company and the doctor and the proposed 
network will interfere with this.
We have concerns that this initiative will be followed by similar networks in other 
clinical specialties and believe this misguided initiative should be terminated 
In light o f these concerns we would advise you not to take part in the initiative... a 
robust united front by ophthalmologists and anaesthetists, and all other consultants in 
rejecting the proposal will defeat it. In the past Bupa Insurance Limited attempted to 
control hip and knee surgery, but this initiative was successfully defeated by the 
profession.’
This position was largely mirrored by the Royal Colleges:
‘Our position remains that it is inappropriate for Bupa to act as a regulator for one 
sector o f practice and the College does not intend to assist in the implementation of 
Bupa’s plans’..
And:
‘We are content that you may refer to our publications in any discussions you have or 
in your own documents, but we must ask that you refrain from construing this as our 
endorsement of your processes. In addition, while being grateful for sight of your 
publication ‘Creating an Approved Ophthalmology Network’ we have not been 
involved in its creation nor have we had the opportunity to pass comment on it, 
therefore please again note this document cannot be endorsed by us’ (McLaughlin, 
2006).
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The nature and depth o f doctors’ opposition to any attempt to change their working practices, 
fees, or impose external scrutiny upon the quality of that work is clear enough and is a 
recurring theme in this study. In essence the consultants opposed any erosion o f their 
traditional right to self-regulation, objected to the idea that an insurance company could 
impose quality requirements, and questioned whether it was competent to interpret clinical 
guidelines. The literature on the professions reviewed in Chapter 1 suggests that the medical 
profession will not easily relinquish its control over the organisation o f medical care. FIPO’s 
statement in particular appears to assert the traditional cultural authority of the consultants 
and present the proposed change as a threat to the doctor-patient relationship. A key question 
for the thesis is how far market mechanisms are able to successfully deliver change in the UK 
private health sector: the strength of professional and provider opposition is clearly one of the 
most important factors preventing movement from the ‘status quo
O f interest in this regard is the approach o f the UK government with regard to reform of the 
NHS. Whilst in England there has been an attempt to harness market forces to assist and 
reinforce this programme, one may argue that many of its core features owe more to central 
direction than to market levers. Despite the furore surrounding the introduction of private 
sector providers, the numbers of NHS patients actually treated by such providers remain quite 
limited. Hospitals are paid by centrally-determined and uniform HRG payments. Consultant’s 
salaries are nationally negotiated. Quality initiatives such as the introduction o f the 
Healthcare Commission (now the Care Quality Commission) have been centrally mandated. 
The new Conservative/Liberal Democrat administration has indicated in its recent NHS 
White Paper (DoH 2010a) that the development o f a market is to be further encouraged, 
principally through enforcement of an ‘Any Willing Provider’ (AWP) process to ensure 
contestability. However, at the time of writing, reliance on market mechanisms to create 
change within the NHS remains secondary to bureaucratic control.
Clearly the government is more powerful than an individual insurer, and whilst all insurance 
companies acting in unison would be a formidable force, the Competition Commission would 
most likely veto any such ‘collusion’. It is apparent from the foregoing that this is a market 
with considerable ‘structural’ inertia to attempts to change the fundamentals by which price 
and quality are determined and regulated.
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I Bupa’s Attempt to Implement the Network
The subsequent history of the attempts to establish an ophthalmology network illustrated the 
depth o f professional opposition. FIPO and the BMA presented a common front in 
challenging Bupa’s proposals. Their web sites posted a series o f open letters, advising their 
members o f the latest position with regard to negotiations with UKM.
A BMA post in mid July stated that there was evidence of an ‘overwhelming rejection’ o f the 
network by members, and advised individual consultants concerned about a possible loss of 
Bupa practice to band together with local colleagues to oppose the proposals:
‘...The network represents a further measure to control/depress income from private 
practice. If  you doubt this, consider what has happened since the Bupa consultant 
partnership was introduced - no increase in most benefit levels and a depressant effect 
on fees across the whole private sector with the result that the relative value of fee 
income has dramatically decreased since 1990. The effect of the network would be 
much worse as any attempt to increase fees would then result in expulsion and 
exclusion from treating any Bupa insured patients rather than merely losing out on a 
10% procedural bonus... We must point out that it takes two to negotiate and that it 
may not be possible to reach an acceptable agreement with Bupa, in which case our 
advice to decline to be involved in the network would stand. The evidence we have 
from our surveys indicate that there is an overwhelming rejection of the network by 
both consultant ophthalmologists and anaesthetists. We are aware, however, that 
individual ophthalmologists may get nervous about their Bupa practice and we would 
advise that colleagues in each area agree between themselves not to join the network - 
no doctors = no network. You are more powerful than you believe’ (Machin and 
Daniel, 2006).
On the same day (17th July 2006), Machin and Daniel wrote to UKM on behalf of the BMA, 
reiterating the argument that the proposed network was not necessary in order to achieve 
UKM’s objectives regarding quality assurance and cost effective practice. The letter stated 
that the BMA did not accept that there was a problem with the quality o f ophthalmological 
surgery in the UK and believed there were only limited opportunities to improve cost
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effectiveness in the specialty The letter went on to say that ophthalmologists' representatives 
were ‘very willing to work with Bupa on cost effective practice and have identified length of 
stay, list planning and prostheses as areas where progress could be made...The willingness to 
progress this issue is dependent on an agreement that the intention is to substitute the network 
proposals with this initiative proposed by the profession’ (Machin and Daniel, 2006).
Bupa executives were skeptical about how the BMA proposed to apply such ‘cost effective 
practice’ to the PMI market, given that the profession opposed ‘managed care’ guidelines and 
collective fee setting. Nevertheless, negotiations continued.
On 28th July 2006 the BMA reported to its members that:
‘[The Association is] pleased to report that we have reached a provisional agreement 
with Bupa Insurance Limited. They have accepted our argument that consultants do 
not find the concept of belonging to a network acceptable. In its place, they have 
agreed to our proposals for joint working at national and subsequently at a local level 
on cost effective practice and the equitable distribution of the benefits which accrue...
The achievement o f this agreement was entirely down to the unanimity of purpose 
demonstrated by the profession and its successful implementation is wholly dependent 
on the outcome of the upcoming national negotiations which will be carried out by 
your representatives’. (Machin, 2006).
In fact, the BMA’s conclusion that UKM had dropped its ophthalmology network proposals 
was incorrect. In November, Hospital Doctor, under the title ‘Bupa drives on with approved 
providers’, reported that:
‘Bupa Health Insurance's controversial plan for a network o f approved ophthalmology 
providers and consultants has re-emerged. Bupa is now asking individual hospitals to 
make combined applications, with individual doctors or consultant groups, to become 
approved providers. In information to applicants, Bupa said it would take 'all 
opportunity' to ensure subscribers are aware of any financial consequences of them 
using unapproved providers.
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Bupa is asking one hospital or consultant group to head up the bid as 'lead provider'. 
The other doctors in the combined submissions should contract their services to the 
lead provider, the insurer suggests. Bupa could then contract with the lead provider 
for a range o f services, with the provider submitting a composite invoice.
Bupa says it will continue to recognise consultant anaesthetists for reimbursement, but 
does not want to hold contracts for providing ophthalmic anaesthetic services.
Lead providers will be responsible for subcontracting anaesthetic services and for 
making sure that all involved have agreed to pricing.
While recognised anaesthetists who do not have a subcontract with a Bupa-approved 
facility may still invoice the insurer directly, Bupa said: “It will not be in the approved 
facility's or approved ophthalmologist's best interests” to use non-approved 
anaesthetists. Bupa said individual submissions would be considered when 
“specifically invited” (Newman, 2006).
This was a wholly unwelcome development as far as the consultants were concerned, and this 
was reflected in the response from the BMA and FIPO. There was a further flurry of open 
letters to their members reaffirming their opposition to the network. At the same time the 
profession was trying to marshal support from the wider provider community. A letter issued 
in December 2006 made reference to the position o f one o f the major hospital chains, BMI, 
on the issue:
‘You may be interested to know that BMI Healthcare Limited has advised us that 
having canvassed the opinion of specialists in relation to Bupa’s request for a “team” 
submission, the BMI hospital group will not be making a team submission. They do 
not agree to subcontract the anaesthetists’ charges and have confirmed that Bupa will 
need to negotiate with individual specialists in respect o f their fees. The BMA 
continues to be resolutely opposed to the establishment of networks which benefit 
only Bupa... ’ (Machin and Daniel, 2006 ).
As 2006 drew to a close ‘The Times’ ran an article ‘Bupa takes a stand against 'poor surgeons 
who charge excessive fees' (Hawkes, 2006) which demonstrated that UKM was having more 
success convincing elements o f the national press of the merits o f its proposals than it was
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having with providers: The Times article also reported on figures supplied by Bupa which 
I reaffirmed points previously made in this thesis as follows:
| ‘The survey (by Bupa) also found huge variations in the prices charged by private
hospitals. The NHS tariff for a cataract operation is between £702 and £1,015. But in 
some cases Bupa was being asked to pay £3,500 for an operation in the private sector. 
These prices have a direct effect on premiums. Bupa said that a typical policy-holder, 
aged 32, who was paying £655 a year for medical insurance cover in January 2004, 
will be paying nearly £867 by January.’ (Hawkes, 2006)
Halfway to a Network?
At the time of writing (November 2010) UKM has still not succeeded in establishing a 
national ophthalmology network as originally envisaged. Active and highly vocal resistance 
from doctors groups (and some o f the hospital groups) had been sustained throughout what 
became an extended period o f negotiations and ‘stand offs’. Successive due dates for 
announcement o f the network came and went.
However, that is not to say that UKM was unable to create a de facto  network o f a kind. What 
happened on the ground was that UKM directed a significant proportion of members (though 
not all) via Bupa’s customer service centers to those providers with whom it had negotiated a 
pricing agreement - in effect creating an ad hoc network. Whilst the need to direct customers 
on a case-by-case basis created operational pressures for those call centers, UKM appears to 
have favoured this low-key approach as an alternative to a push towards a position where it 
could publicly announce a formal network arrangement. Whilst Bupa’s website makes no 
mention o f a network, it does contain a list o f approved ophthalmic units searchable by 
geographical area which reinforces the view that there is an informal arrangement with 
network characteristics. Bupa issued a letter to intermediaries (brokers) stating that from 1st 
August 2007 there would be more than 100 Bupa-approved Ophthalmic Units and that any 
member treated at these hospitals would have their costs met in full.
This did not escape the attention o f the consultants, who argued that the arrangement 
disadvantaged patients. According to FIPO (FIPO, 2007a) if the patient decided to go to a 
‘non-approved’ facility the reimbursement would be:
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‘.. .approximately 50% for the consultant fees and thus the patient will be penalised. 
Whilst this is a big step back by Bupa Insurance from their original proposals which 
envisaged package pricing and more control of the referral pathways it is not as yet 
satisfactory because many hospitals including (at this precise date) the whole BMI 
group (the largest in the country) have been excluded from the “approved” network.
In some areas o f the country there are very few (if any) “approved” options available 
for Bupa subscribers to have their cataract or eye treatment. This means that many 
patients are being referred to awkward or distant locations for their treatment, often 
under a consultant who is not their first choice’.
The reference to UKM’s dispute with BMI pointed towards another problem for Bupa: that 
the largest hospital group had decided that it was not going to co-operate with UKM in its 
attempt to lower prices. FIPO also stated that, in response to UKM previous suggestions of 
poor quality in UK ophthalmic surgery, it was setting up a national cataract audit in the 
independent sector. FIPO was confident that audit would refute UKM’s allegations. 
However, at the time of writing (almost three years after this announcement) FIPO have yet 
to announce its results
FIPO’s ‘December Update’ (2007b) reported that the Bupa ophthalmology network ‘has not 
been implemented’. Under the arrangement that had emerged, UKM had reduced the benefit 
maxima reimbursable to non-approved consultants for cataracts by some 50%, from £741 to 
£386 (Fox, 2007b). This appears at first sight to be a radical move and a clear statement of 
intent that the company was going to be a price setter in the cataract market. However on 
closer inspection the announcement may neither be as brave, nor as radical, as one might 
assume. The reduced reimbursement applied only to non-recognised providers. Recognised 
providers can still charge higher amounts - the implication being that they these can be 
agreed at the point o f being recognized and may differ between providers. The degree to 
which Bupa’s move would generate a real price decrease would be ultimately dependent 
upon:
(i) What prices are agreed with the recognized providers - if they are close to the
historical BM levels the actual gain is negligible;
(ii) How many providers are not recognized and thus subject to the lower 
reimbursements;
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(iii) How many Bupa members were still treated by non-recognised providers.
On this last point such members may well end up paying the difference between the new BM 
and the consultants’ historical prices/old BM which represents a real out-of- pocket price 
increase for those patients.
Unfortunately, although almost three years have passed, none of the above information is in 
the public domain and the author no longer has access to Bupa’s internal deliberations.
Whilst UKM’s website now lists Approved Ophthalmic Units, there is no corresponding list 
o f doctors. This means that Bupa members who have already seen a GP or optometrist who 
has made a referral, must then contact a call centre to determine whether the consultant 
named in the referral is recognized and whether they will face a shortfall. Historically this 
would have been highly problematic to UKM as it undermines the customer-centric service 
proposition that helped underpin the company’s brand.
It seems likely that UKM will have tried to minimize such disruption by recognizing most 
providers and paying the historical BM (or close to it). However, the absence o f vocal 
opposition from organizations such as FIPO and the BMA gives credence to the view that for 
most providers it has essentially been ‘business as usual’. One change the above does signal, 
however, is a move away from uniform reimbursement via published tariffs to a system much 
more akin to that historically used by insurers such as AXA PPP, where individual price 
agreements become important.
The same FIPO update noted that the dispute between BMI healthcare and UKM had yet to 
be resolved and stated that:
‘... a number of Bupa subscribers [are] being forced to transfer their care to 
alternative venues not of their choosing and under consultants who may be perfectly 
satisfactory but with whom they have had no previous contact or relationship’
(2007b).
Bupa executives were aware that geographical gaps in provision would have negative 
marketing implications, and they continued negotiations with certain large hospital groups, 
including BMI. The author understands from industry informants that eventually Bupa and 
BMI reached an agreement acceptable to both sides. BMI hospitals are now included on 
Bupa’s list o f approved units, as are a number of HCA hospitals.
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It is too early to state with certainty who has come out on top in this extended contest 
between providers and insurer. Perhaps immediate advantage is less important than 
engineering limited change and building upon that foundation in the longer term. But it is yet 
unclear whether any gains made by Bupa will have cumulative benefits for insurers. At one 
level, the wrangle between Bupa and the consultant bodies may be taken as a conflict 
between two interest groups with different ‘world views’. However there is the alternative, 
more mundane explanation that heated rhetoric masks the traditional manner o f negotiating 
between insurers and providers in healthcare, where both parties compete to capture the 
moral high ground before the court o f public/patient opinion and their own constituencies 
over what in reality are marginal gains or losses.
AXA/PPP Network Initiatives
Bupa have not been the only company to attempt to establish a specialty network. In October 
2007 AXA PPP started to roll out its own network for cataract surgery. This network was 
different in conception from the Bupa ophthalmology model because it depended on contracts 
between the insurer and the hospital group, which was then responsible for ensuring that its 
subcontractors (the consultants) complied with insurer requirements. Patients were directed 
to AXA PPP network hospitals according to whether they lived within a particular catchment 
area, defined by travel time.
FIPO reported this development thus:
‘...Hospitals that have joined the network so far include the Nuffield Hospital Group 
and some other small independent units. The Nuffield Hospital management has 
written out to their local consultants suggesting that new arrangements will have to be 
made between the hospital and the profession if these ophthalmologists wish to 
continue to treat this group o f PPP subscribers in Nuffield Hospitals for cataract 
procedures.
Undoubtedly this will mean package pricing and will pass the choice o f consultant to 
the hospital manager who will then select from a smaller group of consultants.
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.. .In effect this is similar to the Bupa plan and, if  implemented, will again restrict 
patient choice, destroy continuity of care and break the GP to consultant referral 
pathway’ (FIPO, 2007b).
PPP appears to have had fewer problems implementing its network than Bupa. The author 
believes this was primarily because PPP had a history o f being more assertive with providers, 
For example they de-recognised more consultants than Bupa during the period the author 
worked at UKM, a position that has been confirmed by a FIPO consultant survey (FIPO, 
2010a). PPP appears to have a corporate culture more conducive to managing the conflict 
with providers associated with such initiatives.
FIPO reported in May 2009 that Ramsay (previously Capio) hospitals had agreed new fee 
arrangements for cataract surgery and had thus been successful in regaining entry to the PPP 
cataract network. The FIPO letter included details o f the fee levels involved whilst making 
the point that were ‘...lower than the Bupa Benefit Maxima and presumably would not allow 
consultants to charge directly for any top-up fees’ (Glazer and Packard, 2009).
Set out below are those fees compared to the Bupa Benefit Maxima prior to Bupa’s own 
ophthalmology initiative, to give an indication to what degree insurer initiatives had reduced 
fees in this area.
Table 6. Bupa and AXA PPP cataract reim bursem ent
PPP Bupa
£ £
Surgeon Fee Cataract GA 600 741
Surgeon Fee Cataract LA 775 926
Biometry 75 n/a
Pre & Post Consultations 0 No limit given -  can be
(included within surgical fee) charged separately
These are significant decreases but it is not clear if they result from the specific creation of a 
network, or just reflect a historical over-pricing which reduced when competing providers
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willingly came forward to deliver the service at a lower price. To be more specific the same 
result may well have occurred simply by imposing lower reimbursement levels. If enough 
providers had accepted the new reimbursement level and not subsequently ‘shortfalled’ the 
patient, the net effect would be the same. This is an interesting question but cannot be proven 
one way or the other because it is not possible to isolate the impact o f creating the network 
from the fee reduction amongst the ‘first movers’ (AXA PPP and Bupa). Once a new de facto  
market rate is set that a sizeable number of providers will adhere to, other insurers can adjust 
their fee schedules (based on the historical relationship their fee schedule -either paying more 
or less than Bupa or AXA PPP with some degree of security and without creating a network.
The reductions also need to be viewed in the light o f what other health systems, were paying. 
The 2009 NHS HRG tariff for Phaco-emulsification cataract extraction and lens implant was 
£947 for day cases (which accounts for around 98% of all cases) and £1,387 for inpatients 
(DoH, 2009a). Private sector prices remain well above these rates and continue to show 
marked variation. The website Private Healthcare UK quotes self-pay cataract removal costs 
of £l,800-£2,900 for Spire Healthcare Hospitals, and £l,950-£2,600 for Nuffield Hospitals 
(Private Healthcare UK, 2009). Bupa Cromwell Hospital in central London quotes £1,625 
for a cataract (single, local anaesthetic) and £1,725 for a cataract (single, general anaesthetic) 
both as day cases and both excluding doctor’s fees (Cromwell Hospital website). Parkside 
Hospital, also in London, quotes £2,705-£2,855 inclusive (Parkside Hospital website). The 
Coplow Day Case Cataract Unit quotes £1,380 which covers surgery on one eye, all post-op 
visits and eye drops (Coplow Day Case Cataract Unit website).
Contrast the above with the prices mentioned in the following quote from a junior doctor 
practicing in the USA:
‘...look at how compensation has fallen over the last 10 years alone. One Attending 
has told me that when he started about 10 years ago cataract reimbursement was 
$1,800, and no-one could foresee it falling below $1,000. Now, Medicare is currently 
paying around $650 a case, and if you are co-managing, this puts your personal 
collection at about $500’ (Student Doctor Network website).
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; $500 is around £300 at current exchange rates (October 2010) which perhaps puts UK 
consultant fees into perspective given US Healthcare’s reputation as one of the most 
expensive health care systems in the world.
However, the above does not mean that Bupa will not make any attempts to reduce provider 
costs. Despite likely sustained provider opposition Bupa probably continue to pursue a 
strategy based on establishing specialty and/or condition specific networks; but on a 
piecemeal basis.
Bupa’s Latest Initiative: the Physiotherapy Network
The latest initiative o f this kind is the establishment of a Bupa physiotherapy network. The 
tender process commenced in March 2008 and the network went ‘live’ in May 2009. The 
rationale for pursuing a network in physiotherapy was highlighted by Bupa (Bupa Group, 
2009) in a press release, which explained that the insurer was encountering a variation of 
around 200% variation in the costs of a physiotherapy session, and that the number of 
sessions provided for the same condition varied from one to sixteen.
Unsurprisingly there was opposition to the initiative from the physiotherapy community led 
by the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy, and Physio First (previously known as the 
Organisation o f Chartered Physiotherapists in Private Practice) This included (unsuccessful) 
complaints to the OFT and the FSA. However, the network has been established, initially 
covering 3,000 clinics and practices. Whilst this is considerably less than the 6,500 
practitioners that Bupa originally recognised to treat Bupa members, it is likely that the 
network will grow. The CSP reported that Bupa had:
‘...backed away from their previously stated position of seeking to cut radically the
number o f private practitioners treating Bupa patients  They have stated that they
expect that a similar number to the current 6,500 practitioners to be included (subject 
to their tender process)’ (Grey, 2009)
This initiative very much fits with Bupa’s historical approach. Achieving lower prices with 
little diminution o f member access is a highly desirable outcome for any insurer, but
136
j particularly so for Bupa. All the signs are that the physiotherapy network initiative has been 
successful. What then will happen to the other specialty network proposals? These will be 
probably be further modified, partly as Bupa learn from previous initiatives, it may be that 
such networks will be aimed at a sub-stratum of Bupa members who choose a more restricted 
network product.
What explanation can be offered for the apparent ease by which Bupa established a 
physiotherapy network? There appears to be four interconnected reasons:
Firstly, physiotherapists have little experience or history o f operating as an organised body 
with regard to collective bargaining/action with insurers;
Secondly, physiotherapists are unlikely in general to consider themselves as powerful as 
consultants in either their individual or collective negotiating with insurers;
Thirdly physiotherapists are unlikely to see themselves (in general) as generating as 
significant psychological dependency (or agent relationship) amongst patients as consultants; 
Fourthly, many physiotherapy interventions for patients are discrete and time limited (often 
relating to post operative mobilisation and recovery). The patient may well regard such 
physiotherapy input as commoditised (if physiotherapist A is unavailable I shall simply see 
physiotherapist B). Moreover those patients who see physiotherapists for an extended period 
(and are more likely to build up a substantive relationship) are liable to have those 
interventions reviewed under the ‘chronic condition exclusion’ commonly found in insurance 
policies (see page. 199). Physiotherapists may well be more aware o f this vulnerability than 
the patient.
Collectively the above translates into a relatively weak negotiating position- and carries with 
the threat o f defection by individual physiotherapists and practice groups.
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Conclusion
The reader is liable to be struck by the amount of time and resources that it has taken for 
Bupa to try and create something resembling a de facto  ophthalmology network. Since this 
speciality is dominated (in terms o f volume and reimbursement) by one well-defined 
procedure, it might be concluded that the problems would be even greater in other areas of 
clinical practice.
Cataract surgery is the most commonly performed elective operation in the NHS and waiting 
times have fallen so significantly combined with increasing activity that a recent paper 
questioned whether the procedure is now undertaken too readily in the public sector (Keenan 
et al, 2007). The above would seem a particularly poor foundation from which to resist the 
attempts of an insurer with 40% private market share to reduce reimbursement levels. Yet 
that resistance has been sustained, and if not entirely successful it has meant that the network 
Bupa created was less comprehensive than intended. On balance the incumbent providers are 
likely to feel quite satisfied with the limited progress Bupa have made, and the time it has 
taken to achieve the limited gains realised.
What conclusions can we draw from the protracted struggle to establish speciality-specific 
networks? Firstly it illustrates just how difficult it is for an insurer to engineer a significant 
change in the way providers deliver services. The experience o f Bupa, as the largest player in 
the UK PMI market, must be seen as reflecting the dominant trend. However, it must be 
acknowledged that AXA PPP encountered less opposition when it established a ‘direct 
referral’ process for both oral surgery and ophthalmology, whereby the member is referred to 
a network hospital rather than a consultant. Probably consultant organisations felt less 
threatened because o f the smaller scale of the AXA PPP initiative compared to that of Bupa 
UKM, as the market leader. It is also possible that Bupa were considered more vulnerable 
than AXA PPP to confrontational tactics because of its traditionally permissive approach to 
consultant price setting.
Secondly, the structure of the current UK provider market is dominated by powerful provider 
and insurer groups. Each has an interdependence with the other which creates an uneasy 
equilibrium of sorts. The furious reaction of both hospital providers like HCA and the
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doctors’ groups to Bupa’s specialty network proposals was in part based on a realisation that 
UKM were attempting to disturb that interdependence and realign relationships so as to 
reduce the power o f the traditional providers.
The chapter suggests that there are a number of options for driving down provider costs. One 
approach is to introduce new providers into the market as demonstrated by the UK 
government’s use o f ISTC’s. A second approach is simply to reduce reimbursement levels 
and encourage members to seek out providers who will deliver services at the lower prices. 
This would put the onus on members to seek out those providers who would bill at the 
reduced prices. Historically this has not been in line with UKM’s customer culture but the 
events described in this thesis suggest that in reality this might have been the simplest way to 
reduce UKM’s costs, albeit at a possible cost to ‘shortfalled’ members.
The third approach examined in this chapter of creating a formal network o f Tower cost’ 
providers appears from the Bupa experience to require a sustained effort and carry significant 
transaction costs. As outlined in Chapter 3, the attempt to create specialty networks gives us 
an opportunity to examine the transaction costs of a formal contracting/tendering approach.
Transaction cost economics helps explain why health care commissioning in this manner 
generates significant overheads and opportunity costs (Williamson, 1985; Dixon, Le Grand, 
and Smith, 2003; Edwards, 2005; Marini and Street; 2007). The events set out in this thesis 
provide a demonstration that an approach based on constructing tenders which providers bid 
against has to deliver significant gains to justify the investment the commissioner has to make 
in pursing such a strategy. This is not to say that tenders are not worthwhile, merely that 
commissioners need to carefully consider the effort involved in that approach against the 
possible gains.
In that regard it is noteworthy how much time (and resources) Bupa has committed in its 
efforts to create a single specialty network; a specialty moreover that is dominated (in terms 
of volume and reimbursement) by one well defined procedure. Furthermore, that procedure 
has been subject to a significant expansion o f provider capacity within the NHS, with a 
commensurate fall in waiting times. Indeed cataract surgery is the most commonly 
performed elective operation in the NHS and waiting times have fallen so significantly
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combined with increasing activity that a recent paper questioned whether the procedure is 
now undertaken too readily in the public sector (Keenan et al, 2007).
The above would seem a particularly poor foundation from which to resist the attempts o f an 
insurer with 40% market share to reduce reimbursement levels. Yet that resistance has been 
sustained, and if not entirely successful it can be hardly characterised as a rush to respond to 
new economic realities. On balance the incumbent providers are likely to feel quite satisfied 
with the limited progress Bupa have made...and the time it has taken to achieve what gains 
have been achieved.
Indeed the most significant point is the amount of time it has taken Bupa to get where they 
are, rather than to question whether prices will eventually fall in private sector cataract 
surgery. The author believes they are falling and will continue to do so -  largely because their 
starting point enabled providers to significantly reduce prices and still make a profit. 
Moreover arguably prices would have fallen even if Bupa had done nothing. In this context a 
reform programme stretching well past half a decade for a partial implementation o f one 
specialty network is frankly underwhelming.
A fourth option is to seek an alliance with either the hospital or the consultant as the primary 
contractor and expect them to drive down the costs of subordinate parties. The AXA PPP 
oral surgery and ophthalmology networks, which used the hospital as the prime contractor, 
are examples o f this approach. Bupa UKM had reservations about this strategy because it 
was concerned that it might alienate doctors and would also deliver more power to the 
hospital chains, thus further strengthening their negotiating position.
Finally we must return to the questions posed at the outset of this chapter. Specifically: to 
what extent is a market operating in the provision of private healthcare in the UK, and can 
insurers use market mechanisms to encourage providers to change behaviour to bring about 
quality and price improvements?
On the first question there is undoubtedly a market operating in the private sector for hospital 
(and consultant) services. On the question o f the degree to which purchasers are able to 
influence this market, the reality is that it is actually very difficult for even an insurer as large 
as Bupa UKM to effect significant change in provider behaviour. As the UK PMI market is
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delivering health care at a price significantly above that of many other developed countries 
we might deduce that market mechanisms are currently performing poorly in this regard. A 
rejoinder to this is the objection that the prices charged reflect supply and demand and in this 
regard the market is simply doing what all markets This may be so but the point is that the 
particular structure of the UK private market is keeping prices higher than they could be and 
is to that extent is operating in a suboptimal manner. The next two chapters will examine the 
private sector’s record on quality issues.
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Chapter 6
Promoting Clinical Quality: Concepts, Issues and Experiences in 
the USA and the British NHS
Introduction
This chapter provides the context for a detailed examination in Chapter 7 o f the UK private 
sector’s approach to quality issues, and in particular Bupa’s clinical quality initiatives. The 
present chapter commences with a general discussion of the concept of quality in health care 
and some of the key issues in this area. The sections that follow deal respectively with 
quality in the pluralistic US health care system (where notions o f purchasing for quality 
originate) and quality in the NHS (the public system that now offers significant opportunities 
for an expansion o f UK private sector activity).
Chapters 6 and 7 taken together shed light on the degree o f influence that purchasers can 
exert on providers to improve the quality of the care provided in the US and in the UK public 
and private systems. The two chapters will help us to assess whether the UK private sector 
has a higher regard for clinical quality than the public sector, and whether the private sector is 
better able to take forward the clinical quality agenda.
There is little evidence from the material presented so far that either the selection of provider 
or the amount payable for services depends on patient or purchaser assessments of the quality 
of the clinical care provided. Nor do insurance companies place much emphasis on 
demonstrating high quality care as a way of differentiating their product from that of 
competitors. This chapter and the next will attempt to explain why that has been so 
historically and to what degree the situation may be changing.
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I Health Care Quality: Concepts and Issues
i
What is Quality?
This is a deceptively simple question, for a number of answers can be given and each has 
implications for how health systems are to be judged. The US Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
defines quality in healthcare as follows:
‘Quality is the extent to which health services for individuals and populations increase 
the likelihood o f desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional 
knowledge’ (Institute o f Medicine, 1990).
This definition has a number of strengths, but as will be demonstrated below, sometimes 
bears little relation to consumer notions o f what quality health care should be. Textbook 
definitions, such as those found in the books by Siren and Laffell (1996) and Folland, 
Goodman and Stano (2001), often cite Donabedian’s (1980) ‘three stage’ criteria for health 
care quality assessment. The three stages in this model are:
Structure: the quality and appropriateness of the available inputs and their organisation; 
Process: the quality o f the delivery o f care;
Outcome: measurement o f the ultimate quality of care.
It should be noted that the literature associated with the definition and measurement of 
quality in relation to health care is formidably extensive. While both the Institute of 
Medicine’s definition and Donabedian’s criteria might be useful starting points, there is a 
long list of factors said to influence ‘perceptions’ o f quality. What is significant is that 
quality in relation to health care could be considered as one (or more) o f any o f the following:
i. Fully meeting the expectations of the patient in relation to the service being 
delivered (patient satisfaction);
ii. Fully meeting the expectations of the funding agent in relation to the services 
being provided to a patient (satisfaction of the funding agent - which may or 
may not be the same as (i) above);
iii. Zero errors in the service supplied;
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iv. Compliance with a defined set o f standards (that may or may not include a
defined range of errors);
v. Meeting the expected health outcome;
vi. Peer approval of the service provided.
Donabedian’s three stage criteria can be mapped against the above, but the list introduces 
additional elements. Adherence to any one o f the above (or indeed a combination of 
elements) could result in a different judgement as to whether quality health care is being 
delivered.
It is also possible under any of the above definitions to deliver high-quality health care to a 
section o f the population and something less to the rest. If there is a desire to bring equity of 
access to services as a criteria this can be done, but we are then introducing a political value 
into the discussion. In practice, discussions on quality in health care are often bound up with 
access and affordability issues. Moreover if a health system is set the objective o f providing a 
certain level of access and subsequently it transpires that this is not being achieved, then this 
becomes a performance/quality issue. For this thesis, focusing as it does on the private sector, 
equity considerations lie largely outside of the immediate discussion. Accordingly this 
section will concentrate on the ‘technical’ aspects o f defining and securing quality care.
Quality Assurance in Health: A Universal Problem?
Most observers consider assuring health care quality to be a problem in all health care 
systems - regardless o f how they are funded, organised and delivered. The argument might be 
summarised as being that the delivery o f quality health care is too variable and inconsistent, 
particularly given the large sums o f money that all developed countries are spending on 
health care. Some of the deficits in this regard were brought into stark relief by Chassin 
(1998). Reflecting that companies such as Motorola work towards (and achieve) a defect rate 
o f no more than 3.4 per million - otherwise known as six sigma quality - he noted that:
‘.. .only 21 % of eligible elderly heart attack survivors were taking beta blockers 
following their illness, a treatment that has been shown to save lives. This amounts to 
a defect rate o f 790,000 per million, or less than 1 sigma. In that study, patients who 
did not receive the drugs experienced a 75% higher death rate than those who did. 
Another study showed that 58% of patients with clinical depression were either poorly
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evaluated or inadequately treated, a defect rate o f 580,000 per m illion...The Harvard 
Medical Practice Study estimated that hospitalised patients were injured because of 
negligence in about 1% of all admissions, a figure that was characterised as 
comfortingly low by some observers when the study appeared. To Motorola, however, 
these failures translate into 10,000 defects per million, 3000 times worse than the Six 
Sigma goal... At a defect rate o f 20%, which occurs in the use o f antibiotics for colds, 
the credit card industry would make daily mistakes on nine million transactions; 
banks would deposit 36 million checks in the wrong accounts every day; and deaths 
from plane crashes would increase one thousand fold’ (Chassin, 1998, p.567).
This dissatisfaction is compounded by difficulties in developing and gaining access to 
meaningful measures of quality. One result has been the reliance on ‘trust’ in the absence of 
precise measurements o f provider competence and performance (Arrow, 1963).
Significantly, Coye’s observation o f ‘highly variable patterns o f care, widespread failure to 
implement recognised best practices and standards o f care, and persistent inability of provider 
systems to achieve substantive changes in patterns o f practice’ (Coye, 2001) could have 
applied to any country (she was referring to the USA). Further evidence that there are 
common quality concerns to be found in health systems world-wide comes from Blendon et 
al’s study (2003) of health care experiences in five developed countries - the USA, Canada, 
UK, Australia and New Zealand.
The authors state that:
‘...despite clear structural differences among the systems, findings in all five 
countries reveal consistent dissatisfaction among surveyed populations with general 
health system quality, stemming from problems associated with medical errors, 
inadequate patient-physician communication, and insufficient co-ordination of care’ 
(Blendon et al, 2003, p. 106).
It should be noted that these problems were identified from a survey o f the experiences of 
sicker adults in these five countries. Other patient (and non-patient) population groups might 
very well report different quality concerns. Moreover it was not the case that the survey 
found all countries to be equally bad or that there were no national differences reported in
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what was considered the greatest problem. Hussey et al’s (2004) study reinforced this when it 
looked at the same five countries, using different indicators, and found that no single country 
scored consistently as the best or worst overall. The method utilised by these authors relied 
upon statistical indicators, such as thirty-day case fatality rates after myocardial infarction 
and stroke, breast screening rates and so on, rather than a survey.
We also have Coulter and Clary’s (2001) analysis o f patient experiences o f hospital care in 
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA, based on a mail survey. The highest 
satisfaction ratings were reported by patients in Switzerland and the lowest by patients in the 
UK. Overall, however, the authors concluded that:
‘.. .the results offer compelling evidence that there are major deficits in the quality o f 
hospital care in all of the countries studied’ (Coulter and Cleary, 2001, p.250).
Geographical variations in the use of treatments provide further evidence o f uneven quality. 
US variations are presented in considerable detail in the Dartmouth Atlas (Wennberg and 
Cooper, 1999) but this is not a problem confined to the USA. McPherson et al (1982) 
demonstrated this with a study o f variations in common surgical procedures and further 
evidence was provided by (Chassin et al, 1987). The all too-convenient assumption that low- 
rate regions had it right turned out not to be the case. A more complicated picture has 
emerged. For example, the Trent region in the UK, although performing far fewer cardiac 
operations per head o f population than the USA, was judged to have inappropriate rates for 
coronary angioplasty (51 percent) and coronary artery bypass graft (42 percent) (Chassin et 
al, 1987, p.2535).
A BMJ editorial summed up the problem thus:
‘Health care systems fail to provide treatments that are known to work, persist in 
using treatments that don’t work, enforce delays, and tolerate high levels o f error’ 
(Smith, 2001).
All o f the above help to illustrate the problems that exist with assuring health care quality, 
and suggest that these are not confined to a particular funding or delivery system.
146
Quality and Health System Performance
Coulter and Cleary’s (2001) article made reference to the World Health Organisation’s 
(controversial) ranking o f health systems around the world, (WHO, 2000) on the basis that 
much o f it was concerned with client orientation and respect for persons. Views o f how a 
particular health system was performing on such matters were seen as broadly determinant o f 
health care quality. When France was named as top of the rankings, headline writers were 
quick to dub France as having ‘the best health care system in the world’.
Health care quality and overall system performance are not the same thing, although given 
the uncertainty regarding definitions o f quality noted earlier, the terms are often conflated. 
McGlynn (2004) in an article entitled ‘There is no perfect health system’ stated at the outset 
that:
‘Extensive research into quality o f care in different countries yields no conclusive 
findings that one system is better or worse than others. Quality does not necessarily 
vary with financing mechanisms; even countries with single-payer systems have 
variations in quality. Quality is not directly related to the amount spent on health care, 
since the highest-spending country (the United States) does not have measurably 
better outcomes’ (McGlynn, 2004, p. 100).
Whilst not necessarily disagreeing with McGlynn’s overall conclusion, a criticism that can be 
levelled against the article is that it fails to distinguish clearly between quality and overall 
system performance. McGlynn also makes an explicit assumption that outcomes are the 
definitive measure of quality in health care. Whilst this thesis strongly supports the 
importance of outcomes, it is important to understand that different audiences may perceive 
outcomes in different ways. Thus public perceptions of what makes for good health care 
quality may not be the same as those o f either healthcare professionals or academics. This 
helps to explain why some health care systems promote certain ‘quality’ features significantly 
more than others. Alongside this there is the associated observation that the value systems of 
different societies (and sub groups within a particular society) may also create different 
perceptions of what constitutes quality health care.
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Promoting and Rewarding Quality: The Story so Far
One might paraphrase the challenges facing those who wish to promote quality health care as 
follows:
• How do you effectively measure quality?
• How do you communicate the results in a way that is meaningful to non-statisticians?
• How do you promote and reward good quality care and discourage poor practice?
• How do you get people to care about it?
The latter issue might be rephrased as ‘the lack o f a business case for quality’.
On the first issue, the problem can be illustrated (in part) by the previously cited article by 
Hussey et al (2004). Hussey and colleagues started with about 1000 quality measures 
collected in one or more o f the countries studied and ended up with just sixteen measures that 
could be applied in all five. As McGlynn notes:
‘The measures themselves are, by the authors’ own admission, an opportunistic set 
that does not give a comprehensive picture of quality in any o f these countries. To 
understand better how each country’s health system works, we all need to invest in 
measurement’ (McGlynn, 2004, p. 100).
None of countries studied by Hussey routinely and comprehensively measured quality. 
McGlynn correctly states that:
‘For quality o f care to improve, health professionals and consumers need to know 
what should be done differently and how much o f a difference is necessary to get a 
better result. This means that we need much more comprehensive measures of quality 
than are available routinely in any o f these countries’ (2004, p. 10).
The methodological problems in capturing and then comparing health care quality are well- 
documented and apply to both public and private systems. There is insufficient space to 
explore these methodological issues in this thesis. The general concern that they are still so 
prevalent and persistent despite the importance and cost of health care to modem societies 
was captured in a Health Affairs editorial: ‘Given the vast societal investment in medical 
care, it’s incredible that so few ways exist for evaluating performance’ (Iglehart, 2002 p.7).
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Having considered what quality means and some current controversies, the chapter now 
moves on to describe trends in the United States and the British National Health Service. The 
first deals with a system where ideas about using purchasing to improve quality have 
attracted increasing interest, whilst the second covers a public service, which however, now 
provides opportunities for expansion o f the UK private health care sector. Both might 
therefore be likely to be major influences on the approach of UK insurers and private 
hospitals.
Quality in the United States
General Trends
Quality in the US system has traditionally been assumed to be ‘guaranteed’ by systems of 
individual and institutional accreditation, certification and licensure (Ferlie and Shortell 
2001). At the hospital level, early steps in developing accreditation included the 
establishment o f the Healthcare Facilities Accreditation Program (HFAP) in 1945 and the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation o f Hospitals (JCAH) in 1950. By the mid-sixties the 
Federal Government determined that accredited hospitals would be deemed to meet the 
conditions for automatic participation in the new Medicare and Medicaid programs, 
effectively giving the independent accreditation bodies an institutional role as ‘deeming 
authorities’. Currently US hospital accreditation is dominated by the ‘big three’ o f the Joint 
Commission (the successor to JCAH), HFAP and Det Norske Veritas Healthcare Inc (DNV), 
a new player that gained deeming authority from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) in 2008. Many private-sector payers (employers groups, HMO’s. PPO’s and 
insurers) now insist on provider accreditation.
The traditional stance of private purchasers in the US market towards quality has been to 
require a combination of provider accreditation and public reporting of quality information 
(Rosenthal et al, 2004). Efforts in the latter area have generally been quite limited. Jost and 
colleagues (1995) analysed the content of US purchaser/provider contracts and found that, 
apart from a standard requirement for accreditation, few contracts made reference to process 
or outcome measures o f quality. While many contracts contained a section on utilisation and
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quality review, more attention was paid to utilisation than quality with just a few contracts 
requiring physician profiling or compliance with practice protocols.
Confidence in the US quality assurance system was shaken by a succession of studies 
showing wide variations in practice and a high rate of medical errors (Kohn et al, 2000; 
Institute o f Medicine, 2001; McGlynn et al, 2003; Healthgrades, 2004). This resulted in 
several governmental and voluntary sector initiatives to improve quality. These included a 
National Practitioner Data bank (recording information on physician malpractice), a National 
Forum for Quality, and a Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and Reporting (Ferlie 
and Shortell, 2001). In 1999 the Agency for Healthcare Policy Research (part o f the US 
Department o f Health and Human Services) was reconstituted as the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ), with a remit to support research and develop policy to 
improve health care quality. However, the Institute of Medicine’s recommendation to create a 
Centre for Patient Safety and a nationwide reporting system within AHRQ was not 
implemented. The private, non-profit National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) 
was established in 1990 to accredit health plans and promote quality, and has developed a 
Health Plan and Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) for this purpose.
A more recent development among US payers -  and the aspect o f the US system most 
directly relevant to this thesis - involves offering enhanced payments to reward compliance 
with quality requirements (Rosenthal et al, 2004). ‘Pay for performance’ (also known as P4P 
or value-based purchasing) has excited widespread interest and influenced developments in 
other countries, such as the NHS CQUIN initiative. The CMS has introduced a number of 
demonstration projects, which (typically) reward hospitals for reporting specified quality 
information (Hillman et al., 1999; Lindenauer et al 2007), and this approach has also been 
taken up by private sector purchasers. Rosenthal and associates (2004) identified thirty-seven 
payment-for-quality programs that linked physician or hospital incentive payment (usually 
bonuses) to specified compliance with purchaser requirements.
Nearly half these programs were run by employer purchasing coalitions, such as the 
Integrated Healthcare Association (IHE), Bridges To Excellence (BTE), and the Leapfrog 
Group, but insurers like Aetna, Cigna and several companies from the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association were also well represented. Three years later Epstein (2007) reported that more 
than half the private sector HMO's had initiated P4P programs, covering more than 80% of 
HMO enrolees. Evaluations suggest that P4P has been successful in areas such as improving
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smoking cessation and immunisation rates (Kouides et al., 1998; Fairbrother et al., 1999; 
2001; Amundson et al., 2003; Roski et al., 2003), but evidence on hospital quality outcomes 
has been more mixed. While Lindenauer et al. (2007) found quality gains in the CMS pilot 
projects, Rosenthal et al (2005) conclude that paying providers to achieve fixed performance 
targets produces few quality gains and tends to reward those with higher performance at 
baseline. Epstein’s NEJM editorial commenting on the CMS pilots stated that pay-for- 
performance ‘...is fundamentally a social experiment likely to have only modest incremental 
value’ (2007, p.517). Furthermore a 2007 study analysing Medicare beneficiaries’ healthcare 
visits showed that a median o f two primary care physicians and five specialists provide care 
for a single patient andthe authors doubted that pay-for-performance systems could 
accurately attribute responsibility for the outcome of care for such patients (Pham et al,
2007). Although the above illustrates that there is considerable debate about the precise 
benefits (and practicality) o f P4P, commentators such as Rosenthal et al (2006) and Epstein 
(2007) predict that its use by purchasers will continue to increase.
The sub-sections that follow look in more detail at the trends by which purchasers 
increasingly require reporting o f  quality information and seek to link payments to compliance 
with purchaser quality requirements, and the arguments surrounding these issues.
Public Reporting o f  Quality Information
Marshall et al consider public reporting in the USA to be very much like overall health care 
delivery in that country:
‘It is diverse, is primarily market-based, and lacks an overarching organisational 
structure or strategic plan. Public reporting systems vary in what they measure, how 
they measure it, and how (and when) it is reported’ (Marshall et al, 2003, p. 136).
Given that much of US healthcare operates within an open market it is o f particular interest to 
this thesis to consider what is driving the provision of quality information into the public 
arena. Marshall and colleagues consider there to be two main factors. First, they argue that 
there is a ‘business case for quality’ which says that high quality care will lower costs to 
payers (whether insurers, employers or government). Second, they identify a growing interest 
in the use o f ‘tiered pricing’- the coupling o f a portion o f the health care costs that a person 
pays to the price charged by the provider for the health care. For example a person may face
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no personal costs to have treatment at a hospital that is ‘preferred’ by a health insurer, but 
face a cost of say two hundred dollars a day if they choose a ‘non-preferred’ hospital.
As Marshall et al point out, historically price has been the dominant factor determining which 
hospitals are ‘preferred’, but ‘...because o f concern from employers and patients, publicly- 
reported quality information is starting to play a part. The goal is to promote the use of 
providers that deliver the best quality for price (“value-based purchasing”)’ (2003, p. 137).
Explaining why progress in both areas has not been as great as many hoped will help bring us 
back to one o f the central questions addressed by the thesis: the role (and limitations) of 
markets in promoting high quality care.
Marshall et al conclude that there is:
‘...a growing body of evidence to suggest that many consumers, purchasers, health 
professionals, and to a lesser extent, provider organisations are either ambivalent, 
apathetic, or actively antagonistic towards report cards’ (2003, p. 140).
Providers, perhaps more than purchasers, are rooted in a culture that might be considered 
sympathetic to quality improvement. The oft-noted influence of professionalism in health­
care (Kessel, 1958; Blumenthal, 1994) makes for an environment where clinical quality is 
considered important, as does the threat of negligence litigation (Quam, Fenn and Dingwell, 
1987). Even if  public performance data is not leading to the adoption of quality assurance 
programmes o f the kind mentioned above, it may be promoting aspects o f quality that are 
rewarded in the market. Hibbard, Stockard and Tusler’s review (2005) is instructive in this 
regard. Whilst acknowledging that several studies have produced mixed results, the authors 
also quoted their earlier work (using a controlled experimental design) which produced strong 
evidence of the effectiveness of public reporting on quality improvement. The authors noted 
that ‘...most public reports are complex and difficult to interpret and therefore do little to 
enhance or threaten institutional reputations’ (Hibbard, Stockard and Tusler, 2005, p.l 150). 
They found that public reporting stimulated quality improvements, but what was also 
significant was that there were no observable shifts of patients away from low-rated hospitals 
to higher-rated ones over the period in question. In effect this echoed the earlier study
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undertaken by the same authors (Hibbard, Stockard and Tusler, 2003) that hospitals viewed 
such reports as affecting their public image but not their market share.
Studies have shown that patients have low awareness that quality information exists, have 
poor knowledge o f the information relating to the provider they are using, and have a low 
degree o f interest in such information (Chemew and Scanlon, 1998; Scanlon et al, 1998; 
Beaulieu, 2002). Schneider and Epstein’s (1998) survey of Pennsylvanian patients who had 
actually undergone CABG surgery found a surprising lack o f interest in coronary artery 
bypass graft (CABG) report cards. Only 1% to 2% said such reports were a major or 
moderate influence in their choice of hospital or surgeon. Moreover Erickson et al (2000) 
found that New York health plans do not use performance data to choose high-performance 
centres for CABG surgery (Erickson et al, 2000). At the same time we should acknowledge 
that the CABG report card has been credited with removing low-volume surgeons in New 
York. Chassin (2002) credits the use of public report cards for the decision of 27 low-volume 
surgeons to cease performing CABG surgery in the state between 1989 and 1992.
In the case of the public, there appears to be an apparently contradictory desire for more 
information on provider performance (Edgman-Levitan and Clearly, 1996). Marshall and 
associates (2003, p. 141) note however that ‘when this information is published, the public 
does not search it out, does not understand it, distrusts it, and fails to make use of it’. A 
similar point was made in memorable fashion by Dr David Katz (2005) when he told the 
2005 Annual Meeting of the Council of International Hospitals: ‘Americans take a lot more 
time to choose their next car than their doctor’. Against this, some modest progress was 
reported by a Kaiser Family Foundation study that found that the percentage of respondents 
reporting using information comparing quality among health plans, hospitals or physicians in 
the past year had increased from 12% in 2000, to 19% four years later (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2004).
Problems with Public Disclosure
Despite the momentum for more information about quality to be made publicly available, not 
everyone believes this is a good idea. Werner and Asch (2005) highlighted a number o f 
unintended consequences of public disclosure. They point out that despite considerable 
support for public release of performance measures there has been little research on its effect, 
and no attention to possible negative consequences on health care.
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While the studies cited above showed that CABG mortality rates in New York had dropped, 
and attributed this to the CABG report card, Werner and Asch (2005) noted that there have 
been simultaneous reports o f surgeons turning away the sickest patients in an effort to avoid 
poor outcomes. They question whether public reporting is really improving the quality of 
health care, and point out that:
6 if quality report cards cause physicians to select patients based on risk profile, the
quality o f care and outcomes o f people eligible for CABG may worsen even as 
mortality rates among those who receive CABG im p r o v e s ’ ( W e m e r  and Asch, 2005, 
p . 1242).
The key word is if, and highlights an important point. Unless the scoring system is robust, 
and adjusts for case mix, it will lack professional credibility and may well discourage doctors 
(and hospitals) from treating certain types of patients. As these are most definitely not an 
intended outcome o f public quality reporting these are issues o f substance.
Werner and Asch acknowledge that public reporting has an important role to play in 
providing accountability and enhancing trust, and that these are issues considered important 
by the public. One study showed that 92% of Americans felt that the reporting of serious 
medical errors should be required, and over 60% wanted this information released publicly 
(Blendon et al, 2002). It is likely that similar results would be replicated in the UK. If  
reporting (public or otherwise) is to promote and not interfere with its ultimate goal of 
improving care, current processes will need to improve. One o f them - as Werner and Asch 
propose - is that participation must be mandatory; not least because otherwise low scoring 
providers may stop disclosing their quality data (McCormick et al, 2002). These quality 
measures and the way they are reported must also be universally mandated and uniformly 
applied.
Why Purchasers and the Public Neglect Quality
Explanations for the relative lack of interest o f purchasers and the public in reported quality 
measures include:
• The information is not easily understandable;
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• The information is not meaningful;
• What is collected is what is easily measured, not what is important.
Beyond this there the issue of the importance afforded to ‘trust’ in health care. As previously 
noted, Hall’s (2001) view is that the psychologically traumatic nature o f illness and the 
vulnerability it creates, makes trust a central aspect of social relationships in health care. On 
this explanation the public might like the general idea o f quality reporting and provider 
accountability, but when it comes to their personal care they prefer not to think about such 
matters. The patient does not seek to substitute his/her personal judgment for the judgment of 
the physician; the trusted agent the patient has selected to make decisions on his/her behalf.
The norms o f the doctor/patient relationship may help to account for public neglect of quality 
information, but do not explain why purchasing organisations (both private and 
governmental) fail to make greater use of quality reporting. As Marshall et al noted:
‘Purchaser organisations ...with some notable exceptions...seem to be remarkably 
passive in scrutinising the quality of care for their patients’ (2003, p. 145).
This is an important issue because it strikes at the heart o f a key question - can you rely on 
the market to drive quality in healthcare? As was the case with price reduction (in the 
previous chapter), the answer on the available evidence appears to be that to date purchasers 
have been relatively ineffective in forcing quality improvements through the use o f market 
forces. Most o f the evidence considered so far comes from the US policy commentary, but 
we will try to test this funding with more detailed evidence from the UK in this and the next 
chapter.
Is There a Business Case fo r  Quality?
Some American commentators have drawn unfavourable comparisons between quality 
control in manufacturing industry and in health care (e.g. Coye, 2001). Businesses invest in 
quality for a number of reasons aside from any notion of an ethical desire to do so. Modem 
quality control mechanisms - six sigma, quality circles, Total Quality Management (TQM), 
Lean Production and so on, have their origins in industrial manufacturing and their large- 
scale adoption is connected to the efficiency advantages o f doing so. They help to ensure that
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a product meets consumer quality/price expectations, while also keeping production costs 
low.
Coye argues that the relative absence of scientific manufacturing processes in health care 
keeps costs higher than they otherwise would be, and also results in a weakness in quality 
control mechanisms:
‘The health sector has been exceptionally untouched by the transforming principles o f 
quality management that revolutionised manufacturing and service industries in the 
1980s. For those sectors, quality management became the core task of executive 
leadership and the defining competency o f a successful organisation.’ (Coye, 2001, 
pp.44-45).
In health care - by contrast - the prevailing wisdom is that the investments required in high 
(and consistent) quality are largely not justified in terms of increased revenue, profits, 
customer loyalty.. .or even the kudos and brand reinforcement that the resultant media 
coverage might bring. Providers in the US do set great store on ratings, such as ‘The top 100 
best hospitals’. But these tend to rest on subjective factors such as reputation rather than any 
systematic assessment of performance and quality outcomes (Sehgal, 2010).
Investing in quality within a commercial healthcare operation carries a measure o f risk. In 
business terms managers must believe either that the consumer/purchaser wishes for higher 
quality criteria than are currently being made public, or that by highlighting a quality 
differential ‘new demand’ will be created. Additional expenditure without additional demand 
or revenue would result in decreased profits.
There is a school o f thought that argues that high quality medicine ultimately equates to 
cheaper medicine, but this is a controversial hypothesis, especially in the private health care 
industry. Fireman, Bartlett and Selby (2004) in a recent study o f the impact of disease 
management initiatives in the USA state that:
‘The great hopes engendered by disease management -  that more consistent 
intervention in chronic illnesses and better treatment using clinical guidelines from
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evidence-based medicine would lower costs - have yet to be realised. Health care, like 
many other institutions and agencies, has found that “better” and “cheaper” do not 
always partner well’ (Fireman, Bartlett and Selby, 2004, p.63).
These authors concluded that although disease management remained a promising approach 
to quality improvement it did not reduce costs.
The alternative route to profitability, should cost reduction not be possible, would be higher 
prices for higher-quality care. Coye articulates this second understanding of what a business 
case for quality would mean when she says:
‘In practical terms, this would mean that health care organisations achieving superior 
quality outcomes could expect to gain a higher price. Purchasers would pay a higher 
premium and insurers would pay higher fees or capitation rates...’ (Coye, 2001, p.45).
Coye’s argument would depend on payers reaching a reasoned judgment that members 
provided with information on improved outcomes would be prepared to pay increased 
premiums rather than transferring to other schemes and this seems to run counter to the 
findings o f the studies o f public or patient interest in quality information mentioned earlier.
To some extent the prospects for higher prices would be dependent on costs not falling, since 
purchasers would be unlikely to pay more against the background o f a decreasing cost base. 
The evidence on the prospects for cost savings remains scant.
Kilpatrick et al’s (2005) comprehensive review of peer-reviewed literature found that only a 
small number o f studies met their inclusion criteria and gave no conclusive answer.
Moreover, there is a further complication for the quality = low cost school. Whilst a 
quality-based approach may make best sense to a health system overall, it may be financially 
disadvantageous to individual players. This point can be illustrated by reference to Casalino’s 
(2001) study o f Californian physician groups. Casalino explains that proponents o f prepaid 
group practice believed that capitation would incentivise physician groups to invest in 
improving quality, since healthier patients would be more profitable. However, patient 
mobility meant that projected cost savings in future years did not go to the organisation that
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had made the initial investment. Furthermore, organisations that gained a reputation for high 
quality might attract sicker patients, but do not receive higher capitation rates to pay for the 
care o f these patients. Casalino concluded that physician groups and HMO’s would not 
develop organised processes to improve quality if they lost money in the short term by 
making that investment. This view is supported by Leatherman et al (2003) who state that
‘.. .the financial benefit often did not return to the initial investor or was greatly 
delayed’ (Leatherman et al, 2003, p i 7.).
Similar problems arise at the level o f the payer/insurer. As Rosenthal and associates (2004) 
argue, quality improvement has some elements of a public-good problem. An investment 
made by one payer results in benefits to other payers because o f non-exclusive contracting. 
This discourages individual payers from making investments or taking other risks associated 
with purchaser initiatives that put unwelcome pressure on providers to improve quality 
Purchasing alliances such as the IHA, BTE, and the Leapfrog Group partially overcome this 
problem because o f their large market share in certain geographical areas, but initiatives from 
conventional insurers carry a downside and face formidable obstacles in breaking out of 
established fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements.
Gaining Market Leverage
In practice, providers principally attempt to squeeze higher prices from purchasers, not by 
demonstrating higher quality, but by striving for increased market leverage. Classical 
economic theory suggests that an organisation’s attempts to squeeze higher prices by gaining 
market leverage is doomed to failure in competitive markets, (as in the long run, if an 
organisation tries to maintain its prices at a level much higher than costs, other organisations 
will enter the market and draw those customers away by offering lower prices). But as 
Casilino acknowledges, health care markets are far from perfect. As a result:
‘Physician group, hospital, and HMO leaders, who are interested in surviving in the 
short run in an imperfect market rather than on theoretical predictions about the long 
run in a perfect market, strategize constantly about market leverage’ (Casalino, 2001, 
p. 103).
Schaeffer and McMurty go further and state bluntly that:
158
‘In the current system, poor quality pays: physicians are reimbursed for both 
incorrect treatment and effective therapy’ (2004, p.l 18).
Leatherman et al make the same point when they say that one o f the key impediments to 
quality improvements is:
‘ .. .failure to pay for quality, while paying for defects.. .In effect, the rewards in the 
payment system are perverse; ordinary, even defective care receives the same 
payment as optimal care’ (2003, p.25).
Whilst Medicare, Medicaid and many insurers are no longer paying for ‘never events’(CMS,
2008), a relatively recent study by Harvard researchers concluded that US hospitals were still 
passing on 78% of the costs of all adverse events and 70% of the cost o f negligent injuries 
(Mello et al, 2007).
Incentives fo r  Quality in Health
Literature from the USA typically points to the lack of incentives (particularly financial) to 
energetically pursue quality goals. In ‘Crossing the Quality Chasm’ the conclusion was that
‘Payment policies (must) be aligned to encourage and support quality improvement to 
encourage threshold improvements in quality’ (Institute o f Medicine, 2001 p.2).
The conventional wisdom in the USA is that providers of all types - clinicians and hospitals - 
respond to financial incentives. Coye (2001, p.50) notes that:
‘Clinical quality measures are latecomers to the incentive mix for physicians, at least 
as far as health plans and purchasers are concerned, and are non-existent in the fee- 
for-service (FFS) world’.
She also states that:
‘A business case for quality would require that purchasers, users, and providers 
recognise and value advancements in quality outcomes. Purchasers and users would
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reward improvement in outcomes with either greater volume or higher payment. 
Providers would strive to produce higher-quality care to enhance earnings and to 
reduce costs’.
The tone of Coye’s article is one of regret that such practices have yet to take place. It is not 
difficult to find authors making similar points. Joseph Newhouse’s article ‘Why is there a 
Quality Chasm?’ (2002, p.23) has the following conclusion:
‘Physicians want to practice good quality medicine. But there are costs to keeping up, 
and in many cases the rewards for using the best technique are weak or even negative. 
The design of better incentives thus should be a higher priority’.
Coye and Detmer (1998) argue that US purchasers currently hold providers accountable only 
for price and need to include more requirements on quality in contracted health plans. Yet 
this has proved difficult because studies suggest that providers are less interested in quality 
improvements than in achieving increased treatment volumes. Thus Pham et al (2004 found 
that:
‘...physicians tried to raise prices and considered investing in organised quality 
improvement processes to be of lower priority than increasing service volume.
A few respondents reported on medical groups’ efforts to improve efficiency by 
consolidating practice sites, using physician “extenders” (such as nurse practitioners), 
or instituting open-access scheduling (queuing patients on a walk-in basis without 
appointments) to minimise waiting times. Even fewer respondents mentioned efforts 
to improve clinical quality. Few were using patient satisfaction surveys, implementing 
quality improvement projects, or establishing quality performance incentives...Many 
physicians cited the lack of financial incentives from plans or purchasers as a 
deterrent to groups’ committing sizeable resources to quality improvement, and they 
perceived little consumer to compete on quality’ (Pham et al, 2004, pp.75-76).
These authors concluded that physicians respond to pressures in practice, not by increasing 
efficiency or quality, but by seeking to increase the volume of services provided and the 
prices charged.
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We need to be clear that what is being observed is not a set o f abnormal behaviours peculiar 
to health care providers (or insurers) either in the U SA .. .or elsewhere. It is in fact a normal 
response to a particular set of market conditions. Players in other (non-health care) markets 
would behave in the same manner if their particular markets allowed them to do so. 
Fortunately for the modem consumer the prevalent market conditions for most companies are 
not conducive to such a response.
From the foregoing this may sound like a series of problems peculiar to private health care 
markets in general and the USA in particular. Unfortunately this is not the case. The above 
issues appear to some degree in the United Kingdom as will be demonstrated in the next 
chapter.
The Impact o f  Regulation
Devers, Pham and Liu’s (2004) study suggests that three general mechanisms can stimulate 
hospitals to improve patient safety specifically and quality more broadly: professionalism, 
regulation and markets. Their study of the handling of patient safety issues in twelve 
communities led to the conclusion that currently in the USA, the most significant mechanism 
- by some way - is regulation. In particular, the work of accreditation organisations such as 
the Joint Commission (JC) was cited as more influential than any market-driven changes.
This was because hospitals have to be accredited by such organisations, or undergo 
regulatory review by the Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to be eligible 
to treat Medicare patients. With Medicare accounting for around 40% of hospitals’ revenues 
(Devers, Pham and Liu, 2004 p. 109), hospitals have a strong incentive to meet JC 
requirements.
Respondents cited the absence of strong local market incentives for hospitals to improve 
patient safety. As the authors noted:
‘...employers and insurance brokers who work with them reported relatively little 
interest in hospital patient safety. Employers were most concerned about premium 
increases, and although reduction in medical error might reduce costs, few employers 
connected the two issues’ (Devers, Pham and Liu, 2004 p.l 10).
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The authors also noted features of the market, directly pertinent to Bupa’s experience, 
namely:
‘...health plans (being) unable to provide hospitals with a strong incentive for 
improvement because of consumers’ demands for broad provider networks, the 
demise o f risk contracting, and hospitals consolidation and capacity constraints’
(2004, p.l 10).
Overall they found that non-hospital respondents were generally sceptical that hospitals had 
made real progress in improving patient safety (2004, p. 108)
Summary
In the USA continuing efforts, especially by CMS and large employer alliances, to utilise 
market mechanisms to improve health care quality are being seen. At the same time there are 
significant obstacles to the wider adoption o f pay-for-performance, because o f vested 
interests in fee-for-service and a lack o f clear incentives for quality initiatives in hospitals and 
by conventional insurers. Initially developments in the USA were aimed at promoting the 
collection and publication of information on outcomes, but are now shifting to rewarding 
high quality care itself - and its corollary - penalising poor care. For example, CMS has 
started to decline payment for ‘never events’ from April 2008 (CMS, 2008). Interestingly, it 
is often a governmental organisation that is setting such targets and defining incentives - 
rather than the ‘invisible hand of the market’.
Having reviewed developments in the USA, we turn in the next section to how these issues - 
fragmented and non-mandatory reporting standards, low public expectations, inadequate 
reimbursement mechanisms and poor market leverage -  play out in the United Kingdom’s 
public NHS.
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Quality in the NHS
General Trends
Despite being considered a recent development, public disclosure of health care performance 
data dates back in the UK to at least the middle o f the 19th century, when Florence 
Nightingale (1860) highlighted differences in mortality rates o f patients in London hospitals. 
Ferlie and Shortell (2001) trace the modem concern with quality back to the Griffiths Report 
o f 1983, and sporadic attempts over the next decade or two to introduce quality circles or 
total quality management. Performance indicators in the NHS date back to a similar time 
(Pollitt, 1988), and although focusing mainly on efficiency and activity, have included 
clinical indicators with a quality dimension (Giuffrida, Gravelle and Roland, 1999; Mullen, 
2004). However, clinical audit in the 1980s and 1990s remained a professionally-driven 
exercise in which doctors were largely successful in protecting their own version o f quality 
from outside scrutiny (Pollitt, 1993).
The creation o f the NHS internal market in 1991 split the NHS into purchaser and provider 
sides, and opened up the possibility o f NHS purchasers using buying power to achieve price 
and quality improvements in a way which might occur in private markets (Enthoven, 1985; 
Jost et al, 1995). The NHS had always contracted for services provided by general 
practitioners, though not originally within an explicit purchaser/provider relationship. The 
creation o f the NHS internal market created a clearer structure for contractual relationships 
with GPs, and also made it possible for NHS commissioners to apply leverage to hospitals via 
the purchasing function. Quality improvement was one o f the expressed objectives o f the 
internal market reforms (Mays, Mulligan and Goodwin 2000), and associated initiatives such 
as the Patient’s Charter introduced targets with a quality dimension, particularly with regard 
to waiting times (Montgomery 1996). Jost and associates (1995) report the widespread use of 
quality schedules in NHS purchaser/provider contracts in the 1990s, though often with little 
precision regarding required outcomes.
Quality and safety concerns were brought near the top o f the policy agenda by a series of 
high-profile medical scandals that struck the UK in the 1990s; the paediatric cardiac surgery 
deaths at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, the Harold Shipman murders, and the incompetent 
operations performed by Rodney Ledward, to name the three best known examples. All three
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cases highlighted substantial deficiencies in NHS quality reporting, monitoring, and capacity 
to take remedial action.
These scandals created fierce media criticism and public anxiety. Two extensive public 
inquiries were set in motion (DoH, 2002; Dame Janet Smith, 2005). Both made far-ranging 
recommendations in terms of clinical governance and reporting o f untoward incidents. The 
Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry led to the creation o f the independent quality monitoring 
organisation that is now known as the Care Quality Commission.
Yet to date the promises made at the time by Ministers that hospitals and individual clinicians 
would be required to report publicly on clinical quality and outcomes, remain largely 
unrealised. The principal obstacles appear to have been a combination of governmental 
reluctance to make earmarked resources available, and a marked reticence by some o f the 
Royal Colleges/Specialty Associations to collect outcomes data and especially to make data 
public.
NHS purchasers have so far only introduced limited public reporting requirements. The main 
developments in the area of purchaser payment incentives for quality have come in two areas. 
Experiments with a form of pay-for-performance in primary care began in about 2004 and 
more recently attempts have been made to introduce contractual incentives for quality in 
secondary care.
The Quality and Outcomes framework (QOF) was introduced in primary care in April 2004 
as part o f the new General Medical Services contract (Doran et al, 2006). The QOF allows 
GPs to accumulate QOF points based on their achievements against approximately 140 
indicators, which determine the level o f reimbursement. It resulted in substantial increases in 
income when the majority of GPs achieved high points scores (Timmons, 2005). The clinical 
indicators include practice immunisation rates and measures such as percentage o f patients at 
risk from coronary artery disease who have had cholesterol levels measured.
In the English NHS a new payment framework, known as Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation (CQUIN), was announced in 2008 to reward quality improvements in health care 
(DoH, 2008c; Sussex, 2009; Hughes et al, 2011). CQUIN encourages commissioners to 
initiate local schemes which link a specific element of provider income -  currently around
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1.5% of the total - to agreed quality measures. A number of Primary Care Trusts had already 
been doing so with local quality schemes, and CQUIN was intended to roll this out across the 
English NHS.
Having sketched out the main trends, the chapter now turns to consider in more detail 
reporting standards, public expectations, market leverage and reimbursement mechanisms.
Reporting Standards
Marshall et al (2003) in a comprehensive review of the state o f current public reporting in the 
USA and UK noted that there are broadly two reasons for putting performance data into the 
public domain. The first is to increase the accountability of health care organisations, 
professionals and managers. The second is to maintain/ improve quality o f care. Both are 
applicable to the private sector but the first has greater salience in the public sector.
Marshall and colleagues (2003) suggest that effective public reporting needs to be mandatory 
and minimum data sets uniformly applied, and these requirements seem at face value easier 
to meet in an integrated NHS than a fragmented mixed system. The UK should have the 
unassailable advantages of central government enforced data standardisation and system- 
wide coverage. Yet it is only recently that these advantages have started to be exploited.
Whilst it is true that some information about NHS hospital performance has been in the 
public domain since the early 1980s, the UK until recently had relatively few examples of 
purposeful release of information about quality of care. O f late the position has improved 
significantly. A number of quality indicators now form part o f NHS Trust performance 
indicators and the NHS Information Centre (2009) has produced Indicators for Quality 
Improvement which has over 200 indicators (examples o f which are provided in Appendix 7). 
The English NHS Standard contract also contains a number o f quality indicators (see 
Appendix 8). Following Lord Darzi’s report (Lord Darzi of Denham, 2008), NHS Trusts will 
be required to include quality accounts in annual reports. Quality accounts come into 
operation in 2010/11, though some fear that they may become an annual ‘box ticking’ 
exercise (West, 2009). The quality account includes performance against a number o f self­
selected indicators from the ‘Indicators for Quality Improvement’ list, as well as against 
national priorities. For the present overall public reporting (although systematic in relation to 
the above performance indicators) remains relatively hamstrung by a combination o f poor
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data quality and, until the publication of the recent White Paper (DoH 2010a), a marked 
reluctance to mandate public reporting on health outcomes at consultant or procedural level.
The Society o f Cardiothoracic Surgeons has been the most committed to such reporting 
(prompted by the scrutiny which followed the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry). However in 
2003, a study o f UK cardiac surgery data (Fine et al, 2003) demonstrated large 
inconsistencies among various data sources even for an outcome as apparently unequivocal as 
death. Not unnaturally this created legitimate anxiety amongst clinicians about possible 
miss-representation of their true results, as well as proper allowance for case mix. Despite 
this, in 2005 the individual performance data for all the cardiac surgeons in the North West 
Region of England was published. Interestingly however, this landmark event was prompted 
by a request from the Guardian newspaper -using new legislation (The Freedom of 
Information Act, 2000) - for the performance results. The authors decided that it would be 
more responsible of them to present their individual performance data in a medical journal, as 
they believed case mix would be given fuller consideration (Bridgewater, 2005).
Other specialties continue to move at a slower pace. The general reluctance to install a 
transparent system where providers can be readily identified is noteworthy; and as will be 
seen in the next chapter problems with both the adequacy and transparency o f outcome date 
extends to the UK private sector.
The development of medical audit after the establishment of the internal market was limited 
both by practical implementation problems (Black and Thompson, 1993; Giaimo, 1995; Grol 
and Wensing, 1995), as well as a measure o f professional resistance (Pollitt, 1993; Harrison 
and Ahmad, 2000; Harrison 2002; Exworthy et al, 2003). As mentioned earlier, audit in the 
early 1990s was a professionally-led process and attempts by the state and managers to align 
it with the wider performance management agenda had at best mixed success. Although 
doctors perceive their autonomy to be threatened, the profession continues to have 
considerable influence in areas such as the public reporting of quality information.
The BBC programme ‘Trust Me, I’m a Doctor’ (BBC 2, 2000) illustrated the limitations of 
the current approach to audit .Barry Jackson, then President of the Association of Surgeons of 
Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI) was asked what mechanisms were in place that would 
stop surgeons from undertaking operations beyond their competence. His answer (as
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subsequently reported in the BMJ (Berger, 2000) was as follows: ‘a ‘surgeon’s conscience’ 
would prevent that happening... Mr Jackson was also asked what proportion of surgeons 
knew their outcome figures. ‘I would think less than 50%’ he said’.
Unfortunately there is good evidence to believe that ‘a surgeon’s conscience’ will not stop 
some doctors from performing procedures beyond their competence or too infrequently to 
attain/retain competence (Gawande, 2003; 2009; Groopman 2008).
The above highlights the ambivalent attitudes to public reporting from the various parties that 
might collectively be described as ‘the medical establishment’. Overall surprisingly little 
substantive progress on quality occurred from the publication o f the BRI Report until the 
Darzi Review (Lord Darzi of Denham, 2008). Lord Darzi’s report unquestionably promoted 
the importance o f high quality care. It remains to be seen if this can be sustained in the face 
o f a much tighter fiscal environment.
In concluding this section it is worth noting that a five country survey o f hospital executives 
(Blendon et al, 2004) found that UK respondents were the most receptive to the information 
on clinical quality being made publicly available. They were also more inclined to believe 
that their government had an effective policy that was designed to improve quality of care.
Public Expectations
Research suggests that public expectations in the UK largely mirror those o f the USA. There 
appears to be support for publishing clinical quality information - including outcomes - but 
relatively little interest in using it to determine which provider to see. A large-scale study 
recently completed by the Kings Fund in four areas of England showed that, in principle, 
patients valued aspects of quality when choosing a hospital. However, most patients chose to 
be treated by their local provider, and few consulted published performance information on 
quality to help them choose, instead relying on past experience and their GP’s advice (Dixon, 
et al 2010).
The King’s Fund study paints a similar picture to that emerging from an earlier Market and 
Opinion Research International survey of public attitudes. MORI’s Ben Page writing in the 
Health Service Journal noted that:
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‘Only a minority want to know about technical aspects o f performance. For example 
55% want to know how budgets break down, but only 10% want to know about 
morbidity or mortality rates’ (Page, 2004a, p.22).
With regard to provider quality in general, again the British public essentially mirrors US 
views as to what is regarded as important. However, one might speculate that there will be 
different ‘tolerance’ levels as to what would be regarded as an unacceptable standard in 
relation to decor, quality of food, waiting time to see a doctor and so on. Nevertheless, to 
quote Ben Page once more:
‘Actual medical success alone seems to have little to do with perceived patient 
experience. There is no relationship between in hospital Mortality Ratios and patient 
perceptions. Regardless of death rates, those who survive to fill in surveys seem 
equally positive or negative...Similarly, there is no relationship at all between how 
CHI star ratings rate different Trusts and public perceptions o f performance - with 
only 2 percentage points difference in terms of average patient perceptions o f zero- 
stars and three-starred trusts.’ (Page, 2004b, p.23).
With the incidence of MRSA and other hospital acquired infections in NHS hospitals subject 
to considerable media attention it is unsurprising that concerns over cleanliness have grown 
to over shadow many other quality issues. Thus a recent MORI survey on patient choice 
states that:
‘The general reputation of a hospital would not be the single most important factor the 
40+ age group takes into account when choosing where to go for treatment or an 
operation; rather it is cleanliness, followed by the length o f waiting lists’ (MORI, 
2006, p.3 ).
The table below illustrates the point in more detail. Particularly noteworthy is the relatively 
low rate o f respondents (26%) who considered ‘operation success’ rate to be the most 
important factor.
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T a b le  7. M O R I Q u est io n n a ire  (M O R I 2006 , p .17)
Which two or three of these would be most im portant to you in choosing which hospital 
to use for treatm ent or an operation?
%
Cleanliness 54
The length of time I’d have to wait for an
50
operation or treatment
Reputation of the hospital 34
Operation success rates 26
Being treated with dignity and respect by staff 24 
The convenience o f the location / transport
20
facilities
Reputation of consultants 18
Being able to set my own date and time to see
13
a consultant or specialist
Having a choice of consultant 10
Whether I can have more care at home rather
7
than in hospital
The environment I am treated in (e.g. in a
6
private room or on a ward)
The option of having alternative / 
complementary therapies 
Other 1
None of these 1
Don't know 1
Deaths associated with poor cleanliness on wards at Tunbridge Wells and Maidstone N HS 
Trust in 2006 was extensively reported in the national media and undoubtedly reinforced 
public concerns in this area. The subsequent scandal at Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust 
(Francis, 2010) has done the same with regard to basic clinical care and the treatment o f  
patients with dignity.
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Market Leverage
In a unified national health system one might think that public purchasers would have few 
problems in applying substantial market leverage on providers to ensure that quality health 
care is delivered. The American commentators Leatherman and Sutherland (2003, 2004) 
considered that the Labour government’s Quality Agenda was the most ambitious, 
comprehensive and systematic effort to create sustainable capacity for improving the quality 
o f a nation’s health care system to date, and presumably judged that the commissioning 
arrangements in place could deliver the plan.
Yet, commentators such as Walshe, et al (2004), as well as the author (Royce, 2000), have 
raised concerns that the commissioning function is inadequate to perform the tasks assigned 
to it. There is a view that PCT’s are not strong enough to stand up to large NHS trusts in 
tough contract negotiations and too small to fulfil their public health responsibilities. Given 
this lack of leverage with larger trusts, few PCT’s have been able to press providers 
effectively over quality issues (Light, 1998; Curry, et al, 2008).
The House of Commons Health Committee’s recent report on Commissioning (HCHC, 2010) 
reiterated the view that there was an imbalance o f power between PCT’s and trusts and a lack 
of levers. The report quoted a submission from the King’s Fund, highlighting findings from a 
Birmingham university study which suggested that recent NHS reforms might have 
exacerbated the problem:
‘For elective care, the payment by results tariff, patient choice and the "any willing 
provider" requirement mean that PCT’s have little control over what they pay or 
where patients are treated while quality standards are set nationally. The increasing 
concentration o f some services in specialist centres effectively creates more local 
monopolies and large acute hospital trusts can be even more dominant in their local 
provider markets [...] The ability of commissioning to be an effective lever for 
change has, therefore, yet to be proven’(HCHC, 2010: para 96).
It was noted that the imbalance in size and resources was generally accompanied by an 
imbalance in clinical information available, with the providers having much more knowledge 
about the quantum of care delivered, thus making it difficult for purchasers to challenge 
hospital trusts (HCHC, 2010, para 78). The Committee also drew attention to problems in the
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staffing of PCT’s arising from inadequate skills, and the effects o f organisational turbulence 
created by the succession of NHS reforms.
In evidence to the HCHC, the DoH conceded that in the past:
‘.. .the necessary system levers and enablers were not in place to support, resulting in 
unbalanced relationships and influence between providers and commissioners’ 
(HCHC, 2010, para 99).
The fact that both quality requirements and tariffs were fixed nationally was felt by the 
Committee to leave local purchasers with few levers that could influence their providers. 
Generally the pursuit of centralised commissioning policies, with mandatory use o f a 
standard template contract and central targets, tended to reduce the importance of local 
elements in contractual agreements (Hughes et al, 2011).
It is less than clear that the proposed abolition of PCT’s and their replacement by GP 
commissioning groups, (DoH 2010) which are likely to be smaller organisational entities than 
PCT’s, will redress this imbalance.
Reimbursement Mechanisms
The most interesting features o f reimbursement mechanisms relating to the promotion of 
quality in the NHS are the current difference of approach between primary and secondary 
care. The use o f earmarked payments for ‘quality measures’ within the GP GMS contract has 
been previously noted. In contrast, until the Darzi reforms (2008) made reference to the 
possibility of introducing a differential payment for quality reimbursements in the hospital 
sector, incentive payments in secondary care had been limited to some discretionary 
allocations. Indeed, as the HCHC report suggested, one o f the main features o f PbR has been 
the supposed abolition of price considerations within the general contracting framework 
altogether. By this is meant the promotion o f a standard tariff for procedures under PbR. In 
theory trusts then compete on ‘quality’ rather than price, as the price paid is meant to be 
standard between providers. The actual system is somewhat more complex than this - with 
market forces adjustments, phasing in and so on, but the principle is of a standard tariff. 
Again, in contrast to primary care, no attempt has been made to link NHS consultant
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payments to the achievement o f specific quality measures (despite the fact that both contracts 
were centrally negotiated essentially in parallel by the DoH).
To date, competing on quality within the acute sector o f the NHS appears to have principally 
consisted of competing on access times for treatment. Critics o f this approach include those, 
like Appleby (2005), Coulter, Le Maistre and Henderson (2005) and Burge et al (2004), who 
argue that these may not be the features that truly interest patients. Instead, they believe the 
public care about:
‘.. .quality, reputation, and other similar concepts often top the public's lists o f 
desirable features of health services - often in preference to specific criteria such as 
shorter waiting times and greater choice’ (Appleby, 2005, p.63).
Until recently there was little in NHS payment mechanisms that could be regarded as 
providing a positive incentive to delivering high quality services to patients. As previously 
noted, critics of US health care has tended to complain that the payment system rewards poor 
practice. However such criticism could also apply to the NHS. Likewise the problems of 
uniform reimbursement rates such as those cited for Medicare (DRG's and CMS) are 
amplified for the English NHS given that HRG-based reimbursement remains the basis on 
which the overwhelming majority o f an NHS trust’s income will be derived.
Trusts are unable to charge a premium price from either being associated with (or actually 
delivering) a higher quality service than other providers. In theory those trusts operating the 
shortest wait times (which can be seen as a quality indicator) will be rewarded with more 
patient referrals and thus more income. Whether such cases are profitable is another matter. 
The same also applies to more ‘natural’ quality criteria (hygiene factors such as MRSA rates 
and patient satisfaction ratings) which private providers will feel confident they can score 
well on. Patients may be attracted to those hospitals, and can even demonstrate that 
preference through ‘choose and book’, but prices are fixed regardless of demand.
Following Lord Darzi’s review, the new CQUIN payment framework mentioned at the 
beginning o f this section was introduced (DoH, 2008c), It allows purchasers to make a small 
proportion o f contractual payments dependant on achieving quality requirements. As the 
guidance states:
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‘Providers will have a right to have the opportunity to earn this money through a 
locally agreed scheme, but it will not automatically flow through to providers as it 
would in previous years’ (DoH, 2008c, p. 14).
There are four features of CQUIN that should be noted. Firstly, CQUIN monies are not 
additional to the general NHS allocation but form a ring-fenced part o f the reimbursement to 
providers via PbR and the other contracts arranged between PCT’s and providers. Secondly, 
in 2010/11 the CQUIN payment framework covered just 1.5% of a provider’s annual contract 
income. Thirdly the DoH expected that in its first years o f operation the main focus would 
most likely be on rewarding data collection. This has led to criticism that CQUIN payments 
are currently being used to reward the achievement o f minimum standards rather than high 
quality care (Healthmandate, 2010). Finally, CQUIN also applies to NHS commissioning 
with private sector providers.
CQUIN is similar to the ‘pay-for-performance’ initiatives in the USA that also attempt to 
encourage higher quality care through the use of financial incentives. Whether the sums on 
offer are sufficient to achieve that aim is debatable, but the aspiration and direction of travel 
are clear enough, and are unlikely to be reversed. In the 2011/12 Operating Framework the 
DoH announced that reimbursement for an emergency admission within 30 days of an 
elective procedure would not attract any reimbursement (DoH, 2011).
The other recent development in NHS reimbursement methodology with a quality dimension 
has involved giving enhanced tariff payments to those providers who can demonstrate that 
they are meeting defined standards (DoH 2010b).The number o f procedures where enhanced 
tariffs would apply was extended in the 2011/12 Operating Framework (DoH, 2011).
Ii
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Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the difficulties in defining and operationalising concepts of 
health care quality, and discussed approaches to quality in the market-based US system and 
the public NHS.
Quality is in many ways a complex and elusive phenomenon that both US private health care 
and the NHS have struggled to implement, and yet there are developments in both systems 
that suggest routes to quality improvement and might provide lessons for other systems, such 
as the UK private sector.
The US health care system is one of the most entrepreneurial in the world and, more than 
other system, might be expected to harness the potential o f market incentives and levers to 
force quality improvements. In fact as we have seen the ‘business case for quality’ is less 
clear-cut than might be expected. Research suggests that short term-investment does not 
necessarily translate into long-term gain for the purchaser making the investments. Nor is it 
easy for payers to challenge the established framework o f fee-for-service remuneration from 
which providers and physicians have much to gain. A US insurer that pushes providers hard 
to change behaviour runs the risks of incurring high short-term costs, while long-term gains 
are dispersed right across the market. For this reason it is unsurprising that many o f the 
innovations in purchasing have come from the CMS or purchasing alliances which have a 
large market share in certain geographical areas and are less affected by this phenomenon. 
Overall though, pay-for-performance is a growing trend in the United States, so that more 
than half of private-sector HMO’s now make use o f ‘P4P’ in some areas. This means that 
there are a wide range o f models that observers such as managers in the UK private system 
can review and perhaps emulate.
The NHS has also become increasingly interested in quality, with some policy advisors 
drawing explicitly on US experiences (e.g. Ham, 2005). As we have seen one problem is that 
lip-service to quality has often been subordinated to concerns with cost containment, 
efficiency and activity. Paradoxically, the Labour Government’s attempts to support an 
English supply-side market by use of standard tariffs and central steering o f commissioning 
via a standard contract, may have reduced the ability of NHS purchasers to use market levers
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to achieve local quality improvements. The structure o f the English NHS, with an imbalance 
of power between PCT’s and NHS trusts, also appears to be a barrier to developing value- 
based purchasing. However as we have seen there are significant developments in both 
primary and secondary care, which may change this picture. The QOF, CQUIN and 
enhanced tariffs for quality (DoH, 2010b; 2011), all have the potential to provide lessons 
about whether pay-for-performance works and how it might be developed. Given the 
potential importance of NHS activity to the UK private sector, these might again be of 
interest for managers in private-sector payers, such as Bupa, when they consider their own 
strategies towards quality improvement.
In the next chapter we consider some o f the issues discussed in this chapter in relation to the 
UK private sector, and recount the experience of some of Bupa’s main quality initiatives.
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Chapter 7
Quality and the UK Private Sector 
Introduction
This chapter begins with a general discussion of the conceptualisation of quality in the UK 
private health care sector, including its marketing against the backdrop of the public NHS, the 
limits of quality-based competition, the arguments for and against directing patients to 
selected providers, and the presentation o f quality in advertising. Later sections of the chapter 
describe a major Bupa quality initiative where professional opposition to insurer attempts to 
improve quality was evident, and (in less detail) the experience o f four other Bupa quality 
initiatives.
More generally the purpose o f the chapter is to explore arguments about the potential o f the 
UK private market to secure quality improvements (returning to certain themes touched upon 
in earlier chapters), and specifically to investigate how far a large purchaser such as Bupa can 
use buying power to change provider behaviour.
How the UK Private Sector Markets Quality
Cowterposing Private Sector Quality and NHS Care
As was initially noted in Chapter 2, both the scope o f the private sector in the UK and some 
o f  its key dynamics have been defined by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the NHS. 
The same applies with regard to quality. This largely defines what it is about health insurance 
in the UK that makes it attractive to potential buyers (what is often spoken of within the 
industry as ‘the customer proposition’), and to what degree insurers (and providers) can 
differentiate themselves - both from the NHS and from each other. With regard to this, a 
number of features are worth noting.
Firstly, it had traditionally been considered that the main point of distinction o f the private 
sector from the NHS had been the ability of people with health insurance to receive prompt
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treatment for a wide range of elective conditions. As such, a key assertion that health insurers 
sought to demonstrate was that private insurance was necessary and/or desirable because o f 
long NHS waiting times (Besley ,Hall and Preston,1999; Propper, Rees and Green, 1999; 
Higgins 2004). Latterly, this assertion has been under threat due to the sustained focus on 
reducing NHS wait times and the recent success in doing so.
With regard to this it is interesting to note the difference between the DoH and private 
insurers in the attention given to providing a wait time guarantee and subsequently measuring 
patient waits. The government have invested considerable resources in an attempt to deliver 
referral to treatment times, as is evident when one views the DoH’s ‘ 18 weeks: Delivering the 
18 week patient pathway’ website (2009b). In contrast, the private sector does not provide 
any guarantees, and makes no attempt to systematically measure customer wait-times. In fact, 
although it would appear that the conventional wisdom is that waiting times are not a 
problem for private patients, certain individuals may well have an unpleasant surprise in store 
for them should they choose a particularly well-known consultant - both in terms of the time 
they will have to wait before he/she can perform the operation, and also the size o f the 
‘shortfall’ that the insured member will have to pay.
The second feature is closely related to the first. The NHS was established to provide a fully 
comprehensive health service funded from taxation and free at the point o f use. As there are 
no tax advantages relating to the purchasing of health insurance, private insurers have sought 
to highlight failures in the NHS’s ability to meet individual expectations and the advantages 
of the service delivered by private healthcare. This includes waiting times, but also extends to 
other key areas such as physical environment, cleanliness, the quality of food, access to a 
particular consultant, staff attitudes and consumer sovereignty.
Finally, private insurers have been eager to highlight that their policyholders receive 
consultant-delivered treatment (in terms of whom they see for their outpatient consultation, 
and who performs the operation). The use of non-consultant grade doctors in private 
healthcare (outside of ISTC’s) has historically been very limited - mainly to the presence o f a 
resident duty doctor at night in private hospitals. This contrasts with the position in the NHS 
where much care is undertaken by doctors in training grades. As previously noted this places 
the consultant at the apex of private care with much resulting power and influence and 
reinforces the natural authority that the consultant exercises. Arguably, the cultural authority
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of senior professionals has not been eroded in the UK to the extent that may have occurred in 
the USA (Schlesinger, 2002).
The above translates into a customer proposition that has three foundations:
• Access - quick treatment;
• Quality - consultant-led care in a comfortable, safe environment;
• Convenience - treatment at a convenient facility with greater say as to who undertakes 
treatment and when it takes place.
This trinity o f advantage coalesces to create peace of mind -  a feature often emphasised in 
PMI advertising, especially by Bupa. Consumers on both sides o f the Atlantic often appear 
to make purchasing decisions on an emotional basis, and wish to be sure that treatment will 
be available without barriers when necessary (Cordina, Pellathy and Singhai 2009). For the 
UK private sector this proposition has remained essentially unchanged since the creation of 
the NHS and its durability is testament to its strength and enduring attraction.
For insurers two o f the main threats to market share come from the narrowing gap with NHS 
care and rising premiums, but a third lies in the difficulty of differentiating between 
companies. Failure to convince consumers of the existence o f a difference in the service 
provided carries the risk that perceived product homogeneity will lead to fierce competition 
on price.
Insurers try to counter this in a number of ways. There are many insurance products available 
on the market. For example Moneysupermarket.com website claims that its database will 
search 450 health insurance products (Moneysupermarket.com, 2009). Numerous product 
variations exist but some of the most common differences are shown below:
• What conditions/treatments are covered;
• Whether costs are fully refunded or some form o f co-pay is required;
• Whether there is a moratorium on treatment (a wait period before you can claim after 
joining);
• The degree to which there are restrictions on who you can see and where you will receive 
treatment;
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• The standard o f accommodation (guaranteed single room, for example).
Such variations provide consumers with a considerable number o f choices, but also make 
comparisons between insurers’ products difficult. This fact helps account for the existence of 
specialised firms o f brokers, who market their ability to make such comparisons and 
negotiate (on the client’s behalf) ‘best value’ insurance cover.
Given the above, one may ask how insurers have been able to maintain profitability in what 
should (at first sight) be an extremely price-sensitive market. In economic parlance their 
ability to extract sizeable economic rent from what seem to be fairly homogeneous products 
is somewhat puzzling. Part o f the explanation may lie in the very fact that private health 
insurance has been considered unaffordable by much of the UK population. Whilst this has 
limited the potential customer base it allows premium prices to be charged because it is seen 
as a ‘luxury product’- rather like ‘prestige’ cars.
However, this does not explain why companies do not make more strenuous efforts to 
increase market share by cutting prices. At one level this is exactly what company executives 
say they are doing, and that year on year it is harder to deliver targeted financial returns. As 
we have seen in previous chapters, insurers rarely compete on the basis of price or detailed 
quality information, but they may use reputation to justify high prices. In the case o f UKM, 
the Bupa brand is itself a powerful tool used by managers to maintain profit margins. This is 
explored in more detail - along with Bupa’s approach to quality - in the next section.
Competing on Quality: The Bupa Experience
As previously noted, Bupa is both the largest and best-known private healthcare company in 
the UK. The term private healthcare company is deliberate because Bupa is far from being 
just a health insurer. Until recently (2007) it was also the third largest private hospital 
provider and it remains the largest care home company in the UK. The Bupa brand helps both 
to sell Bupa products and maintain a price premium. Successful brands carry positive 
associations in the minds of purchasers. In the case o f Bupa that association might be 
characterised as ensuring high quality, dependable medical care is delivered from a friendly 
company you can ‘trust’. Indeed the Bupa brand is so ubiquitous within private healthcare 
that it was commonplace to hear that Bupa members, when contacting a Bupa service centre,
179
were surprised that the private hospital to which they were being admitted was not owned by 
Bupa.
Given the importance of brand reputation to Bupa and what that brand is associated with, it is 
unsurprising that ‘quality’ is used as a key element of Bupa’s marketing stance. It is also 
considered an important source of brand differentiation and a mechanism for generating 
positive media stories. However a strong association of the brand with positive quality in the 
minds o f potential and current members creates two problems. The first is the idea that the 
brand can be ahead o f reality. In other words, if customers already think they are getting very 
high quality healthcare, the company will struggle to get the recognition (and market 
advantage) they might hope for in subsequently undertaking quality assurance/improvement 
initiatives. To use an analogy drawn from the stock market, it is as if customers have 
assimilated these features into the value they assign to the product and thus already 
incorporated them into the price they are prepared to pay. Under such circumstances, insurer 
quality initiatives call for fine judgement as to how these will be presented to customers. Far 
from being welcomed - as an indication of professionalism and helping to justify the price 
premium - customers may express displeasure that the initiative in question is not already in 
place.
The other problem is that the public’s definition o f ‘quality’ has been shown to focus 
primarily on the ‘aesthetics’ of care. This is unsurprising given what has already been noted 
in the earlier sections concerned with the US system and the NHS. Insurers such as Bupa may 
decide to undertake measures to improve (or assure) quality simply because they believe this 
is the ‘right thing to do’. However, as commercial entities they are perhaps more likely to 
decide that there is no good competitive reason to do so. The essential dynamics behind such 
decision-making has previously been noted in the previous chapter’s discussion on ‘the 
business case for quality’.
If insurance scheme members/private patients perceive quality as principally being about 
speed of access, choice of provider and physical environment, then that is what providers will 
promote and provide. Successful insurers and providers respond to market demand. The 
popularity and profitability of companies like Bupa, HCA, and BMI has been a testament to 
their ability to set, and meet, customers’ expectations of quality healthcare defined in such
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terms. In terms of these demands, their internal organisation is ‘incentive compatible’ and 
well adapted to the environment.
For Bupa’s UK insurance division, this creates something of a conundrum. Quality initiatives 
above and beyond the ‘hygiene’ factors referred to above may help the company to set itself 
apart from its competitors. For example, it might claim that it is the only company 
undertaking a specific quality initiative (such as establishing an accredited cancer network). 
However, it is not clear that this has any direct impact on the decision to purchase or renew 
for the reasons cited above. The conventional wisdom in the UK PMI industry (as illustrated 
by the marketing literature of both insurers and private providers) is that the concept o f 
quality will be primarily driven by a combination of:
• speed of access;
• a large choice of potential providers;
• the ‘hygiene’ factors associated with private care (such as clean hospitals, private rooms);
• the more personal care that is a consequence o f staff having more time and being more 
customer focused than in the NHS;
• the ease and quality of the administration process (pre-authorisation, payment o f claim 
etc).
The concept of quality in relation to clinical credentials is considered secondary (beyond the 
emphasis on consultant care). Indeed it is debatable whether many purchasers o f health 
insurance in the UK actually see this as the legitimate province o f insurers. The dominance of 
the NHS may be a factor with this issue perhaps being seen as an area that the NHS would 
naturally lead, and the same applies with regard to the CQC which regulates provider quality 
in both sectors. There is also the role o f Royal Colleges and Professional Associations which 
together reinforce the idea that quality will be determined and safeguarded by the self- 
regulated activities o f clinical professionals. As a result, the quality o f consultants is usually 
taken as a matter o f faith, and in the case o f hospitals judgements are often made from 
external appearances.
Insurers regularly commission agencies to undertake surveys and run focus groups of existing 
and potential members to ascertain their views on the quality of the service provided to them.
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However the results are commercially sensitive and thus not publicly available. One can 
assume that these identify a number of concerns and that a successful company will look to 
address them. If it did not make commercial sense to do so, they would be concentrating on 
other quality measures. This is not to say that there is no interest in more advanced /different 
quality measures but these have not reached any sort o f critical mass.
Directing Patients to Providers
The notion that some hospitals and doctors provide a superior service to others and that it is 
therefore in the best interests of the patient to utilise them, can seem both a simple and 
fundamentally attractive proposition. However in reality the proposal to direct patents to such 
providers (and thus limit the extent of free choice) has been a controversial issue on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In the UK the whole issue o f ‘choice’ and access to local services as it 
relates to the NHS has generated considerable debate. Ironically in the UK the government 
have been trying to promote more choice o f provider (DoH, 2007, DoH 2010a) for NHS 
patients at a time when many some private health insurers have been seeking to limit care to 
networked providers, or doctors who undertake not to charge above benefit maxima. In the 
USA, the initial rise and subsequent backlash against managed care had, as one o f its main 
features, the issue of restricting choice o f provider (Hurley, Bradley and White, 2004). In the 
UK, the promotion of choice has historically been one o f the central planks o f the private 
healthcare ‘proposition’. Any insurer (in any country) that wishes to direct its members 
towards a narrower group of providers has four major hurdles to overcome.
The first is that the concept that an insurer can decide which consultant or hospital is used 
and what treatment is provided may be at odds with members’ expectations about the 
insurer’s role. Whilst some people might welcome additional information to help them to 
determine where to receive best care, many will be resistant to the idea that a party other than 
their GP or consultant should provide advice or direction about their care. This will be 
particularly so if such advice/instructions conflicts with that given by ‘their’ clinician. 
Essentially, this is about ‘trust’ and as previously noted most people are well-inclined 
towards the professionals who treat them. Insurers must also overcome suspicion from 
members that the insurer’s motivation is more about saving money than promoting quality. 
Moreover many consumers find the idea of variable quality of doctors and the treatments they 
provide difficult to contemplate. When emotionally vulnerable it is unpleasant to consider the 
consequences of not being able to put your trust in one’s doctor or hospital.
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Secondly purchasers face a practical problem. How do they actually determine who are the 
good (and poor) quality providers and how is that information to be conveyed? Much o f the 
previous chapter was devoted to the problems in collecting and utilising valid quality 
information and that discussion will not be repeated.
Thirdly, we have already established that many people purchase PMI because it provides 
more choice, sovereignty and autonomy. Any diminution o f these factors - for whatever 
reason - is seen to undermine the rationale for purchasing PMI in the first place. Finally, even 
if all these problems could be overcome, insurers have the problem of how to explain why 
such measures are not already in place. They are fearful o f reactions such as: ‘I thought I had 
bought the best, now you’re telling me that many of the providers you recognised weren’t up 
to the job?’ Expectation management is crucial if the insurer is not to end up in the 
undesirable situation of being lambasted for initiating quality improvements (on the basis that 
the consumer already thought that level of service was in place when they purchased the 
product).
Advertising and Product Material
Space does not allow an extensive review o f medical insurers’ use of advertising/product 
material so this section will be confined to a few salient observations. The first is that 
medical insurers tend to promote the same features - shorter wait times, consultant care, clean 
hospitals, convenience and consumer sovereignty. Because of this marketing agencies 
struggle to differentiate their clients. Some will put more emphasis on ‘affordable care’ 
(budget schemes), others will use the traditional messages but attempt to be more aggressive 
in their tone.
For example, in August 2004 Norwich Union ran a print advertising campaign in London 
headlined ‘health scare or health care?’ with the words set against a picture o f a culture of 
microbes. The advertisement went on to say:
‘With all the latest scare stories about levels o f hygiene in London’s hospitals you 
might want to consider all the alternatives available. We can provide you with a wide 
range of health insurance policies that will give you access to high quality, private 
hospitals and you won’t have to wait to be seen’ (Norwich Union, 2004).
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Other insurers, including Bupa, try to lay claim to the notion that the customer is purchasing 
‘peace o f mind’ by ‘buying the best’. In effect they look to address the second o f the ‘risks’ 
identified by Arrow (1963) and discussed in Chapter 1 -  the risk o f incomplete or delayed 
recovery. Bupa’s adverts are a good example o f this. Aside from sometimes highlighting 
specific components of Bupa Group such as insurance, care homes, and health screening they 
seek to convey a message of ‘safe in our hands’. Indeed the long-running advert used through 
much of 2005 ‘Kissing baby better’ (Bupa, 2005a) featured images o f young and old taking 
comfort from the security provided by Bupa cover, with a soothing folk song playing in the 
background , but with no specific product information provided.
The contrast with Prudential Health’s advertising is striking. Prudential Health is a relatively 
new entrant to the UK health insurance market having commenced operations in 2005. The 
company has attempted to distinguish itself from existing insurers by focusing its advertising 
(and product proposition) on the idea that customers should be rewarded for their efforts to 
keep healthy -  a UK version o f the consumer-directed healthcare programs that are being 
promoted within US healthcare (Cogan, Hubbard and Kessler, 2005; Feldstein, 2006 ). Thus 
the Prudential health advert for October 2005 reads as follows:
‘Just got the bill from my health insurance. How come if I fit a burglar alarm, I pay 
less on my contents insurance, if I keep my car on the drive, I pay less on my car 
insurance, yet if I try and look after myself what happens to my health insurance? 
Nothing. My premiums still go up and so does my blood pressure. PruHealth is a 
revolutionary type of health insurance that rewards you for looking after yourself. 
About time. Fair health insurance, it’s all part of the plan from Pru’ (Prudential 
Health, 2005).
Whether soft focus or hard-hitting advertising is more effective in attracting and retaining 
customers is not the main topic o f this thesis. However the above should give a flavour o f the 
type of advertising seen in the UK, and what place clinical quality has within it. In respect of 
this the final example comes from Bupa’s poster campaign (Bupa, 2005b) launched in 
September 2005. This featured four separate posters as follows:
Expert: Our specialists make you feel better;
Clean: Our hospitals make you feel better;
184
Quick: Prompt treatment makes you feel better;
Choice: The latest treatments make you feel better.
The documentation that potential and existing members receive reinforces the kind o f 
‘traditional’ PMI values and advantages outlined above. It aims to reassure the reader that 
they have made a wise choice, that the hospitals they have access to are o f a high quality, and 
the consultants (being consultants) are specialists. High quality is defined in terms of 
facilities, cleanliness and convenience. The only attempt likely to be made to define a 
specialist is that, as consultants they have trained for at least seven years. A typical example 
o f the language used is shown below. The source document is the Bupa membership Guide 
for the product known as Health Care Select 1 - one of a suite o f product offerings available 
to personal customers. It has been chosen because it is typical o f the genre. Under the section 
headed ‘our commitment’ (Bupa, 2003a, p.5) it states:
‘The Bupa commitment always includes: Setting quality standards and monitoring all 
aspects o f our service, to make sure you always receive the best possible care and 
attention.’
Under ‘Hospitals’ (Bupa, 2003a, p.65) the following statement is made:
‘We want to make sure that when our members receive treatment in any hospital 
recognised by Bupa in the UK they will receive consistently high standards o f clinical 
and customer care. That is why we select hospitals that are committed to high 
standards and customer service.’
The author has never seen within either Bupa or literature from competitors any explicit 
linkages made between outcomes, clinical quality, and the characteristics of the providers 
recognised to treat members. Quality assurance in the PMI sector thus seems to be process 
rather than outcome driven. However, this does not tell the whole story. For a more complete 
picture it is necessary to examine in some detail what approach Bupa has taken to promote 
clinical quality and how this sits within its current customer proposition.
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Bupa UK Membership’s Quality Initiatives
Historically the cornerstone of UKM’s quality assurance process consisted of:
i. For hospitals and clinics, the requirement to undertake (and pass) a Provider 
Assessment Document (PAD) and subsequent physical inspection;
ii. For doctors, the need to meet Bupa’s recognition process, central to which is the 
requirement that doctors must hold, or have held, a substantive NHS consultant post.
The consultant recognition process has remained essentially unchanged over time. However, 
managerial enthusiasm for undertaking labour-intensive (and thus costly) hospital inspections 
on a routine basis diminished to the point whereby during the authors last three years at UKM 
few (if any) routine inspections took place. As the Health Care Commission (HCC) took over 
responsibility for regulating both the private and public sectors there was a desire within 
UKM that the company reduce its own quality-assurance documentation, with the aim o f 
using the general assessment o f hospital standards undertaken by the Healthcare Commission. 
It is understandable that both UKM and providers would be keen to avoid unnecessary 
duplication. Moreover, hospitals would understandably be reluctant to co-operate with 
insurer-based accreditation if they perceived that there was no added-value. However the 
decision begs the question as to how rigorous and reliable Healthcare Commission 
assessment was going to be. Whatever the actual answer to this might be, for the purposes of 
this thesis the relevant point is that senior managers were confident that for Bupa members 
this level of general quality assurance would be deemed satisfactory.
Whilst the level o f routine quality assessment and surveillance undertaken by UKM on 
providers might be considered somewhat perfunctory (and perhaps rather less than members 
would expect given the statements in the documents quoted previously), the company has a 
more impressive record in setting and regulating quality criteria for a number o f specialist 
conditions. This is of considerable interest for this thesis both in terms of the reasoning 
behind such initiatives, how they have been implemented, and providers’ reactions to them. 
Specifically it is o f central importance with regard to one o f the central objectives o f this 
thesis: undertaking an assessment of the ability and willingness o f the private sector in the 
UK to promote and improve health care quality.
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Over approximately the last decade UKM have undertaken a number of specific ‘quality’ 
initiatives with the aim of improving the quality o f care for its members and to assist the 
company in positively differentiating itself from the NHS, and from other insurers. Some (but 
not all) of these initiatives have also had an element of cost management within them. The 
main initiatives directly relating to clinical quality have been:
• Introduction o f a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) network;
• Introduction o f an Ophthalmology network;
• Introduction o f a Physiotherapy network;
• Best practice for hip and knee arthroplasty;
• Critical care unit accreditation;
• Introduction o f a provider network for Bone Marrow Transplants;
• Introduction o f accredited units for breast, bowel, and gynaecology cancer services;
• Best practice for the management of back pain;
• Patient Satisfaction questionnaire;
• Patient complaints database;
• Supply of SF 36 and VF14 Outcome data from providers.
O f these, the establishment of MRI, Ophthalmology and Physiotherapy networks have all 
been previously discussed. This chapter will consider another initiative with particular 
significance for the thesis topic -  concerned with hip and knee arthroplasty - in detail, and 
then describe more briefly four of the remaining initiatives.
Best Practice for Hip and Knee Arthroplasty
Background to the Initiative
Hip and knee arthroplasty (replacement) surgery is one of the mainstays of private practice in 
the UK, and there is considerable variation in both length o f stay and cost between providers. 
This was therefore a natural issue for UKM to focus on. With over 5000 such operations 
being undertaken annually on UKM members it was a material and high profile area. The 
author was intimately involved in the project almost from the outset, being charged with 
leading the initiative. Essentially the aims boiled down to two objectives:
1. Setting out quality criteria that would improve/ assure care for Bupa members;
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2. Establishing an expectation about length of stay (and associated care process) 
which, if implemented, should lead to cost savings.
The approach was to produce a document from which to engage hospitals and consultants 
that would draw heavily on clinical references on current good practice. Attempts to engage 
providers (both clinicians and hospitals) in a constructive debate about such issues always 
carry a cost, both financially and in terms o f opportunity costs. Based on the results o f the 
various engagement exercises charted in this thesis, whether the results o f such ‘engagement’ 
justifies their costs appears questionable.
In October 2002 UKM circulated ‘Ensuring high quality care in major jo in t surgery; A 
discussion document with the profession and hospitals ’ (Bupa, 2002b). The document was 
circulated to professional associations, hospital groups and other major orthopaedic 
providers. Additionally, the top 30 Hip and Knee arthroplasty surgeons (by volume o f Bupa 
members treated) were sent personal copies o f the document and copies were made available 
to any consultant/body that requested it.
Following receipt of these comments UKM issued a revised document ‘Ensuring High 
Quality Care in Hip and Knee Arthroplasty Surgery’ (Bupa, 2003b). This document was 
discussed at a series of regional meetings (19 in total) undertaken across the UK. Every 
surgeon and anaesthetist who had billed Bupa for a hip or knee replacement during the 
previous year was invited to the meetings, and 191 consultants attended.
Following those meetings UKM then produced a revised (and final version) of its proposals 
entitled ‘Ensuring high quality care fo r  hip and knee arthroplasty surgery ’ (Bupa, 2004) in 
February 2004. This included an appendix with comments received from the 72 consultants 
who had responded to the previous documents. This process has been outlined to illustrate 
both the lengthy timescale and the extended nature of the engagement process.
Minimum Volumes: a Controversial Proposal
Much of the document was a reflection o f best practice as set out in literature such as the 
British Orthopaedic Association (BOA) publications on best practice for total hip and knee 
replacements (BOA, 1999). The sections ‘observations on good practice’ and ‘health 
outcomes’ were well received, as was the proposed tightening o f hospital standards (by
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consultants if not necessarily by hospital managers). However, other elements proved 
considerably more problematical. A key element was the proposal to introduce minimum 
volumes that any consultant would have to achieve before being authorised to carry out such 
operations on Bupa members. Whilst it was accepted that minimum volumes were not the 
sole measure o f quality, UKM’s contention was that the evidence clearly showed that there 
was a minimum volume below which outcome was likely to be (negatively) affected. The 
establishment o f minimum volumes at that time was considered to represent a highly visible 
quality differential with both the NHS and other insurers.
The proposal to establish minimum volumes provoked considerable discussion with 
clinicians. The author took part in many debates on the subject - both through correspondence 
and face-to-face. These discussions were marked by a distinct lack o f consensus. This is best 
illustrated by reference to various positions taken by consultants in letters to Bupa that 
appeared in the Appendix of the document (see Appendix 6).
The proposal that provoked much reaction was for a minimum volume to be set for hip and 
knee replacements, and also for knee revisions. The justification for doing so was set out in 
the document with 21 supporting clinical references (Bupa, 2004).
The Response o f  the Professional Associations
Whilst the views o f individual consultants varied and were often encouraging (as can be seen 
from the written comments in Appendix 6), the responses from the British Orthopaedic 
Association (BOA) and the British Association (for) Surgery Knee (BASK) were essentially 
negative. Their position could be summarised as:
A. We are against insurers trying to establish quality standards for doctors. This is best 
left for professional bodies to do;
B. We are in favour of promoting high-quality practice but determining what actually 
constitutes good and poor practice is very difficult, as is what is required for someone 
to be considered competent. If minimum volumes are to be set it is for the 
professional bodies to undertake this. However currently it is too technically 
problematic to do so.
Despite numerous meetings and exchanges of correspondence over a prolonged period the 
author saw no discernible change in this position. Moreover that stance has not modified
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since. However, the most strident criticisms of the proposals emanated from FIPO. A 
statement on its website said:
‘.. .there was no evidence whatsoever that the arbitrary numbers chosen by Bupa 
would in any way reflect quality of care. There are fundamental objections to an 
insurer developing a preferred provider list of consultants and acting as a quasi­
regulator... FIPO in conjunction with BOA, BASK and BOTA sent out a 
questionnaire to 1,700 orthopaedic consultants throughout the UK. There was an 
overwhelming response of 858 consultants representing 50 % of all orthopaedic 
surgeons... 88% of consultants believed the Bupa proposal was driven primarily by 
financial consideration and 18 % believe it driven by quality’(FIPO, 2006a).
Management o f  LOS and other Issues
The disagreements over minimum volumes rather overshadowed reaction to the other 
proposals in the document. One of these related to the establishment of length of stay (LOS) 
‘targets’. The document quoted the current range - from an average of 5.8 days to 18.2 days 
for hip arthroplasties and 5.5 days to 16.2 days for primary knee arthroplasty of Bupa 
members treated for these conditions (Bupa, 2004). For patients without significant co­
morbidities the proposals were:
• Six days for primary hip arthroplasty;
• Six days for hip resurfacing;
• Nine days for hip revision;
• Seven days for primary knee arthroplasty;
• Ten days for knee revision.
The document was at pains to state that the Bupa ‘targets’ did not represent a maximum LOS 
after which reimbursement to providers would not be made. They would merely trigger 
discussions between Bupa and providers when high LOS was identified. The length o f stay 
‘targets’ did not appear over-ambitious as a number of private and NHS providers already 
had LOS below these for the procedures in question. The NAO in its 2003 publication ‘Hip 
Replacements: an update’ (NAO, 2003) quoted the Orthopaedic Services Collaborative (part 
o f the now defunct NHS Modernisation Agency) recommendation that a primary hip 
replacement without complications should have an expected length o f stay o f only five days.
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Nevertheless there was disquiet about what some consultants saw as the introduction o f US 
style ‘managed care’.
With regard to the other key proposals, professional opinion was firmly in favour o f Bupa 
making it mandatory for hospitals performing hip /knee arthroplasties to have laminar flow 
systems in the operating theatre (not all had). They were also generally enthusiastic about 
comprehensive pre-operative assessment. With regard to outcomes the document had stated 
that:
‘Bupa’s general position will be to support follow up appointments and x-rays for hip 
and knee arthroplasty where they are undertaken as part o f a long term outcome 
programme as follows; six months post surgery, one year, five years, ten years and 
then five yearly thereafter (assuming that the member remains a Bupa member)’ 
(Bupa, 2004, p. 14).
This was welcomed by providers but was the source of some anxiety within UKM. A 
commitment to long-term follow-up potentially increased claims expenditure and increased 
the difficulty in distinguishing between acute and chronic care. In this regard the cynicism o f 
those 88% of consultants (quoted by FIPO above) about the motives behind the initiative may 
have had some grounds.
In earlier versions of the document UKM had also proposed some form of differential 
reimbursement based on numbers of cases treated, outcomes and/or work performed at 
designated specialist centres. By the time of the final document this had been abandoned in 
the face of limited professional enthusiasm and internal concerns as to the administrative 
complexity (and cost) of implementing and operating such a scheme.
Loss o f  Momentum
It was soon evident that UKM would have to either implement its proposals in the face of 
sustained professional opposition or quietly drop them. The professional associations were 
not going to change their stance. The position of the hospital groups was more equivocal but 
there was some concern within UKM that implementation o f the standards would adversely 
impact on member access and would lead to pressure for increased prices to cover the costs 
o f implementation.
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In the face of such obstacles, UKM did not take forward its proposals. This leads one to 
question how committed the organisation was to the stated aims o f the initiative at the outset. 
Given the not inconsiderable costs that had been expended getting to this point this may seem 
a somewhat perverse question. However, the high volumes of hip and knee replacements 
funded by Bupa added to the perceived risks of the initiative and resulted in a degree of 
managerial uncertainty once it became obvious that professional opposition would not soften.
The decision to ‘hang fire’ was made easier by developments in the NHS. In April 2000 the 
National Audit Office (NAO) produced a report in which, when referring to consultants who 
undertook very low volumes, stated that:
‘.. .many of the consultants who responded to our survey commented that the numbers 
being performed are, in many cases, insufficient to ensure that the skill and 
experience levels are such as to maximise the chances of a successful outcome for the 
patient’ (NAO, 2000).
Both the NAO and DoH were interested in the content and outcome o f UKM initiatives, 
particularly following the recommendations contained in The House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee report ‘Hip replacements; an update’ ( 2004) which had noted that half 
the consultants undertaking primary hip replacements did less than the equivalent o f one a 
week. They had recommended that the DoH:
‘.. .should gain a good understanding of the relationship between the number of 
operations carried out by individual surgeons and their outcomes. It should then set 
minimal annual volumes of primary and revision hip replacements to be undertaken 
by surgeons who work in the NHS’ (The House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee, 2004, p.6).
This was considered a fortuitous development by UKM, particularly when a representative 
from Bupa (initially the author) was invited to join the DoH Orthopaedic Working Party 
established as a response to the Public Accounts report. There was a hope that UKM’s aims 
would be largely met without having to engage in conflict with the providers. Indeed, there 
now seemed a genuine possibility that the orthopaedic community would be forced to either
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establish minimum volume measures itself as a way of self-regulating or that government 
would impose its own criteria.
UKM’s proposals were held in abeyance (ostensibly until the DoH Working party had 
completed its deliberations). At the point the author left Bupa (February 24th 2006) no further 
action had been taken by UKM in taking forward its recommendations.
The DoH Working Party commissioned a report to look at the relationship between volume 
and outcome (Judge et al, 2006).The conclusion that low volume units were more likely to 
have poorer outcomes made the front page of Hospital Doctor (Newman, 2005, p .l)  and was 
reported as follows:
‘A Government-backed report linking numbers o f hip and knee replacement 
operations with outcomes may lead to closure o f units performing low volumes of 
these procedures, Hospital Doctor can reveal...The findings have potential 
implications for the private sector, which did not supply data for the study...The DoH 
asked the researchers not to investigate links between outcomes and individual 
volumes although their literature review found that for hip replacement, surgeon 
volumes may be more important than unit volumes. Prof Dieppe said: “We firmly 
believe that the whole functioning of the unit is most important to outcomes”. The 
paper was submitted to the DoH in August, which told the team it would publish its 
response shortly’.
The article was written in 2005 yet the response o f both the DoH and indeed of
Bupa has still not appeared as o f the date of submission o f this thesis. It would seem that the
implications of adopting the report’s recommendations remain too radical for either party.
Other Bupa Quality Initiatives
The Initiatives Covered
Four o f the most interesting remaining initiatives will be outlined and their central 
characteristics highlighted (the remaining three generic initiatives are described in Appendix 
10). One feature runs through many of them - the dichotomy between the company’s desire
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to establish quality networks, and the marked reluctance to mandate members to use them. 
This will become evident as each initiative is examined.
Critical Care Accreditation
The objective of this initiative was to ensure that members who were having procedures that 
were likely to require a period in a critical care unit were only treated in hospitals that had the 
appropriate facilities. This seems both straightforward and sensible but as will be seen 
implementation turned out to be problematic.
A process of inspection of crucial care units, using the Intensive Care Society to undertake 
the work on behalf of UKM was undertaken. However, a significant obstacle to timely 
completion of that process was that not all private hospitals took up the offer o f an inspection. 
A number of hospital groups were reluctant to engage in the accreditation process, arguing 
that it would take up their s ta ffs  time and they saw no commercial benefit in co-operating. 
Crucial to this was the uncertainty as to whether accredited units were going to see more 
patient volume at the expense of non-accredited units. In short: was UKM going to direct its 
members to have their treatment at accredited units? UKM was unwilling to offer a guarantee 
o f additional volume.
The decision not to do so primarily centred on a reluctance to challenge the referral decisions 
of GPs and consultants, and the problems this would generate for call-centre staff of difficult 
‘clinical’ conversations with members/doctors. This was compounded by uncertainty as to 
what clinical procedures should be dealt with in this way. Underpinning all o f this was 
concern that restricting member choice would raise members’ anxiety about the procedure 
they were to receive, and that this would undermine a core component of the company’s 
product proposition.
The result was an inspection process that took years to undertake and indecision on the 
crucial issue o f what was going to happen to non-accredited units. This was compounded by 
the decision at the outset that only those hospitals with at least 5 critical care admissions per 
annum were to be included in the inspection process.
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This raises a key issue with regard to the entire critical care initiative. A meaningful 
accreditation process for critical care implied that non-accredited hospitals would be 
restricted in the type of cases they could treat. This in turn implied direction of members 
away from non-accredited facilities. Even if these principles were accepted, for an 
accreditation process to work properly it needed to be kept up-to-date and cover all hospitals. 
However as time went on it became apparent that the commitment to such a time-consuming 
and expensive process were lacking, and in the absence o f a decision to actively exclude non- 
accredited units the project lost momentum. One result of this was that UKM found itself in 
the strange position of having a quality initiative it could not easily promote to members, as 
to do so raised the possibility of receiving awkward questions about the status o f non- 
accredited units.
Three years after the commencement o f the project it was agreed that UKM would not 
attempt to establish a directional critical care network and moving forward, that UKM would 
look to the Healthcare Commission to ensure that critical care facilities in private and NHS 
facilities were adequate. Bupa would not pursue a separate accreditation process for critical 
care. Instead UKM would confine itself to the following activities:
• For those units that had already been inspected, UKM would publicise the network on the 
basis that it had undertaken an inspection of these units and was satisfied that they met the 
standards set by the Intensive Care Society. It was intended that hospitals in this category 
would in due course be highlighted on the members' website. Should a member note that 
they were being referred to a hospital not on the list for a complex procedure they would 
be advised to check with the consultant/hospital for an assurance that adequate critical 
care arrangements were in place;
• Where UKM had committed to inspection visit(s), these would continue, reflecting the 
fact that considerable effort had already been expended getting hospital groups to agree to 
these visits;
• Moving forward, UKM would not continue with a separate accreditation process but 
instead liaise with the Healthcare Commission to determine which hospitals have met 
their standards for critical care. UKM could then promote these units as having 
appropriate critical care facilities. It was proposed that any hospital failing the Healthcare
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Commission standards would not be allowed to admit patients requiring critical care level 
2 or 3 and these could be dealt with on an ad-hoc basis should they came to light;
• An analysis o f activity in hospitals that had not been accredited against the listing of 
procedures known to routinely require level 2 or 3 care would be undertaken. If  any were 
found, letters would be sent to the hospitals in question highlighting the issue and 
suggesting to them that they may wish to satisfy themselves that they would meet the 
Healthcare Commission standards in this area. The letters and any replies would be 
copied to the Healthcare Commission.
Thus UKM’s critical care initiative eventually petered out. This is a good example o f the 
practical issues that surround a quality initiative for any organisation, and particularly so for a 
commercial company. Such initiatives may look attractive and relatively simple to undertake 
when first discussed but actually require sustained effort and resources - both to establish and 
maintain. If an organisation is not fully signed-up to all the implications of running a quality 
network (or does not recognise that doing so will mean real changes for staff, customers and 
providers) then it is likely to compromise the chances of success. In the case of critical care it 
would seem that UKM embarked on an enterprise that it was neither operationally, nor 
culturally ready to see through to its planned conclusion.
Establishing a Bone Marrow/Stem Cell Transplant Network
One reason UKM may have decided to go ahead with critical care accreditation related to the 
comparative ease with which it had previously established specialist centres for bone 
marrow/stem cell transplants (BMT’s). Unlike critical care, attendance at these units was 
mandatory (with a specific clause in members’ policy booklets stating this). However there 
were key differences between the two schemes which help to explain why establishing (and 
policing) a BMT network was relatively easy compared to other conditions. Bone 
marrow/stem cell transplants are expensive treatments that only a very small number of 
members require each year and few providers have the clinical infrastructure to provide. 
Patients requiring such transplants would most likely already be well aware that few centres 
undertook them and their GP/consultant would have referred accordingly. In summary, units 
effectively self selected themselves, with few hospitals able to provide this service. In such an 
environment establishing a network was non-controversial and easy to administer. It might be 
pointed out that given the factors described above, any claims that a mandatory network is
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evidence o f a true commitment to clinical quality has rather less meaning than might 
otherwise be supposed, as patients would in all probability go to these hospitals in any case.
| Breast, Bowel and Gynaecological Cancer Networks
At the time of writing Bupa remains the only UK insurer that has created national networks 
for breast, bowel, gynaecological cancers (Cancer BACUP, 2004). The establishment of 
accredited breast cancer units from 1998 (subsequently followed by bowel and 
gynaecological cancer networks in 2001 and 2005 respectively) has been UKM’s most 
significant ‘clinical quality’ undertaking to date. The drive to do so was in response to the 
increasing evidence that patients with certain forms o f cancer received higher quality 
diagnosis, treatment and care when they were treated by dedicated teams o f consultants, 
nurses and other clinicians with specialist skills (NHS Executive, 1997).
UKM worked closely with professional bodies such as the Association o f Breast Surgeons 
and The British Society of Blood and Marrow Transplantation to develop assessment 
questionnaires for hospitals. The assessment process was comprehensive, involving 
considerable work for both providers and UKM. In the case of the Breast units these were re­
assessed using updated criteria in 2002. However the issue - as ever - was what would happen 
to the non-accredited units. At that time Bupa did not put in place any internal mechanism to 
direct members to accredited units and the non-accredited hospitals largely continued to 
admit patients for breast and bowel surgery.
UKM took a number o f actions over a number of years to try and get the non-accredited units
i to stop treating Bupa members for the conditions in question. These included writing to non­
approved hospitals requesting that they to stop treating Bupa members, mailing GPs to
I inform them which were approved hospitals, promoting the approved units on the Bupa
website and supporting the marketing undertaken by these hospitals. None of these actions 
made any measurable difference.
This begs the question why UKM did not simply de-recognise the non-approved units. There 
were probably two reasons. The first is technical in that UKM’s administrative systems at 
that time effectively only allowed consultants and hospitals to be either recognised for 
everything, or not recognised at all. Undertaking procedure/condition specific recognition 
was technically difficult (and expensive) to programme into the system. The other reason
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related to UK Membership’s previously noted aversion to establishing mandatory networks. 
This was motivated not only by concerns over member reaction but also by a quasi- 
philosophical position with regard to customer sovereignty (T f members choose to go to a 
non-approved unit should we stop them, isn’t PMI all about greater choice?’). Added to these 
concerns was a desire to avoid potential conflict with major hospital groups should one or 
more o f their hospitals be excluded.
It is particularly noteworthy that appeals to hospitals’ (and surgeons’) clinical governance 
responsibilities did not work. Non-approved surgeons and hospitals were written to, pointing 
out that they had either failed the recognition process - or more often - had failed to apply. 
Bupa requested - on clinical governance grounds - that they stop treating breast/bowel cancer 
cases, as UKM did not consider that they had the suitable facilities in place. The providers in 
question may have reflected that if UKM really thought this, they should stop agreeing to 
their members being treated at the hospitals in question (and paying the resultant claims) 
when those members contacted UKM to pre-authorise treatment. In any case the behaviours 
displayed were essentially as described/predicted by writers such as Rodwin (1993), Chaix- 
Coultier, Durand-Zaleski and Duieux (2000) and Le Grand (2003).
This was a considerable source of frustration to UKM managers who were keen to pursue the 
clinical quality agenda. In February 2005 a process known as ‘financial re-directionality’ was 
implemented. This entailed writing to non-approved providers stating that from a given date 
UKM would recoup any payment made to them for any breast or bowel cases treated.
Patients requiring this surgery should instead be referred to their nearest UKM-approved 
Breast or Bowel Cancer Hospital (all within 20 miles of a non-approved unit). The aim was 
to establish a natural re-referral process o f members to approved hospitals and consultants. 
The hospitals were also advised that UKM expected the member to be ‘held harmless’ (a 
term meaning that the member would not be pursued for any charges, instead any payment 
issues being conducted with the insurer). As such, under no circumstances should the 
member be required by the provider to directly settle any charges.
Letters went to:
• 72 non-approved hospitals still providing Bupa members with breast surgery;
• 121 surgeons providing the breast surgery at the non-approved hospitals;
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• 100 non-approved hospitals still providing Bupa members with bowel cancer surgery;
• 195 surgeons providing the bowel cancer surgery at the non-approved hospitals;
• 49 Bupa Approved Breast Cancer Hospitals who had allowed a non-specialist breast 
surgeon to perform breast cancer surgery;
• 50 Bupa Approved Bowel Cancer Hospitals who had allowed a non-specialist bowel 
surgeon to perform bowel cancer surgery.
In all cases there was an appropriate Bupa-Approved Cancer Hospital within 20 miles. The 
letters offered each hospital the opportunity to apply/reapply for approval if appropriate. The 
numbers are quoted in this thesis to illustrate the scale of provider non-compliance prior to 
the implementation o f that policy.
The threat o f imposing financial penalties appeared to immediately focus management 
attention within the hospitals concerned on this ‘clinical governance’ issue. For example, in 
March 2005 (before the new policy had come into effect) the percentage of patients treated in 
approved units was 78% for breast and 62% for bowel. By October 2005 this had increased to 
89% and 79% respectively. The reason that it was not 100% reflected the fact that the 
imposition o f ‘financial re-directionality’ was undertaken via a phased hospital group roll out. 
The practical reason for this was to accommodate the work generated by non-approved 
hospitals deciding upon receiving the letter that they now wished to apply for accreditation.
Although the process was convoluted, it seems reasonable to conclude that a meaningful 
quality network has finally been created and enforced. The time and effort required to do so 
should be noted. In the case of gynaecological cancers the network o f approved units only 
came into being in 2005 and a further period was to elapse before financial re-directionality 
was to be applied to them.
The cancer approved centres formed the centrepiece of UKM’s claim to be the market leader 
on healthcare quality. Such initiatives form part o f the company’s marketing and sales 
presentations although what influence they had on decisions to either purchase or renew 
membership cannot be determined. During the author’s time at Bupa many within UKM were 
frankly sceptical that they had much effect beyond reinforcing existing notions about what 
sits behind the brand. They would argue that as people generally believed such quality
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measures were already in place as an inherent component of private healthcare there was no 
commercial gain to be had from expending resources on establishing such networks. It is 
perhaps noteworthy then that the last of these was established some five years ago with no 
further cancer or condition specific networks being put in place since then.
Promoting an Evidence-Based Approach to Back Pain
Running in parallel to the creation o f approved cancer units was a drive by UKM to promote 
an evidence-based approach to the use o f certain procedures in the management o f back pain. 
The approach was set out in the UKM document ‘Evidence-based approach to back pain’ 
published in August 2002 and stated that:
‘When a condition is covered the funding of effective healthcare will be evidence-based and 
delivered efficiently as soon as possible. Emphasis will be placed on funding diagnostic and 
treatment services that have been demonstrated to be effective. The funding o f indeterminate 
diagnostic procedures and processes, and ineffective treatments, will be subjected to 
increased scrutiny and managed by establishing mutually agreed treatment goals, progress 
reviews, and limiting the duration and/or number of treatments. Bupa is concerned that the 
delivery of serial ineffective treatments results in prolonged delays without positive outcome 
for patients and that this potentially contributes to their overall suffering through 
demoralisation and adoption of a passive sick role.
The funding of treatments and procedures that have been demonstrated to be deleterious or 
harmful will cease.
Funding for experimental or unproven techniques and procedures will only occur as part o f a 
recognised and ethically approved clinical trial as described in the Government’s Research 
Governance Framework’ (Bupa, 2002a).
This was a comprehensive document for the procedures examined, and had been subject to 
lengthy discussion with various professional bodies. It was 39 pages long, with 126 clinical 
references. Invariably when the subject o f back pain is considered in the context o f UK health 
insurance the question of whether it should be regarded an ‘acute’ versus a ‘chronic’ 
condition arises. In common with other UK insurers, most UKM policies stated that they did 
not cover treatment for a ‘chronic condition’. However what is actually considered a chronic
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condition is the subject of much debate and ambiguity, both between insurers and providers, 
and within a company (in relation to how particular claims are adjudicated). A significant 
consequence o f such ‘cut offs’ is that any attempt to produce an evidence-based approach to 
what treatments should be covered (and with it the natural desire to confer clinical legitimacy 
to those policies), run up against the natural suspicion o f clinicians and patients that the prime 
motivation is cost reduction. This view is made all the more likely because clinically the cut­
off point for funding may make little sense. This tension aside, in the case o f UKM’s policy 
every effort was made to justify the guidance by the application o f clinical evidence - hence 
the 126 references and the extensive consultation process.
In summary, interventions were classified into three categories. Those that did not need 
clinical pre-authorisation by UKM’s ‘back pain’ team; those that did, and a third category of 
interventions that UKM would no longer fund (see Appendix 3).
In the case of spinal fusion the documentation was particularly extensive. Defined clinical 
criteria and clinical pathways were set out that had to be met before a member would be 
eligible for funding. This set up an administrative burden on both the provider and insurer, as 
such criteria (if they are to have any meaning) required policing. The full text is shown in 
Appendix 4 (Bupa, 2002a ibid).
In October 2003 UKM produced a second document ‘Evidence-Based Approach for Lumbar 
Surgery and Invasive Procedures’ (Bupa, 2003c). This followed the same format and 
approach as the 2002 document consisting as it did o f 41 pages and 135 clinical references. 
This serves to highlight the point that such initiatives are considerable undertakings. The 
funding matrix is shown in Appendix 5.
This is a much more proactive management o f commissioned care than one currently finds in 
the NHS and represented as sophisticated an approach to evidence- based medicine as 
anywhere in the developed world. However, the next intervention reviewed in the document 
was the use o f implantable/intrathecal infusion pumps. Here the document suddenly became 
brief, simply stating that Bupa’s policy was not to fund:
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‘Bupa recognises that these devices may be useful for some cases in the management 
of persistent (chronic) pain. However, this currently falls outside the remit o f  private 
medical insurance’ (Bupa, 2002a).
However it should be noted that UKM was at the same time funding implantable /inthrathecal 
infusion pumps where the patient concerned was suffering from chronic pain relating to 
cancer. The rationale for this was that it had an overarching commitment (and associated 
customer proposition) that all secondary care aspects of cancer-related treatments were 
covered. Unsurprisingly many clinicians (and patients) found this reasoning difficult to 
accept. Whilst such a policy may be commercially defendable, it undermines - perhaps fatally 
- the moral and intellectual authority o f an insurer to challenge clinical decision making.
As well as containing proposals to make funding conditional on the safety of the procedure, 
the 2003 document proposed to make it dependent on the status o f the surgeon and centre in 
which surgery was carried out:
‘Bupa is signalling an intention to explore avenues for funding spine surgery on the 
basis of two variables. The first involves the determination about the effectiveness 
and safety o f specific procedures. Each procedure has been assigned to one of: “Red 
List”, “Yellow List’, or “Green List” . The second variable will involve assigning each 
surgeon to one of two categories “Bupa-Recognised”, or “working in a Bupa- 
Recognised Spinal Centre”. Bupa is undertaking further development work on 
defining these categories’ (Bupa, 2002a ibid).
The recognised Spinal Centres would receive automatic authorisation for ‘Yellow’ list 
procedures, so long as they were performed within the specific Bupa policy for that 
procedure. However, other Bupa-recognised surgeons would need to provide clinical 
information about the reasons for surgery or investigation.
Again this proposal ran into opposition from the profession. At the date of submission o f this 
thesis spinal centres have not been established and no specialist network has been created. 
Moreover no further work was been undertaken following the October 2003 publication to 
take forward implementation o f the spinal centres. Bupa has established a ‘back pain’ team of 
nurses operating out of one its service centres to deal with queries from providers and
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members about its policies and once again it should be noted that designing and then 
operating such a policy carries a significant overhead. The degree to which Bupa succeeded 
in policing the level of interventions with a low evidence base is not known, but its ability to 
do so was undoubtedly somewhat constrained by the challenges some providers and indeed 
members made to Bupa’s right to set such policies at all, as explored in the next section.
Challenges to Policy
UKM has experienced problems with certain clinicians and members challenging the right o f 
the insurer to deny funding for ‘experimental’ procedures. Essentially there are two points o f 
interest here with regard to the wider quality agenda. The first is that certain clinicians 
challenged UKM’s policy not to fund a particular procedure on the basis that can be 
summarised as ‘the published evidence may not support this intervention but I believe it can 
be effective’. Moreover these clinicians usually supported their arguments by stating that they 
were currently performing the procedure in the NHS.
A second development was that that some members were challenging UKM’s funding 
decisions. These complaints were normally related to a refusal to fund either an intervention 
deemed ‘experimental’, outside of the terms o f the policy, or related to overseas treatment. 
Ultimately such complaints (if not resolved) are considered by the Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS). Crucially the FOS is increasingly finding in favour o f the complainant. The 
Ombudsman’s view appears to be that UKM is essentially an indemnity insurer. As such, 
UKM (and other insurers) are seen as having no real part to play in determining or assuring 
healthcare standards for their customers. The philosophy underlying the FOS’ position is that 
the consumer should be sovereign at all times. If the consumer decides to use providers that 
their insurer considers sub-standard or to undergo a procedure that is categorised as 
‘experimental’ or even unsafe, then providing they have been informed o f the insurer’s 
concerns it is for the customer to decide what to do. The insurer should pay for the procedure 
equivalent to what they would have paid to an approved provider for a ‘traditional’ 
procedure. By doing so FOS argues the insurer is not ‘out of pocket’, as it would have paid 
the member to have an approved procedure from an approved provider. The Ombudsmen 
does not appear to have a problem with insurers stating to the member that should they 
pursue such a course they will not be covered for any subsequent complications.
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The same logic applies to overseas treatments. Insurers may have specific clauses within their 
rules stating that members are not covered for overseas treatments (the reason given was 
normally that the insurer could not quality assure overseas providers). However the 
Ombudsman increasingly takes the view that such exclusions are contrary to the spirit o f the 
insurance agreement.
These judgements are creating de facto  precedents and FOS is putting pressure on insurers 
not to contest cases of this type, given that the Ombudsman’s position is already known. In 
effect, if a complaint is received from a member who has been denied an experimental 
treatment, or the option o f going abroad for treatment, then the insurer is under pressure to 
pay up to the level that would have been payable if  the claim had been undertaken in the UK, 
or for a traditional procedure. When it comes to procedures proscribed in UKM’s back pain 
documents, the FOS seems to take the view that if consultants believe the procedure is going 
to help the member then it is not for FOS (or the insurer) to challenge them. Clearly the 
insurer’s position is not helped when consultants say that they undertake the procedure in 
question within the NHS.
The Ombudsman’s stance presents all insurers -  but particularly UKM - with two significant 
problems. Firstly, it undermines control of costs in that restricted clinical networks (including 
quality-based networks) may be overridden by members determined to go to an alternative 
provider. Although such members would only be reimbursed at the network cost rate, if 
enough of them were to do this, that would undermine one o f the main advantages o f such 
networks - discounts based on expected volumes (as discussed in Chapter 3). To date this has 
not been a major threat as few members insist on going ‘out of network’ and fewer still 
pursue their cases as far as the Ombudsman.
The second threat is both more relevant and serious - particularly for an insurer marketing its 
product on ‘clinical quality’ grounds. If FOS regards all UK health insurance as being 
essentially of an indemnity nature then the ability o f insurers to differentiate their product via 
the promotion of clinical quality is compromised. A perennial debate within UKM was 
whether the organisation was a health care company first or an insurer? As far as FOS is 
concerned there is no debate. UKM is an insurer.
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Conclusion
What conclusions can be drawn from this examination o f UKM’s approach to quality in 
general and in particular their actions over the last decade? Certainly several initiatives have 
had a measure o f success from the perspective of the insurer, and may have brought some 
quality improvements. If reality did not always quite match the rhetoric, Bupa did indeed 
appear to be the market leader in relation to promotion o f health care quality issues. However 
the baseline for quality improvement was generally low.
Whether the UK private sector is able to move healthcare quality onto the next stage, 
envisaged by the likes of the IOM, or to deliver six-sigma quality is questionable.
Currently the private sector in the UK seems largely ready to follow public expectations of 
health care quality rather than try to change them. The author would speculate that this 
inertia has its root cause in a combination of a lack o f a ‘burning platform’ in terms o f 
business performance, combined with a degree of complacency as to the true quality gap. By 
the former is meant that the traditional business model, emphasising ‘traditional’ notions of 
quality continues to dominate thinking and until the latest economic downturn this was 
undeniably a successful business strategy. In the case o f UKM the potential ‘burning 
platform’ was stiffer competition from an improving NHS or from other insurers. But the 
general view among senior managers was that this competition was not strong enough to 
require Bupa to demonstrate a clearer quality advantage to justify its premium pricing and the 
‘brand’.
Building reputation via quality improvement would have benefits for the insurer but was 
vulnerable to a countervailing pressure to increase profitability. The Bupa Group has multi­
national interests and ambitions to further increase its overseas presence. To do this it has 
utilised domestic ‘profits’ to assist in financing the expansion o f overseas operations. Over 
the last two decades UKM generated significant profits without making large capital 
investments in UK hospitals or care homes.
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Faced with a choice between making potentially destabilising changes that might translate 
into long term profits at the cost o f short-term problems, versus leaving things essentially 
unchanged, Bupa’s senior management tended towards the latter (whatever their public 
statements to the contrary). In the absence o f an immediate threat to market share or profits, 
radical change would depend on significant risk taking by managers who appeared generally 
risk adverse.
Much of this inertia can be explained by the sustained opposition that insurers - and 
particularly Bupa - faced from providers and professionals when efforts were made to 
promote quality programmes or develop quality standards. This chapter has provided several 
empirical case studies that support this observation. That opposition, coupled with the 
transactional costs associated with formal quality assurance processes, led to the 
abandonment o f several quality initiatives.
All o f the above essentially replicates the pattern of past responses o f providers and insurers 
described in the literature, and provides further empirical reinforcement to various predictions 
as to how healthcare operates with regards to quality initiatives. Firstly it has been difficult to 
make ‘the business case for quality’ in the UK private market in a similar way to that 
described previously by Coye (2001) Casalino (2001) Marshall (2003) and Sehgal (2010) in 
the USA.
The provider -and especially physician-resistance described in this chapter to third party 
‘interference’ with clinical autonomy, referral patterns and reimbursement conditions has 
effectively mirrored that documented over many years by writers like Kessel (1958), 
Freidson, 1970a; 1970b; Abbott, 1988; Mechanic, 1991 and Light (2000, 2004). This 
chapter thus proves a further illustration of the continuing tension between professional 
autonomy and managerial control previously documented by the above authors as well as 
Freddi and Bjorkman, (1988) Scrivens, (1988) Wolinsky (1993) Harrison and Pollitt, (1994) 
and Ferlie(1997).
Bupa’s quality initiatives can also be conceptualised in part as an attempt to undermine 
professional autonomy and self regulation, a theme previously explored by Harrison and 
Ahmad (2000) and Davies and Harrison (2003). As such, this chapter has provided a further 
opportunity to examine the interplay of purchaser and professional power, specifically in the
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private sector context. Part of this has centred on perceived or actual threats to the 
‘knowledge mandate’ (Halliday, 1987) enjoyed by doctors. A particular case in point being 
the reaction of the orthopaedic community to Bupa’s hip and knee proposals.
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion
This thesis set out to accomplish a number o f objectives.
1. To establish how the UK private healthcare market has operated to date and provide a 
detailed review of the current dynamics of UK private healthcare;
2. To catalogue and then assess how Bupa as the largest UK insurer has tried to make 
changes within that market;
3. To assess to what degree market levers and incentives are being utilised by Bupa (and 
other insurers) to make desired changes to the current status quo, that is to say, to 
reduce prices and raise quality;
This has primarily been an empirical study drawing on the experience of Bupa as the largest 
private medical insurer. The company had attempted to undertake a number o f initiatives 
utilising new incentives and purchasing levers, in what analysts generally consider to be the 
market environment o f the UK PMI sector. There has thus been an opportunity to test a 
number of hypotheses concerning the functioning of markets in healthcare by drawing upon 
the recent experience of Bupa.
The Nature of Market Failure in Healthcare
The introductory chapter set the context against which the events described in subsequent 
chapters were to be understood. It was noted that the academic literature on UK private 
healthcare was quite sparse. The thesis reviewed the findings of authors such as Foubister et 
al (2005) with regard to the dynamics o f the UK private market, and Higgins (1988), Propper 
and Maynard 1989) and Propper, Rees and Green (1999) on the determinants of PMI 
demand. Previous academic studies have not explored the strategy of any individual company 
operating within UK PMI; a topic examined in this thesis.
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Chapter 1 also noted the tendency toward market failure in healthcare noted by many authors 
(Fuchs, 1988 ;Baumol, 1995; Herzlinger, 1997; Smith, 2000; Gaynor, Haas-Wilson and Vogt, 
2000; Nichols et al, 2004; Maynard, 2005; Berenson, 2005; Porter and Teisberg 2006;
Wigger and Anlauf, 2007). This thesis provides further evidence that particular features of 
healthcare that undermine efficient market functioning noted by the likes o f Kessel (1958) 
and Arrow (1968) remain relevant today.
However, market failure is not generally an absolute, ‘all or nothing’ phenomenon. What has 
been described in the thesis is not a complete breakdown o f market forces, but rather sub- 
optimal functioning and little indication that the market operates as a self-improving system. 
Other industries provide numerous examples that competition can work effectively to deliver 
high quality and low price products that fully meet customer expectations. Significantly 
however, the market environments in which they operate are not characterised by the 
combination of features encountered in healthcare and which the UK PMI market 
exemplifies. The traditional UK private health sector exhibits all the features that contribute 
to market failure such as the lack of visibility of price signals to individuals engendered by 
insurance and third party payment, moral hazard, information asymmetry and psychological 
dependence.
The partial control of the supply of healthcare by a strong and largely self-regulating 
professional group is a particularly important factor not present in most other production 
industries. Here the issues are not just information asymmetry arising from the medical 
profession’s ‘knowledge mandate’ (Halliday, 1987), or ‘knavish’ behaviour by individual 
practitioners (LeGrand, 2003), but the organised, institutionalised power o f the profession 
(Freidson, 1970a; 1970b; Abbott, 1988). Although Bupa’s various attempts to use market 
levers to change provider behaviour did generate negative reactions from individual doctors, 
the opposition of the consultant representative bodies such as FIPO, the BMA, the Royal 
Colleges and other professional associations was a crucial factor in blocking or attenuating 
proposed changes. The events reported in the thesis suggest that professional bodies were 
often able to build alliances with hospital chains in opposition to purchaser initiatives. 
Although such alliances were not always present, and anyway could sometimes be 
undermined as purchasers offered their own carrots to hospital groups, medical professionals 
still appeared to exercise considerable cultural authority (Starr, 1982) which made it difficult
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for the hospital providers to oppose consultant opinion. Overall, as will be discussed below, 
the degree of countervailing power exercised by UK insurers was quite limited.
To this must be added the particular nature o f how private healthcare in the UK has been 
historically funded and delivered, and who actually purchases clinical services. Chapter 2 
noted that private healthcare has operated for over 60 years in the long shadow cast by the 
free NHS. The UK offers no tax incentives to purchase private medical insurance and UK 
insurance premiums have historically risen above the general rate o f inflation, in addition to 
increasing with age. Problems o f affordability of private healthcare in general and PMI in 
particular has been highlighted by several commentators (Higgins, 1988; Besley, Hall and 
Preston, 1999; Foubister et al, 2005; Farrington-Douglas and Coelho, 2008). These studies of 
demand for PMI show that subscribers continue to be concentrated among individuals o f 
higher income, higher occupational status and predominantly o f middle age.
As noted in Chapters 5 and 7, this has led the industry to place strong emphasis on patient 
choice, and encouraged providers to mount a fierce defence of their clinical freedom to 
engage in private practice. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the major hospital groups for their 
part have a symbiotic relationship with professionals and insurers that made them equally 
resistant to delivering significant price reductions.
Foubister and colleagues had previously noted that the PMI market in the UK appears to
‘...behave as predicted by economic theory, namely, in a form that approximates 
monopolistic competition, with insurers competing through product differentiation 
(and proliferation) rather than simply on the basis of quality and price’ (2005, p.79). 
This thesis shows that the position remained substantially unchanged even after some 
five years of effort by the largest insurer -  Bupa - to change provider behaviour so as 
to influence price and quality, and open the way for such competition.
Interestingly, there appear to be parallels between the operation o f the UK private health care 
market and what took place in US health care about a decade previously. In many respects 
Bupa UKM’s experience of trying to push through various reform initiatives mirrored that of 
the US managed care pioneers mentioned in Chapter 2 and discussed more fully in Chapter 7. 
Just as payer initiatives were adjudged to have largely failed in the USA, so the fate of
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Bupa’s initiatives now looks decidedly precarious -  although no American company has the 
dominant position and national presence that Bupa enjoys in the UK.
Purchaser Scale and Power
As noted above, Bupa's size did not generally translate into power to force either consultants 
or hospital groups to accept its view of required changes in the market. There were 
exceptions and the establishment of the MRI and physiotherapy networks, and accreditation 
o f the breast, bowel and gynaecological cancer units were notable successes. However, 
several other high-profile initiatives failed, and more importantly the essential price dynamic 
o f UK private healthcare remains substantially unchanged. Despite the then Bupa UK 
Insurance Managing Director stating six years ago that the status quo was not an option and 
there was a pressing need to “ruthlessly drive for clinical quality and value for money” (Kee, 
2005), this has not yet happened. Indeed in the area of clinical quality the last major initiative 
by Bupa (the establishment of the gynaecological cancer network) was completed five years 
ago.
Whilst there has not been a fundamental shift in the price/quality dynamic o f private 
healthcare, AXA PPP appears to have had more success with its reimbursement reductions 
aimed at consultants despite having a smaller market share than Bupa. The reasons for this 
were discussed in Chapter 5 and might be summarised as the presence o f a virtuous 
combination of a greater internal resilience to confrontation with providers, coupled with 
AXA PPP’s initiatives being regarded as somewhat less threatening to the provider 
community because it was not considered the PMI ‘brand carrier’ that Bupa is commonly 
regarded as being.
Purchasers’ Ability to Influence Price
The cost of health insurance is determined by four factors: provider charges, claims 
incidence, the costs o f operating the business and the desired profit margin. Claims represent 
the largest component of an insurer’s costs (Foubister et al, 2005), and attempts to reduce 
them take a variety of forms, including initial underwriting, moratorium periods and various 
types o f utilisation review. The degree to which particular insurers employ such measures
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varies, among other things depending on their willingness to be associated with measures like 
utilisation review that are commonly associated with ‘managed care’. In both the USA and 
UK the factors that influence price play out in what can be characterised as market 
environments, but environments that involve only imperfect competition. This thesis has 
described attempts by payers to reduce provider charges and the provider responses 
encountered. For example, Chapter 4 noted that one common tactic used by providers was to 
respond to price controls on reimbursement rates by increasing incidence. Evidence was 
presented from both sides of the Atlantic to show that this has indeed occurred in the past.
Notwithstanding this, the efforts to use of market mechanisms to reduce provider prices in 
UK private healthcare traced in this thesis have usually failed to achieve their desired aim. It 
is true that some individual initiatives have been successful. MRI is the clearest example, 
with some other significant gains for the insurer vis-a-vis price reductions for a few 
procedures such as cataract surgery. However these have not been enough in themselves to 
affect the sharp rate of increase o f premiums in private healthcare. Bramley-Hawker and 
Aslam’s (2003) study, reported in Chapter 4, demonstrated that the UK has high provider 
costs for private healthcare compared to most other developed countries, and there is no 
indication that this has changed. Crucially Laing and Buisson have not reported any deflation 
in premium rates.
The mechanisms utilised to try to exert downward pressure on prices fall into two main 
categories. One has relied on the creation of preferred provider networks, latterly through 
formal tender processes. For Bupa, the MRI, physiotherapy, ophthalmology, and hip and 
knee schemes all fall under this category, as does the original creation of hospital networks. 
Results, as reported in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7, have been decidedly mixed, although all have 
required substantial resources and time-intensive effort from dedicated teams. All have 
involved a large degree of sustained engagement with providers, which typically led to 
confrontation. In short the transaction costs have been significant. Perhaps because o f this, 
Bupa’s enthusiasm for such initiatives appears to have declined, although this is not to say it 
has been wholly abandoned the quest for better price and quality. Bupa had originally 
intended to follow up the establishment o f the ophthalmology network with a series of 
speciality tenders -  orthopaedics was planned to be next - but in the event has not undertaken 
any further network initiatives after the establishment of the physiotherapy network.
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The second approach to the reduction of provider prices has been for insurers to require 
consultants to use an adjusted fee schedule (chapter 4). AXA PPP made recognition of 
consultants to deliver services to its patients conditional on use of a new fee schedule (FIPO 
2010a), a lead subsequently followed by Bupa (FIPO, 2010b). There are two features that 
should be noted with regard to these developments. The first is that they incur far lower 
implementation costs for an insurer than attempts to create preferred provider networks via 
formal tendering exercises. As a mechanism for change, making access to patients dependent 
on acceptance of the insurer’s fee schedule seems to offer a better cost/benefit ratio. The 
second feature is that this approach tends to push the cost of non-compliance by a provider on 
to the insured patient seeking treatment. By establishing a de facto  provider network based on 
provider acceptance of the reduced fees the choice available to patients will most likely be 
reduced. Moreover, where the network allows a doctor or hospital to retain insurer 
recognition but only receive reimbursement at the lower level, patients choosing that doctor 
or hospital will be required to pay the resultant ‘shortfall’. Thus insurer initiatives o f this kind 
may have the consequence of restricting patient choice of provider and leaving patients with 
extra bills. In both cases, risk is being transferred by the insurer to the person insured. This is 
a market mechanism in itself as theoretically it gives the insured patient a direct incentive to 
choose a provider who will accept the insurer’s fee schedule.
This may well prove the most effective mechanism to pressurise consultants to accept lower 
fees. Left to their own devices there is little reason to suppose that consultant fees would fall 
for reasons set out as long ago as Kessel (1958) Arrow (1968) and Miller (1992). 
Paradoxically, although the opposition of consultants to any reductions in their fee schedule 
has been accompanied by a considerable amount of public complaint (see FIPO web site as 
an example) it may well be that the major hospital groups will ultimately prove the more 
difficult to obtain price deflation from. Some years ago the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (1994) commented upon the favourable effects of Bupa’s benefit maxima on 
prices and expressed the view that prices would be even higher without the countervailing 
power of insurers. However, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, the major hospital groups have now 
established a series o f network agreements with insurers that often reinforce geographical 
quasi-monopolies and their financing structure, and have proved unreceptive to calls for price 
reductions.
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Chapter 6 discussed the ability of the US private sector and the public NHS to drive forward 
quality improvements, whist chapter 7 examined Bupa’s quality initiatives. A conclusion that 
can be drawn from both the US and UK private sector experience is payers and providers 
offer consumers the type o f health care that matches the conceptions of quality members 
understand -  typically linked to attractive rooms, hygiene, convenience, accessibility and 
patient sovereignty rather than clinical outcomes.
Bupa’s Ability to Drive Quality Improvements
Bupa have undertaken a number of quality-based initiatives which were reviewed in detail in 
chapter 7. They provide evidence of the limits o f purchaser leverage to change provider 
behaviour, and in some cases also the limitations of particular approaches to network 
creation. Table 8 below summarises the outcomes o f the main initiatives discussed.
Table 8. Outcomes of Major Bupa Quality Initiatives
Initiative Outcome Evidence of
Purchaser
leverage?
MRI network Network established. HCA forced to accept that not 
all group hospitals automatically included, 20% 
reduction in MRI prices achieved.
Yes
Ophthalmology network Not the planned national network but ad hoc partial 
network in some areas. Patients still treated in non­
approved units
Partial
Physiotherapy network Network established, though initially about half 
planned size.
Yes
Hip and knee 
arthroplasty 
(best practice)
Proposals dropped. Both private insurer and 
government initiative have failed to bring real 
progress on minimum numbers.
No
CCU accreditation Initiative discontinued. Bupa phased out own 
inspections and relied on those of HCC.
No
Bone Marrow 
Transplants Network
Network established, but easy because small number 
o f centres and treatments.
Partial
Accredited units for 
breast,
bowel, and gynaecology 
cancer services
Network established. Initial campaign of persuading 
rather than requiring non-accredited units not to 
perform surgery largely failed. Threat o f non 
payment to non-accredited units was successful.
Yes
Management of back 
pain
(best practice)
Funding made more dependent on meeting clinical 
criteria, with some ‘red list’ procedures no longer 
funded, but idea of accredited spinal centres dropped.
Partial
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There were notable successes in the area of the MRI network, and also the physiotherapy 
network and accredited cancer units. However, a critic might argue that Bupa had still not 
managed to force through a major quality initiative in a mainstream acute speciality that 
would impinge significantly on the interests/incomes o f powerful medical consultants. The 
MRI success related to an area of medical technology especially suitable for tendering. The 
physiotherapy network affected a para-profession rather than the medical profession itself. 
Arguably the cancer services initiative impacted most directly on the medical profession. 
Significant gains were made, but the initial strategy of persuasion and appeals to clinical 
governance was ineffective and, only when a direct threat to reimbursement to the provider 
was utilised was there movement from non-accredited hospitals and consultants. This 
initiative consumed substantial resources, and Bupa has not repeated anything similar in a 
major acute specialty since the gynaecological cancer network.
Regardless o f the fate of particular schemes, Bupa remains the insurer most closely 
associated with the promotion of clinical quality in private healthcare. Other insurers and the 
provider community appear prepared to rely on more traditional notions o f healthcare quality 
in private care associated with access, aesthetics and patient choice.
The perceived quality differential between private hospitals and the NHS has long been one 
of the main selling points for PMI. Whether the prominence given to NHS quality in the 
Darzi Report’(Lord Darzi of Denham, 2008) will change the situation by closing the quality 
gap with the private sector is an open question. The quality agenda now has a more 
significant place in NHS thinking and reporting than previously, and it is certainly the case 
that the public sector now reports on a wider range o f quality indicators than the private 
sector. However, one may suspect that ‘quality scandals’ such as Mid Staffordshire (Health 
Care Commission, 2009) and Tunbridge Wells (Health Care Commission, 2007) leave a 
deeper impression in the public mind than any number o f routinely reported NHS quality 
measures.
So far the private sector has avoided adverse events and bad publicity on anything like that 
scale, and without such disasters its present public image of ‘higher quality’ is likely to 
remain. As was seen in chapters 6 and 7, the belief that private healthcare provides higher- 
quality care in the UK is not supported in any comparative studies on outcomes or even 
waiting times (as no research exists). The available evidence of satisfaction with private
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health care comes from high approval ratings in patient surveys on questions such as the 
quality of the food, decor, etcetera, and whether the consultant, nursing and other staff were 
friendly and attentive to the patient’s needs. These are quality criteria o f a kind and are 
important, but the absence of clinical outcomes data makes an objective comparison between 
the two sectors difficult.
As noted in Chapter 6, the NHS is currently doing more to promote outcome reporting 
(through PROMS) than the UK private sector, and is starting to enforce minimum volumes 
for a number o f surgical procedures in cancer and vascular surgery (although not yet for hip 
and knee replacements). Bupa initially led the way with its cancer networks for breast bowel 
and gynaecological cancers but dropped its proposals for minimum volumes in hip and knee 
surgery and has yet to reinstate them. The other insurers have made no attempt to follow 
Bupa’s lead in this area.
Opposition of Healthcare Providers to Reform
An often-reported characteristic o f incumbent health care providers and especially physicians 
-  whether in the public or private sectors, and regardless o f geography -  is their suspicion of, 
and general opposition to almost any changes to the status quo. This thesis has provided 
substantial further evidence to support this general observation.
The struggle between the state and the medical profession for control o f the health service 
had previously been well documented (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Freddi and Bjorkman, 
1988; Scrivens, 1988; Wolinsky, 1993; Ferlie, 1997). Many of the reforms introduced by 
governments have commonly been conceptualised as undermining professional autonomy 
and self regulation. This thesis provided an opportunity to view the same dynamic unfolding 
in the UK private sector. Chapter 1 noted that the ability o f the medical profession to exert 
collective resistance to attempted reform rests partly on its monopolistic control over supply 
(Kessel,1958, Freidson, 1970a; Miller, 1992; Herrick and Goodman, 2007), but also on the 
profession’s demonstration of a ‘knowledge mandate’ (Halliday, 1987) and its cultural 
authority (Starr, 1982). From the evidence of this study, these points apply equally whether 
the body attempting the reform is government, NHS managers or private insurer.
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This thesis provides further evidence o f the strength of professional resistance. In that 
respect it is worth considering that Bupa’s nervousness as to the clinicians’ reactions to their 
various initiatives had two foundations. One was the negative impact of de facto  clinical 
embargoes which -  if  realised -  would create problems for Bupa’s customers in accessing 
services. The second was the negative impact on Bupa customers’ perceptions on the 
company o f a public dispute with doctors.
Insurers seeking to change market conditions must have a strategy not only to nullify 
provider attempts to determine prices but also to tackle professional resistance to challenges 
to their knowledge mandate. As noted earlier, the locus of such resistance is not just 
individual consultants, but the representative professional organisations. When the author was 
at Bupa the approach with regard to the latter issue was rooted in an attempt to engage 
professional representatives in a rational discourse on the merits o f Bupa’s initiatives -  such 
as minimum volumes for hip and knee surgery by citing supporting clinical studies. 
Subsequent events, as described in this thesis have shown that this strategy did not work.
There are a number o f reasons why professional bodies such as the BOA and organisations 
such as the BMA and FIPO were unlikely to abandon their opposition to Bupa’s proposals. 
Aside from economic self-interest they were also aware that a number of those initiatives 
were direct assaults o f the medical profession’s knowledge mandate -  a key source of 
doctor’s considerable influence and economic bargaining power -  and to be protected 
accordingly.
Much of both public and private health care ‘reform’ can be understood as attempts to 
increase control and bring doctors under a common framework of accountability, and are 
typically considered important to the ongoing project of reducing (or at least controlling) 
costs. Direct assaults on both the ‘knowledge mandate’ and the centrality of doctor/patient 
trust have proved problematic which is one reason why attempts have been made to dilute 
their importance through increasing the supply of potential providers (ISTC’s being the 
clearest example o f this). Bupa were late converts to this approach appearing to have 
concerns about the possible degradation o f key elements of the Bupa ‘brand’. Although the 
creation of networks appears to have the opposite outcome -  in that the number of providers 
typically reduces -  the viability o f networks actually depends on a starting position of over-
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supply of the service in question. Encouraging new entrants into the market makes the 
establishment o f networks offering lower prices more feasible.
As has been repeatedly demonstrated in the chapters charting Bupa’s attempts to implement 
quality and contracting initiatives, the extent of provider opposition has sorely tested the 
resolve and power o f the leading UK insurer to engineer significant change in the market.
The jury remains very much out on whether Bupa has either the determination or the means 
to see through its initiatives in these areas. If Bupa cannot do so, it is unlikely that a smaller 
insurer will attempt anything similar in terms of national networks. From the author’s 
experience, the prevailing view of managers in many of the key organisations is that such 
efforts will not bring sufficient reward in terms o f market share and/or increased profitability 
to justify the risk of being the first mover.
The first mover problem has been a major issue for Bupa. The gains from reform appear long 
term and uncertain, whilst the costs are highly visible and much more immediate. Moreover 
it is far from clear that the UK private ‘market’ either requires or will reward such behaviour. 
It was noted in the thesis that in addition to its market share Bupa had a corporate structure 
that potentially made it better placed to see through long-term policies. As noted in Chapter 
2, Bupa has no shareholders but is overseen by the board and 100 ‘members’ who have no 
direct economic interest in the company. Surpluses are reinvested in the business. This 
allows Bupa considerably more latitude in planning a long-term business strategy than would 
normally be found in publicly quoted companies. In short, it would be expected that senior 
executives can more readily take the Tong view’ and see this through.
However, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, there are good reasons to believe that the strategic 
interests o f Bupa Group’s Board lie as much in developing Bupa’s international interests as in 
‘reforming’ the domestic private health care market. The share o f total revenues and profits 
attributable to international operations has seen rapid growth over the last decade such that 
the UK component now represents less than 50% of overall profits. The decision in April 
2007 by Bupa to put all its UK hospitals up for sale was evidence that the company believed 
its long-term future was best served by reducing its dependence on the UK private health 
market. Although UK hospitals accounted for 11% of Bupa’s revenues and around 12% of 
profits, hospitals are capital-intensive operations to maintain. We have seen that the hospital 
sector has been facing a period of uncertainty and change, largely as a result o f government
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reforms to the NHS. Selling Bupa hospitals raised considerable monies that could either be 
invested abroad, or in a further significant expansion of the UK care home sector. Some 
commentators believe that Bupa’s long-term goal may be to become a medical research 
charity along the lines of the Wellcome Trust (Waples and O’Connell, 2007).
This author believes that the former options are more likely than the latter, and that ultimately 
an attempt to turn Bupa into a publicly-listed company remains a distinct possibility. In such 
an environment, the role o f UK Membership will most likely be to continue to serve as a 
brand ‘standard bearer’ and generate profits for the Group. Such a strategy would make any 
radical action that threatens to undermine either objective unlikely. Certainly Bupa cannot be 
accused o f rushing implementation o f any of the controversial policies described. Indeed, the 
thesis has underlined how slow and piecemeal reform of the UK private health care sector has 
been to date. To cite but one example -  the ophthalmology network -  a gestation period of 
the best part o f ten years is considerably in excess o f the entire product cycle of some 
industries.
Investment of time and resources on that scale throws up obvious questions about whether the 
benefit justifies the cost. The ophthalmology initiative has to date produced only a part 
network for cataracts, so that some Bupa members continue to use providers charging above 
network reimbursement rates. From the standpoint of Bupa managers, the important question 
with regard to this is not so much the time it took to get to this point, or that it consists only 
o f one part of one specialty, but whether the network will have a positive domino effect on 
other specialties, in terms o f their pricing and quality. If the network changes provider 
behaviour and makes subsequent specialty networks/initiatives quicker and cheaper to 
implement, managers would judge that the investment had been justified.
This looks an unlikely outcome. The more general view within the industry is likely to be 
that the initiative has been costly, its impact limited and that new network initiatives will be 
undermined by professional resistance. Crucially many see the existing ‘business model’ as 
being viable for the foreseeable future. To managers of this more conventional mindset,
Bupa initiatives are not just an irritant, but illogical and unnecessary disruptions to a UK PMI 
market that continues to generate good profits.
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Limitations of the Study
The main limitations of the study arise from the scope of the evidence assembled, and certain 
restrictions on the presentation o f data arising from the history of the project, the author’s 
position and problems of research ethics and commercial confidentiality. It is also worth 
mentioning the timing of completion of the thesis and the uncertainties that arise because the 
implications of important NHS reforms now underway are not yet clear.
Although some wider contextual data was presented, the main empirical contribution of the 
thesis relates to developments initiated by Bupa, and specifically UKM. Bupa is the largest 
UK private insurer with a dominant position in the PMI market, but it clearly does not 
constitute the entire UK PMI industry. Additionally, the author was a participant in many of 
the events described and, although attempts have been made to minimise bias, readers should 
bear in mind that he was very much in the insurer camp in transactions with hospital 
providers and consultants. Arguably the present study leans more towards the purchaser, as 
opposed to the provider view.
There is therefore obvious scope for further studies that flesh out the account of the UK 
private sector market. Future research could describe in more detail the different approaches, 
relationships and interactions between the major insurers, as well as the hospital groups, and 
their strategies and positions in the UK private market. For the reasons given in Chapter 1 
when discussing methodology, such studies would face considerable challenges in terms of 
access and co-operation, and the author doubts that this gap will be filled quickly.
The problem of setting limits on the data presented is a difficult one for the author, and more 
than a merely academic issue in terms o f possible risks to personal relationships, to the 
organisation studied, and ultimately to the author - in the event that the information disclosed 
could be shown to have damaging consequences for Bupa. Undoubtedly, a more conventional 
ethnographic study would provide more vivid and colourful insights into the internal 
workings o f the insurer, as well as the inside story on some of the events reported. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, there were issues of ethics, personal trust and commercial 
confidentiality that ruled out that option. Unfortunately the risks would have been too great.
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Although presenting a more limited picture o f events, the account offered in the thesis 
nevertheless describes the main factors influencing major Bupa initiatives and gives a good 
sense of the dynamics of the PMI market. It provides an imperfect, but still useful, view into 
a black box that otherwise would remain un-researched.
As the thesis was being completed, a further major round o f NHS reform awaits 
implementation, which in the view o f some commentators will mark the most fundamental 
change in the NHS since 1948. The changes in NHS commissioning arrangements 
foreshadowed, as well as continued support for provider pluralism and a greater focus on 
quality, suggest that the NHS reforms will have consequences for the UK PMI market, but it 
is still too early to say exactly what these will be. The conclusions o f the present study may 
therefore need some updating as the mist lifts from the new landscape o f British healthcare.
Forces for Change
As noted throughout this thesis the UK private sector has a strong operating presumption in 
favour o f maintaining the status quo, both in terms of a stable customer proposition and with 
regard to provider opposition to any downward pressure on reimbursement rates or the terms 
with which it does business. The consultant organisations in particular are also opposed to 
any increased role for insurers in terms o f accreditation, quality assurance or utilisation 
review. Perhaps correctly, they see it as the attempted imposition o f elements o f the managed 
care approach developed in the United States. Foubister and colleagues (2005) noted that 
Bupa’s proposals on hip and knee surgery attempted to combine two core elements o f that 
approach -  the preferred provider concept and utilisation review - and that this helps explain 
the negative response from the profession. This thesis provides substantial further evidence in 
support of that assessment.
One of the characteristics of the private sector has been the durability o f its central business 
model -  both for insurers and providers. The sector has largely continued operating as it 
always has done throughout over two decades o f major NHS reforms. One of the most 
interesting questions at the present time is whether recent developments in the NHS may 
begin to change the private health care sector, and whether quasi-market incentives and levers
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utilised in the NHS may force through some of the changes in behaviour that the Bupa 
initiatives set our to achieve.
In terms of the general impact of NHS reform on the private sector, both hospital groups and 
insurers have adapted. Although the UK private sector’s ability to take advantage o f provider 
opportunities under NHS Choices, or to step forward as expert purchasers supporting NHS 
commissioners, has been hampered by the niche-market history o f the British PMI sector, 
some organisations are beginning to re-position themselves to take advantage of such 
opportunities. BMI’s creation of a separate division for NHS patients, Nuffield’s T1 to T3 
pricing model, Ramsey Healthcare’s expansion o f NHS work to provide 30 percent o f its 
income (Davies, 2010), and Bupa’s attempt to capture some of the treatment centre market 
are significant examples. This is happening at a time when the volume of corporate health 
insurance business is threatened by economic recession, and when some corporate buyers are 
seeking to cut costs via competitive procurement exercises (Davies, 2010).
However, for the substantial bulk of PMI business, the essential dynamics and drivers remain 
unchanged. BMI, the largest hospital group, still derives ninety per cent of its income from 
private sector sources (Davies, 2010). This means that what worked in the 1980s is still 
working in the first decade of the 21st century. Private health care in the UK remains a luxury 
product with a market characteristic defined by the way private health care is viewed by its 
recipients. A recent editorial in Health Market News captured that essence when it stated 
that:
‘ if private health care was food, Harrods food halls would be popping up in every
town in the country’ (Davies, 2009).
With regard to the impact of NHS reform on the regulatory environment and the framework 
of standards in which private healthcare must operate, some significant changes may be 
underway. As was described in Chapter 7, several recent innovations in US private 
healthcare have come about as a result o f the requirements o f the accreditation agencies or 
CMS, so that it is the regulatory bodies rather than the market that is driving change. In the 
UK context, the role of CQC after the next round o f NHS reform (post-2010 White Paper) 
and the further development o f the Darzi quality agenda via development of quality reporting 
and contractual quality incentives within the NHS may be expected to have a knock-on effect 
for the private sector.
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Overall, the experience of use o f market forces in private health care offers mixed lessons for 
policy makers. The evidence from both the USA and the UK is that market forces will 
actively promote and deliver certain quality measures that are valued by customers, but that 
these are not generally related to clinical outcomes. Purchaser attempts to use buying power 
to change provider behaviour have very often failed. Against this, the successful initiatives 
that have been undertaken suggest that - when purchasers provide clear signals and 
incentives, and engage effectively with obstacles such as professional opposition - changes in 
provider behaviour can be secured. What the UK PMI market as a whole is unlikely to do is 
to lead the quality agenda beyond traditional quality concerns. The existing market dynamic 
is not set to develop sophisticated quality criteria and innovative ‘products’ that exploit 
them, in the way, say that the market for computing software does. Rather it has displayed a 
marked tendency towards an equilibrium whereby those wishing to pursue additional quality 
criteria either have to move beyond the conventional wisdom of the market place (as arguably 
Bupa tried to do with orthopaedic minimum volumes) or sit outside the market -  as 
government does.
One particular focus of interest for policy makers is likely to be whether the UK private 
sector can provide commissioning expertise for GP consortia in the post-White Paper reform 
NHS. The reforms look set to open the way for consortia to buy in commissioning support, 
perhaps by subcontracting specific tasks such as procurement, contracting, or strategic 
planning to external agencies (BMA, 2010). Some commercial companies such as Assura 
Medical (2010) are already marketing support services in this area. It may be that private 
companies will quite rapidly develop expertise in this field, but based on the evidence 
presented in this thesis the main established purchasers in the UK PMI market are starting 
from a low base -  arising from the special nature of that niche market. Policy makers should 
therefore be cautious about assuming the competence of private sector players in this field, 
and may find that a reconfiguration o f existing NHS expertise carries fewer risks.
This thesis has sought to explain the way the UK private sector operates and, in doing so, to 
explain how this particular health care market operates. Though the current environment is 
characterised by monopolistic competition, with a large degree o f shared provider control 
over price, a market of a kind operates in private health care in the UK. Indeed it is a lightly- 
regulated market by both European and US standards. Nevertheless it is largely an
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indifferent performer in terms of the value and quality provided. From the evidence presented 
in this thesis, that is unlikely to change in the near future.
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Appendix 1
FRAMEWORK FOR PROCURING EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
FOR COMMISSIONERS (FESC)
FESC is a means that NHS organisations (effectively PCT’s and SHA's) can use to bring in 
support for their commissioning activities, using independent organisations with pre-assessed 
skills in different aspects o f the commissioning cycle.
FESC is one tool that the NHS can use to help address gaps in their commissioning capability 
or capacity and is the result of Department o f Health concern as to the current ability o f NHS 
organisations to deliver ‘World Class Commissioning’.
The FESC frame work itself attempts to bring two key benefits to the NHS:
i. FESC removes the need for PCT’s to undertake a lengthy and costly public procurement;
ii. FESC offers a package o f components that not only ensures that governance requirements are 
met but also provides greater assurance o f value for money.
The suppliers currently on the FESC framework are:
Aetna UK;
AXA PPP Healthcare;
BupaHealth Dialog (Note: Bupa purchased the US firm HealthDialog in December 2007 for 
£310million);
CHKS;
Dr Foster Intelligence;
Humana Europe UK;
KPMG LLP;
McKesson;
McKinsey and Co. Inc.;
Navigant;
Tribal Health Commissioning;
United Health (Europe) Ltd.;
WG Consulting
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Appendix 2
Association of Independent Radiologists 2005 Survey
Yes No Don't Know
Do you think it appropriate that an insurance 
com pany should be involved in clinical
issues? 8% 86%
Do you think it appropriate that an insurer
should become a regulator o f  radiologists? 4%  96%
Do you believe that the present Bupa
Insurance MRI Tender initiative is based
more on cost considerations rather than
quality considerations? 90%  4%
Do you think that Bupa Insurance policies, if 
implemented, could affect patient care? 93%  2%
Do you think if implemented. Bupa
Insurance 's  proposals could damage the direct
relationship between the referring consultant
and the radiologist? 94%  2%
Do you think that the Bupa Insurance
initiative could adversely affect patient
choice? 93%  2%
Would you agree to take part in an audit o f
your immediate colleague 's  work on behalf o f
Bupa Insurance? 10% 75%
Would you be prepared to audit the work o f
colleagues in other hospitals or facilities on
behalf  o f  Bupa Insurance? 12% 72%
Would you agree to have your audit data 
included in to a professionally led and
nationally agreed and confidential project? 69%  15%
Do you think that the Bupa Insurance MRI
tender could lead to conflict between
radiologists and independent hospital
providers? 92% 2%
Do you believe that the Bupa Insurance MRI 
tender arrangements would ultimately lead to 
progressively lower radiological fees? 96%  0%
Do you overall support the concept o f  MRI 
tendering as proposed by Bupa Insurance? 3% 95%
6%
0%
6%
5%
4%
5%
15%
16%
16%
6%
4%
2%
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Appendix 3
Bupa process for determining whether diagnosis /procedures for back pain would be 
funded as set out in ‘Evidence-based approach to back pain \
Diagnostic Procedures for Back Pain
Pre-authorisation by Bupa Back Pain 
Team Not Required
Plain x-ray (Note: normally NOT required 
unless there are Red Flags, including trauma) 
CT Scan 
MRI
Myelography 
Injections (diagnostic) -  facet joint
Pre-authorisation by Bupa Back Pain 
Team Required
Second MRI, CT, myelogram (within 12- 
months)
Second diagnostic injections -  facet joint
Not Funded* Sacroiliac joint arthrography
Interventions/Treatments for Back Pain
Pre-authorisation by Bupa Back Pain 
Team Never required
Manual/Physio-Therapy (including spinal 
manipulation) (NB Max 8 per year)
Pre-authorisation by Bupa Back Pain 
Team Not Required for patients with 
documented Nerve Root Pain, Cauda 
Equina Syndrome, or who is being 
investigated for Red Flags
Where clinically indicated the following may 
be used:
Epidural injections (Max 3)
Facet joint injections (Max 3)
Trigger Point injections/Dry Needling (Max
3)
Sacroiliac joint injections (Max 3)
Pre-authorisation by Bupa Back Pain 
Team Required in all cases
Back Pain/Functional Restoration 
Programmes
RF facet denervation 
Manual/Physio-Therapy (including spinal 
manipulation) >8 Treatments within 12-months
Pre-authorisation Required 
for simple backache
Epidural injections (> 3)
Facet joint injections (> 3)
Trigger Point injections/Dry Needling (> 3) 
Sacroiliac joint injections (>3)
Not Funded * Acupuncture (currently no supporting 
evidence for use in back pain)
Bed Rest
Biofeedback (electromyographic -  EMG) 
Corsets/back belts
Transdermal drug delivery systems (e.g. 
Duragesic, Transtec), outpatient drugs are not 
funded
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Exercise equipment
Hyaluronic acid (SynVisc, Hyalgan,
Supartz)
Hydrotherapy
Indwelling epidural (Racz) catheter
Intradiscal electrothermal treatment (IDET)
Lumbar extenders
Magnetic therapy
Manipulation under anaesthesia/sedation
(MUA, includes “nerve stretching”, “neural
mobilization”
Plaster jackets
Prolotherapy
TENS -(Transcutaneous electrical nerve
stimulator)
Therapeutic beds, pillows and cushions
Traction
Traction with bed rest
VAX-D (Vertebral Axial Decompression)
* Procedures/Treatments of potential benefit may be funded if the member is taking part in a 
recognised and ethically approved clinical trial. Authorisation by the Bupa Back Pain Team is 
required.
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Appendix 4
Fusion (Arthrodesis)
Fusion of the interdiscal space following decompression may be done to provide support to 
an unstable area. Spinal fusion surgery is designed to stop the motion at a painful vertebral 
segment, which in turn should decrease pain generated from the joint. All spinal fusion 
surgery involves adding bone graft to an area of the spine to set up a biological response that 
causes the bone graft to grow between the two vertebral elements and thereby stop the motion 
at that segment. At each level in the spine, there is a disc space in the front and paired facet 
joints in the back. Working together, these structures define a motion segment and permit 
multiple degrees of motion. Two vertebral segments need to be fused to stop the motion at 
one segment, so that an L4-L5 (lumbar segment 4 and lumbar segment 5) spinal fusion is 
actually a one-level spinal fusion. Current information suggests that a lumbar spinal fusion is 
most effective for those conditions involving only one vertebral segment. Most patients will 
not notice any limitation in motion after a one-level fusion. When necessary, fusing two 
segments of the spine may be a reasonable option. However, spinal fusion of more than two 
segments is less likely to provide pain relief because it removes too much o f the normal 
motion in the back and places too much stress across the remaining joints. There are several 
types of spinal fusion techniques including posterolateral gutter fusion, posterior lumbar 
interbody fusion (PLIF), anterior lumbar interbody fusion (ALIF), and anterior/posterior 
spinal fusion. Spinal fusion of any type is generally performed when well-defined instabilities 
have been identified, in patients undergoing laminectomy and have spondylolisthesis, or 
patients with adult scoliosis. Controversy exists as to indications for fusion in cases o f painful 
motion segments of discogenic origin. Pedicle screws, spine cages, wires, and other 
instrumentation used as an adjunct to fusion is often recommended when the affected area 
shows evidence o f instability or has had additional destabilising procedures, such as a 
discectomy or facetectomy. Spinal fusion is generally not necessary for a routine 
decompressive laminectomy for lumbar stenosis.
During recent decades surgical fusion of the lumbar spine has been performed increasingly 
on patients whose pain is of unknown etiology. There are several types of spinal fusion 
techniques including posterolateral gutter fusion, posterior lumbar interbody fusion (PLIF),
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anterior lumbar interbody fusion (ALIF), and anterior/posterior spinal fusion. Until very 
recently it was commonly observed that “the lack of a randomised, prospective study and 
difficulty in comparing outcomes between studies has made it difficult to draw {conclusions} 
from the literature” about the effectiveness o f intervertebral body fusion devices. However, a 
recent RCT which compared three types of lumbar fusion with conservative therapy 
concluded that “lumbar fusion in a well-informed and selected group of patients with severe 
CLBP can diminish pain and decrease disability more efficiently than commonly used non- 
surgical treatment”. The same researchers reported that there was no difference in outcomes 
between the different types of fusion techniques. Another recent RCT compared lumbar 
fusion with “cognitive intervention and exercises” in a group o f 64 patients with CLBP and 
disc degeneration, and found no significant differences in outcomes between the two groups.
Safety
Note: there are many methods o f achieving spinal fusion, and these vary enormously in their 
complexity, degree of risk, and potential for complications. The technique is always to be 
selected by the surgeon. However, Bupa suggests that current information indicates that 
uninstrumented posterolateral fusion is the safest method.
Bupa Policy
Fusion (arthrodesis), lumbar spinal fusion is funded when the following criteria are met.
Indications are for all patients:
• >3 months of appropriate conservative therapy such as physiotherapy, NSAIDs, other 
manual therapy such as manipulation or mobilisation, facet or epidural injections;
• Surgeon must evaluate patient on at least 2 occasions;
• Clinical psychological or psychiatric evaluation is recommended to identify any 
possible risk factors for poor outcome, or barriers to recovery following lumbar fusion 
surgery.
• In addition, patients with no prior spinal surgery should also have one of:
• Mechanical (non-radicular) low back pain with instability;
• Spondylolysthesis with objective symptoms/signs of neurogenic claudication or of 
unilateral or bilateral radiculopathy symptoms/signs corroborated by neurologic 
examination and by MRI or CT (with or without myelography) or with instability.
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In addition, patients with prior spinal surgery (Laminectomy, Discectomy, or other 
Decompression Procedure) should have one of:
• Mechanical (non-radicular) low back pain with instability;
• Mechanical (non-radicular) low back pain with pseudospondylolisthesis, rotational 
deformity or other condition leading to progressive (measurable) deformity;
• Objective signs o f neurogenic claudication or bilateral lumbar radiculopathy, confirmed 
by MRI or CT/myelography and by detailed clinical neurological examination or 
neurological/neurosurgical consultation.
In addition, patients with prior spinal surgery (Lumbar fusion at the same level) should have 
one of:
• Objective evidence (e.g. CT) of pseudoarthrosis;
• Objective signs o f neurologic claudication or bilateral lumbar radiculopathy, confirmed 
by MRI or CT/myelography and by detailed clinical neurological examination or 
neurological/neurosurgical consultation.
In addition, patients with prior spinal surgery (Lumbar fusion at an adjacent level) should 
have one of:
• Mechanical (non-radicular) low back pain with instability;
• Spondylolysthesis with objective symptoms/signs of neurogenic claudication or of 
unilateral or bilateral radiculopathy symptoms/signs corroborated by neurologic 
examination and by MRI or CT (with or without myelography) or with instability.
Instability o f the lumbar segment is defined as at least 4mm of anterior/posterior translation at 
L3-4 and L4-5, or 5mm of translation at L5-S1 or 11 degrees greater end plate angular 
change at a single level compared to an adjacent level on adequate flexion/extension films. 
Bupa acknowledges that the diagnosis of instability is imperfect.
Contraindications. The relative contraindications for Lumbar Fusion include the following:
• Severe physical deconditioning;
• Current smoking;
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• Multiple level degenerative disease of the lumbar spine;
• Obesity (> 120% of ideal body weight);
• >12 months off work, not engaged in usual productive activities;
• If prior spine surgery, then no evidence of functional recovery (such as return to work) for 
>6 months following most recent spine surgery;
• Psychosocial factors correlated with poor outcome such as:
- History of substance abuse;
- High somatic focus on evaluation;
- History o f major psychiatric disorder prior to injury/onset.
Limitations. Lumbar fusion is not indicated with an initial laminectomy/discectomy related to 
unilateral compression of a lumbar nerve root.
Provocative discography, diagnostic facet joint injections, and pain relief during the use o f a 
rigid spinal brace are not definitive indications for fusion
All patients should be supplied with the following information:
• The chance of returning to work following a fusion is about 1 in 3;
• More than half people who undergo fusions feel no better or worse;
• Overall rate of re-operation for fusions is about 20% within 2 years;
• Smoking at the time of fusion greatly increase risk of pseudoarthrosis;
• Pain relief, even when present, is unlikely to be complete.
23 2
Appendix 5
Funding matrix in ‘Evidence-Based Approach for Lumbar Surgery and Invasive 
Procedures’.
Diagnostic Procedures
Pre-authorisation*** by Bupa Back 
Pain Team Not Required
Plain x-ray (Note: normally NOT required 
unless there are Red Flags, including trauma) 
CT Scan 
MRI
Myelography
Injections (diagnostic) -  facet joint, S-I 
joint**
Pre-authorisation*** by Bupa Back 
Pain Team Required
Second MRI, CT, myelogram (within 12- 
months)
Second diagnostic injections -  facet joint
Not Funded*
Notes
* Procedures/Treatments of potential benefit may be funded if the member is taking part in a 
recognised and ethically approved clinical trial. Authorisation by the Bupa Back Pain Team is 
required.
** Diagnostic Injections to the facet/ zygapophyseal joint was previously incorporated in the 
Bupa document (August 2002) entitled Evidence Based Approach to Back Pain1. For policy 
details see the document Bupa Policy Summary (August 2002) Diagnostic Facet Joint 
Injections fo r  Low Back Pain , and Diagnostic S-I Joint Injections fo r  Low Back Pain.
*** For the purposes of this document “pre-authorisation” means referral to the Bupa Back 
Pain Team for authorisation of funding.
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Lumbar Surgery and Proce<dures for Lumbar Spine
Pre-authorisation*** by Bupa Back 
Pain Team Not Required
Decompression (entrapment of single 
lumbar nerve root/roots)
Pre-authorisation*** by Bupa Back 
Pain Team Required
Chymopapain chemonucleolysis (CNL) 
Fusion (arthrodesis)
Laser-assisted disc decompression 
Pedicle screws for spinal fixation 
Percutaneous lumbar discectomy 
RF facet denervation**
Not Funded* Endoscopic anterior spinal surgery 
Endoscopic spinal surgery 
Epiduroscopy
Implantable/intrathecal infusion pumps 
Indwelling epidural catheter 
Intradiscal electrothermal 
therapy/annuloplasty (IDET)
Kyphoplasty 
Sacroiliac fusion 
Spinal cord stimulators 
Vertebroplasty
Notes
* Procedures/Treatments of potential benefit may be funded if the member is taking part in a 
recognised and ethically approved clinical trial. Authorisation by the Bupa Back Pain Team is 
required.
**Radiofrequency Facet Denervation was previously incorporated in the Bupa document 
(August 2002) entitled Evidence Based Approach to BackPainK  For policy details see the 
document Bupa Policy Summary (August 2002) Radio Frequency Denervation Procedures 
fo r  Low Back Pain .
*** For the purposes of this document “pre-authorisation” means referral to the Bupa Back 
Pain Team for authorisation of funding.
New technology: Bupa will continue policy development about new surgical technologies. 
This includes procedures such as disc replacement with prostheses, and products such as 
artificial bone graft materials. These techniques and procedures are not currently funded.
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Where interventions were no longer going to be funded an extended rational was given. As 
example is shown below:
Endoscopic Anterior Spinal Surgery
Anterior endoscopic spine surgery has been described as feasible and promising (Assaker, 
Clinquin, Cotton and Lejeune, 2001) and (Assaker, Reyns, Pertruzon and Lejeune, 2001). It 
has been suggested that the anterior endoscopic approach to the lumbar spine involves minor 
trauma, results in rapid recovery and less pain, and produces good results aesthetically. 
(Burgos, Rapariz, Gonzalez-Herranz, 1998). For this reason, some believe that the 
endoscopic approach to anterior spinal reconstructive surgery has advantages over open 
approaches. Although the endoscopic approach does appear to be technically feasible, 
probably with immediate complication rates similar to open procedures, there are no studies 
available of anterior endoscopic spinal surgery that compares this procedure with an open 
approach. Furthermore, there is no data yet available on long-term outcomes. Therefore this 
procedure is considered to be still under investigation since there are no effectiveness studies 
available.
There is currently inadequate evidence to endorse funding for this procedure or its adoption 
into regular clinical practice.
Bupa Policy
Not funded. Bupa may provide funding for patients who are part o f an ethically approved and 
scientifically appropriate clinical trial (such as a randomised controlled trial).
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Appendix 6
Selection of consultant responses to ‘Ensuring High Quality Care in Hip and Knee 
Arthroplasty Surgery \
Surgical volumes is a very vexed question. I  would be against setting minimum volumes, as 
there are so many factors affecting the outcome. The general principle, o f course, is 
correct that the more one does a thing the better one becomes at it. Take however, the case 
of an older surgeon such as myself who has done thousands ofjoint replacements. Volume 
is not likely to be critical factor until my facilities fail. Once one has done three to five 
hundred knee or hip replacements one could be considered to have learned most of the 
tricks, in which case whether you do five or fifty is probably irrelevant. Another factor is 
innate surgical skill.
Surgeon 1
I  think the minimum volumes for hip and knee replacement should be 12 i.e. not less than 
one a month on average.
Surgeon 2
Consultants should be doing at least 10 hip replacements, resurfacings or knee 
replacements a year to treat Bupa members. I f  they do not they are not in practice and are 
not up to date.
Surgeon 5
With regard to the volumes o f surgery done I  think the numbers are ridiculously small 
myself and I  certainly do not believe that somebody who is doing only ten hip replacements 
a year should be considered to be doing any resurfacing...I think it is perfectly reasonable 
to come up with these targets
Surgeon 6
...issues are incredibly controversial but clearly of relevance. In the aviation industry
...you have to maintain currency ... on a regular basis. ... the same arguments can be
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applied to joint replacement or indeed any other type of surgery,..The problem you face 
however is that by limiting numbers and the way you wish to you may be accused of  
restricting practices.
Surgeon 6
With regard to minimum volumes, I  would think that if one includes NHS practice and 
private practice 10 hip replacements and 10 knee replacements are far too low. My 
recommendation therefore would be 50 hip replacements and 50 knee replacements per 
annum based on four-year average of combined NHS/private caseload.
Surgeon 17
These case volumes are not enough. I  would put hip replacement and resurfacing together 
and say about 40 -  50 and the same for knees. The situation is clouded however when you 
look at past experience. A surgeon who has done say 1000 primaries over 1 0 -1 5  years 
will be fine doing just 10, a new consultant who has done perhaps 25 by himself would not.
Surgeon 19
Your suggestion that the surgeon should do a minimum of ten hip and knee replacements 
to be acceptable by Bupa is reasonable, if  anything a little on the low side. The suggestion 
that the surgeon should do ten re-surfacings to be acceptable is, in my view, on the high 
side, and if implemented would encourage some surgeons to broaden their indication for 
hip re-surfacing in order to meet the numbers.
Resurfacing hip surgery has the potential to be a huge disaster ifperformed only 
occasionally-it is difficult to do and requires a certain degree o f experience. Numbers here 
are relevant. I  am not sure 10 per year is enough!
Surgeon 24
The American studies linking volume with best outcomes are in a number of cases flawed 
and quite apart from this apply to a completely different health care system where the 
average Orthopaedist will do a mere handful of joint replacements each year. This does not 
equate with UK practice where Consultants who are involved in both NHS and private 
work such that provided their private work reflects their NHS case mix there is no 
justification in restricting their private surgery. A further flaw with the concept o f volume
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is that an experienced surgeon may have been doing total hip replacement regularly for 10 
or 15 years but as his special interest evolves in the NHS into for example knee surgery, he 
may then do much fewer hip replacements but require a minimal volume to remain skilled 
and perfectly safe to continue to do hip replacements provided o f course that he is using 
the current best practice techniques. Finally, it is inappropriate to consider that when a 
Consultant is assisting a trainee with a certain procedure that this does not count towards 
volume. The idea is ludicrous.
Surgeon 30
The Consultants here at Hospital X  would easily qualify in this respect for hip and knee 
surgery but despite this we would not support the concept of minimum volumes.
Surgeon 30
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Appendix 7
Selection of NHS Quality Indicators
(NHS Information Centre, 2009)
Acute Care
1. CV13 - Acute units with 5/6 key characteristics (continuous physiological monitoring: 
access to scanning within 3 hours o f admission/24 hour brain imaging: policy for 
direct admission from A&E: specialist ward round at least 5 times a week: acute 
stroke protocols/guidelines)
2. CV14 - Acute units with access to scanning for patients with a stroke within 3 hours 
o f admission
3. RA26 - Emergency re-admissions to hospital following aortic aneurysm surgery 
(Timescale: within 28 days of discharge)
4. RA25 - Emergency re-admissions to hospital following cholecystectomy surgery 
(Timescale: within 28 days of discharge)
5. RA18 - Emergency readmissions to hospital within 28 days o f discharge: fractured 
proximal femur
6. RA17 - Emergency readmissions to hospital within 28 days o f discharge: hip 
replacement surgery
7. RA24 - Emergency readmissions to hospital within 28 days o f discharge: 
hysterectomy
8. RA20 - Emergency readmissions to hospital within 28 days o f discharge: stroke
9. CV35 - Percentage o f ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMD patients who 
received primary angioplasty within 120 minutes of call (call to balloon time)
10. CV34 - Percentage of ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) patients who 
received thrombolytic treatment within 60 minutes of call (call to needle time)
11. CV36 - Percentage o f ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMP patients who 
received thrombolytic treatment within 60 minutes of call (call to needle time) PLUS 
percentage of STEM1 patients who received primary angioplasty within 120 minutes 
o f call (call to balloon time)
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12. CV02 - Proportion of stroke patients given a brain scan within 24 hours o f stroke
13. CV06 - Proportion of stroke patients given a swallow screening, visual fields and 
sensory testing within 24 hours of admission (note there are exceptions see details)
14. CV01 - Proportion of stroke patients given Aspirin or alternative e.g. clonidogrel 
within 48 hours o f stroke (secondary prevention)
15. CV10 - Quality stroke care (outcome - reduction in stroke related mortality and
disability)
16. CV20 - Sites offering thrombolysis to stroke patients.
Planned Care
1. PS09 - Alerts - acute trusts compliant with safety standards - Healthcare Commission’s 
Annual Health Check data
2. PS24 - Availability of hand washing facilities
3. HC12 - Bloodstream infections - Central line
4. NRLS 1 - Consistent reporting o f patient safety events reported to the National Reporting
and Learning System fNRLS)
5. PS 13 - Devices (4b) - acute trusts compliant with safety standards - Healthcare 
Commission's Annual Health Check data
6. PS 14 - Devices (4c) - acute trusts compliant with safety standards - Healthcare 
Commission's Annual Health Check data
7. PS11 - Guidance - acute trusts compliant with safety standards - Healthcare 
Commission's Annual Health Check data
8. VSA03 - Incidence of clostridium difficile
9. VSA01 - Incidence of MRSA bacteraemia
10. PS08 - Incidents - acute trusts compliant with safety standards - Healthcare Commission's 
Annual Health Check data
11. PS 12 - Infection - acute trusts compliant with safety standards - Healthcare Commission's 
Annual Health Check data
12. PS 15 - Medicines - acute trusts compliant with safety standards - Healthcare 
Commission's Annual Health Check data
13. NRLS 3 - Rate of patient safety events occurring in trusts that were submitted to the 
Reporting and Learning System (RLS)
14. PS37 - Sickness Absence Rate
24 0
15. HC21 - Surgical site infections - Orthopaedic
16. NRLS 2 -  Timely reporting o f patient safety events reported to the Reporting and 
Learning System (RLS)
Example of detail within quality indicator:
Ref. https://mqi.ic.nhs.uk/IndicatorDefaultView.aspx?ref=3.02.02
Incidence o f MRSA bacteraemia
Library Reference Number/Identifier
VSA01
Subject
NHS Operating Framework - Vital Signs 
Category
National Requirement Tier 1 
Detailed Descriptor
MRSA numbers and rates per 10,000 bed days 
Rationale
This indicator is also a national target.
Definition
Aggregated data for annual periods dating back to April 2001. These comprise reports and 
rates, as well as confidence intervals for the most recent period. The MRSA bacteraemia rate 
per 10,000 bed-days for each Trust is calculated as:
((Number of MRSA bacteraemia reports from that Trust for the time period) divided by 
(average daily bed occupancy multiplied by number o f days in the time period)) multiplied by 
10,000.
The denominator is overnight bed occupancy data, from the KH03 dataset provided by the 
Department o f Health (DH). This is available at 
http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/hospitalactivitv/data requ...
The latest available denominator data are for the financial year 2007/08 (April to March). 
Units
Rate per 10,000 bed days
Coverage
England
241
Source
HCAI Data Capture System 
Calculations/ Formula/ Methodology
Aggregated data for annual periods dating back to April 2001. These comprise reports and 
rates, as well as confidence intervals for the most recent period. The MRSA bacteraemia rate 
per 10,000 bed-days for each Trust is calculated as:
(Number o f MRSA bacteraemia reports from that Trust for the time period) divided by 
(average daily bed occupancy multiplied by number of days in the time period)multiplied by 
10,000
The denominator is overnight bed occupancy data, from the KH03 dataset provided by the 
Department of Health (DH). This is available at 
http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/hospitalactivitv/data requ...
The latest available denominator data are for the financial year 2007/08 (April to March).
Creator / Producer
Health Protection Agency (HPA)
Status 
In use 
Quality
As this is mandatory data we believe that it is ~100% complete. The MRSA indicator also 
has Chief Ex sign-off (at the acute trust level) each month. We also believe that we are 
capturing most (if not all) MRSA bloodstream infections.
Date
2005
Version History
The MRSA indicator is subject to review as the Department of Health (DH) is considering 
new ""objectives"" for MRSA.
Update frequency
Quarterly
Accessibility
This data is available from
http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb C...
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Publisher / Owner
Health Protection Agency (HPA)
Other related Pi's (relation)
WCC 3.03
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Appendix 8
NHS England Standard Contract 2009/10 (DoH 2008d).
Clinical Quality Perform ance Indicators and Consequences
Clinical Quality
Performance
Indicator
Threshold Method of 
Measurement
Consequence per 
breach
M RSA bacteraemia [Insert the 
Provider's  centrally 
set trajectory for 
reduction in 
incidences o f  
MRSA]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
Clostridium difficile [Insert the 
Provider 's  centrally 
set trajectory for 
reduction in 
incidences o f  
Clostridium 
difficile]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
Without prejudice to 
the provisions o f  
paragraph 9 o f  
Schedule 3 Part 1, no 
consequence other 
than the issue o f  an 
Exception Report 
under clause 33.16.2
Services provided
requiring
rectification
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[where the Provider 
provides abortion 
services under this 
A greem ent : 
improving access to 
contraception advice 
and treatment during 
delivery o f  abortion 
services, including 
follow upl
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Others for local 
agreement]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
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P er fo rm a n ce  In d ica to rs and C o n seq u en ces
Performance
Indicator
Threshold Method of 
Measurement
Consequence per 
breach
Provider cancellation 
o f  Elective Care 
operation for non- 
clinical reasons either 
before or after Patient 
admission
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
Provider failure to 
ensure that ‘‘sufficient 
appointm ent slots” are 
made available on the 
Choose and Book 
system
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
4 hour m axim um  wait 
in A & E from arrival to 
admission, transfer or 
discharge (operating 
standard o f  98%)
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
M axim um  wait o f  1 1 
weeks for 
revascularisation
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
M axim um  waiting 
time o f  31 days from 
diagnosis to treatment 
for all cancers 
(operating standard 
98%)
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
M axim um  waiting 
time o f  62 days from 
urgent referral to 
treatment for all 
cancers (operating 
standard o f  95%)
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
2 weeks m axim um  
wait for urgent 
suspected cancer 
referrals from GP to 
first outpatient 
appointment
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
2 weeks m axim um  
wait for rapid access 
chest pain clinic
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
Percentage o f  SUS 
data altered in period 
between (a) 5 
Operational Days after
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
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Performance
Indicator
Threshold Method of 
Measurement
Consequence per 
breach
month-end. and (b) the 
relevant
Reconciliation Point
Satisfaction o f  the 
Provider 's  obligations 
under each 
A & E/A m bulance 
Services Handover 
Plan
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
Satisfaction o f  the 
Provider’s obligations 
under the Mixed Sex 
Accom modation 
Reduction Plan
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Others for local 
agreement]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per local 
determination]
Quality Perform ance Incentive Scheme Indicators and Consequences
CQUIN
Indicator
Threshold Method of 
Measurement
Period of
Activity
Covered
Payment for 
Achievement
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
[Insert as per 
local
determination]
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Appendix 9 Insurer Fee Schedules
The tables below show the fee schedules o f  5 insurers for a variety o f  orthopaedic procedures.
The procedures are shown by their OPCS codes within RVR. All but one is available to the
public on the internet with one only made available to doctors recognised by that insurer. As
a result in the table below the companies are anonymous.
The tables demonstrate four things:
• That reimbursement schedules often differ significantly between the highest and lowest 
paying insurers;
• Differentials between the highest and lowest paying insurers remain generally consistent;
• Insurers are generally consistent in the relative values they assign to particular procedures 
(perhaps as a result o f  RVR). However this correlation is not followed absolutely. For 
example, for procedure W3715 company C pays the highest amount compared to the 
other insurers but does not do so for the other 1 1 procedures;
• Reimbursement to anaesthetists are generally considerably below that paid to surgeons 
and also vary between insurers.
Procedure Fees
£2 ,500 .00
£ 2 ,000.00
£1 ,500 .00
£ 1 ,000.00
£500.00
£0.00 D (b .D 1 mi
C<V <A> kQ> r!5  kO- A> C o  , i o  A  A  / b
&  ^  rA ,A nA rA <A fA< °  4> 4 > 4 > 4 > 4 > 4 > 4 > 4 >
Procedure Code
□  Company A Procedure
□  Company B Procedure
□  Company C Surgeon
■  Company D Procedure
■  Company E Surgeon
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Procedure Fees
£2 ,500 .00  
£ 2 ,000.00 
£1 ,500 .00  
£ 1,000.00 
£500.00  
£0 00
C\V cv> k V k 5  * >  K<b A  A  A  A
4 ?  / / / / / / / / /
Procedure Code
 Company A Procedure
Company B Procedure
 Company C Surgeon
 Company D Procedure
 Company E Surgeon
Anaesthetic Fees
£ 1,200.00 
£ 1,000.00 
£800.00  
£600.00  
£400.00  
£ 200.00 
£0 00
1 I n I I  s i  nn rnJ
iJnMlif nil I fl:
■  Company A A naesthetic
□  Company B A naesthetic
□  Company C A naesthetist
■  Company D A naesthetist
■  Company E A naesthetist
Procedure Code
Anaesthetic Fees
£ 1,200.00 
£ 1,000 00 
£800.00  
£600.00  
£400.00  
£200.00 
£0 00
r\V
& / / / / / / / / ^  
Procedure Code
&
 Company A A naesthetic
Company B A naesthetic
 Company C A naesthetist
 Company D A naesthetist
 Company E A naesthetist
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Appendix 10 Additional Quality Initiatives Undertaken by 
Bupa
This appendix contains information on three additional quality initiatives undertaken by Bupa 
that did not relate to networks or specific condition groups. The information was not 
included in the main text because of the large number o f initiatives already considered. 
However appendix 10 does provide additional background on Bupa’s stance towards quality. 
The initiatives discussed are Bupa’s:
• Patient Satisfaction questionnaire;
• Patient complaints database;
• Supply o f SF 36 and VF14 outcome data from providers.
Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire
Bupa takes member satisfaction seriously but what UKM has historically been most 
concerned to discover with regard to customer perspectives is illuminating.
One o f the central planks o f Bupa’s customer proposition was the delivery o f excellent 
customer service from the UKM’s call centres. Evidence for this (and what is considered 
important to customers) is provided by the customer satisfaction surveys undertaken by 
UKM.
For example an independent survey in 2005 o f 600 members who had made a claim showed a 
satisfaction rating of 95% with 40% stating that they considered the service as ‘excellent’, 
43% ‘very good’ and 12% ‘quite good’ (Bupa, 2005c). O f 200 personal members 
interviewed, 48% rated the claims process ‘excellent’, 32% ‘very good’ and a further 13% 
‘quite good’. In the same survey 96% of personal members interviewed rated ease o f contact 
either ‘excellent’ (47%), ‘very good’ (35%), or ‘quite good’ (14%). This shows a company 
that took care to ensure members were not left waiting on the phone for very long and that 
staff were trained to be polite and competent to deal with most member queries. Some 92% 
of those interviewed, considered Bupa staff to be caring. It is worth bearing in mind that most 
o f these customers’ exposure to Bupa staff would only be through their contact with the call 
centre.
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Such surveys had been undertaken since the 1990s (at least) but there was no questioning as 
to the quality of the clinical care the customer had received. In 2005, UKM introduced a 
systematic process for gauging patient satisfaction, having decided that such reporting was an 
integral part o f demonstrating the company’s commitment to clinical quality and a patient 
centric approach. Until that point, UKM had not been measuring members’ experience o f the 
treatment they received. It was likely that there was an expectation by members that such 
monitoring was already in place. Bupa felt it needed to take active steps to ensure that it was 
able to give members some credible evidence of provider quality. It is understood that to date 
no other insurer has introduced a similar initiative.
The questionnaire was sent to 60,000 members per annum, all o f whom had received hospital 
treatment with 85% of members rating the overall service as excellent or very good. Some 
94% of members said the service met or exceeded their expectations. There were questions 
on the quality o f the food, accommodation and car parking. Moreover, over 84% of members 
rated the hospital as very clean.
The survey also asked some questions related more directly to the clinical care received. Thus 
85% rated the nursing service as either excellent or very good (48% and 37% respectively), 
with 81% also rating nursing staff as either excellent or very good for keeping them informed 
about treatment. Consultants scored even better with 89% rated as excellent or very good for 
listening very carefully, 93% for their general attitude against the same ratings and 91% for 
the level o f information provided (64% excellent/21 % very good). Finally, some 97% would 
recommend the hospital to a friend or relative.
This survey illustrates that questions about quality of service continued to cluster around the 
aesthetics o f the immediate care experience.
Complaints Process
The implementation of a systematic reporting process for recording member complaints took 
place during 2003, primarily in response to the need to conform to tighter regulatory 
requirements from FOS around the recording and resolution of complaints. UKM introduced 
a computerised recording system known as ‘Resolve’ that recorded and tracked all types of
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customer complaints (both clinical and non-clinical). When the author joined the company in 
2001 it did not have a mechanism for systematically recording clinical complaints.
At one level this was o f relatively little consequence as the standard response to clinical (as 
opposed to administrative) complaints was that the member should take the matter up directly 
with the provider. The reasoning behind this was that UKM as an insurer had no real role to 
play in such disputes. Despite this being the standard response within the PMI industry this 
was evidently unsatisfactory at a number o f levels, both from a customer perspective but also 
in terms o f UKM’s quality agenda and its ambitions to be viewed as a broader healthcare 
company. In consequence a more proactive approach was adopted from 2003 onwards. As a 
result UKM had a growing capability to view customer satisfaction and complaint levels at 
hospital level and some ability to pick up trends with regard to consultants. Ironically this 
was partly a direct result o f a FOS regulatory requirement; yet as the thesis has noted FOS 
itself was making judgements that effectively forestalled insurers’ attempts to take a 
proactive role regarding clinical issues.
The use of Outcomes Data
Bupa has a long-standing involvement in the collection of outcomes data. In 2002 Bupa 
Group’s Medical and Associate Medical Director were able to write an article for the British 
Journal o f  Healthcare Management stating that:
‘In 1998, Bupa launched a national programme to routinely monitor clinical outcomes 
using the SF-36 questionnaire within each o f its 35 hospitals and, more recently, 
throughout many of the ‘network’ hospitals recognised by its insurance division. To 
date, over 70 hospitals have joined the programme and the database records the SF-36 
outcomes associated with more than 90,000 elective cases’ (Owen and Cubbin,
2002)..
This begs the question as to what use was being made of that data to influence clinical 
practice and promote quality? At the time of writing the article the authors were able to state 
that 57.8% of eligible patients received and completed the baseline SF-36 questionnaire (VF- 
14 for cataracts) (Owen and Cubbin, 2002, p.413). Significantly, the results at both hospital
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and consultant level were anonymous. This meant that not only are all hospitals anonymous 
as far as UKM was concerned, but also that neither hospitals nor UKM knew the results for 
individual consultants. Individual hospitals receive results for their own organisation, but 
these are not broken down to individual clinician level. The explanation given for this in the 
article was that confidentiality had been assured “to facilitate the development o f trust”
(2002, p.415).
In a section entitled ‘What next? Disseminating results’ the authors asked:
‘Having measured outcomes, how should they be used? The aims are not just to be 
able to identify and investigate potentially poor performance. The system should be 
able to examine and disseminate the lessons from excellent practice’ (Owen and 
Cubbin, 2002, p.415)..
However it is not clear either how poor performance could be investigated or good practice 
disseminated, when the only person knowing the identity of the good or poorly performing 
hospital or consultant was the party in question. This was the same problem highlighted in 
Chapter 6 on outcomes tracking within professional bodies. The point was not lost on UKM 
(who were paying 50% of the cost of the scheme -which in 2002 was reported at 
approximately £3 per patient (Owen and Cubbin, 2002, p.413) - but were receiving 
effectively no information that they could use. Furthermore, despite the upbeat tone o f the 
article, enthusiasm from providers towards the scheme typically ranged from the lukewarm to 
openly hostile. The article acknowledged wide variations in reporting rates between hospitals 
(2002, p.413). Such variations were seen between consultants in the same hospital, hospitals 
in the same group and between groups.
Moreover, because of anonymity one was unable to tell who was, and was not, participating. 
Given that it was likely that those not taking part were the ones that it was most important to 
see outcomes from, the scheme was another illustration o f the flaws in voluntary reporting. In 
the same way, Bupa Hospitals’ participation (perhaps unsurprising given that this was a 
Group Medical sponsored initiative) was not matched by the other major private hospital 
chains. This was unlikely to change unless it was made a contractual requirement to 
participate and this was a step that UKM were unwilling to take. The reasons for not doing so 
are not fully known to the author, but were likely to include a basic calculation that this was
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not an issue worth falling out with providers on. Besides, extending participation would cost 
more money, and the end result remained a series o f anonymous reports of little practical use 
to hospitals, and even less to UKM.
In 2002 the Group Medical Director wrote to the major hospital groups to canvas their views 
on restructuring confidentiality agreements to allow participating hospitals and consultants to 
be identified. This was duly done but one can only speculate that the responses were not 
favourable. The author believes that UKM no longer collects outcome data from providers 
following the sale of Bupa hospitals in 2007. However, it has recommenced a voluntary data 
collection process for Ophthalmology consultants of patient outcome questionnaires.
The second technical obstacle that undermined the entire process was that even if providers 
had fully participated in providing outcome data, the results at consultant level would 
typically only represent a percentage (often small) of their overall workload. Aside from the 
fact that Bupa-insured patients would typically only constitute around 40% of a consultant’s 
insured cases, most of these consultants also hold NHS posts. To be really useful, what was 
(and is) required is an ability to see the outcomes relating to an individual’s entire caseload. 
This also allows sufficient numbers to be generated to allow statistically significant 
comparisons against peers.
To do so requires a degree of public/private co-operation that has historically been lacking in 
the UK. However there are recent signs that this is an area that may be about to gain some 
momentum.
The ‘Operating Framework for the NHS in England 2008/09’ (DoH, 2008a) includes a 
requirement for NHS providers o f hip and knee replacements, groin hernia surgery and 
varicose vein procedures to collect and report patient reported outcomes measures (PROMS) 
from April 2009 (DoH, 2008b).
This framework also set out both generic and condition-specific recommended methodologies 
(Oxford Hip score, Aberdeen varicose vein questionnaire, etcetera). These have subsequently 
become part o f the CQUIN payments system (DoH, 2008c).
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The above represents the first attempt by the DoH to systematically address what the 
document itself acknowledged was a fundamental gap in knowledge -  namely what the 
clinical outcomes o f these services were in terms of the patients’ perception.
i L
On the 16 June 2008 Bupa Group’s Medical Director (Dr Andrew Vallance-Owen) used the 
opportunity o f a speech at the Royal College o f Surgeons to call for the compulsory 
collection o f PROMs data from the private sector. This would allow comparable information 
between the two sectors of patient perceptions of their treatment. In Dr Vallance-Owen’s
opinion “  such a shared database would ensure fair comparisons and true patient choice”
(Bupa Group Press Release 2008c). Such an initiative is necessary if the UK is to achieve 
comprehensive outcome collection and reporting across both sectors but remains unfulfilled. 
In the absence of a compulsory scheme, the private sector has not responded with voluntary 
participation.
Ultimately, the position of the public sector with regard to publishing identifiable outcomes 
data, or perhaps an edict from the CQC, may determine the position o f the private sector. 
However, if that is the case it is o f a market following, not leading, a quality initiative.
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